referred to in the books discussed here. Vygotsky’s thought not only attributes an important role to sociocultural factors in the development of the mind; it also points out the mechanisms through which this role is realized.

Finally, one reads with ever-increasing frequency that many old and new purely scientific and applied problems can be successfully dealt with only through the combined efforts of scientists in different disciplines. Vygotsky’s thought, which is essentially interdisciplinary, combines psychological, linguistic, sociological, and semiotic ideas, and thus opens up attractive perspectives for such efforts.

L. S. VYGOTSKY

[Concrete Human Psychology]

As unpublished manuscript by Vygotsky

For L. S. Vygotsky the end of the 20s was a time of intensive theoretical and experimental work on developing the basic postulates of his cultural-historical theory of the human mind. The relatively calm and, in spite of everything, happy first five years of his life in Moscow, after moving there in 1924 from Gomel,2 lay behind him. This was a period of his development as a psychologist when his work was in the ascendency; when within a few years, this still quite young man was transformed from a provincial teacher, known to no one, into one of the leading and most outstanding figures in young Soviet psychology: a scholar with an inviolable scientific authority, surrounded by a group of young, also talented, and intensively dedicated disciples; a man with a deep awareness of his mission in the development of science, full of ideas, intentions, and plans, most of which, unfortunately, were destined to remain unrealized because of Vygotsky’s premature death. Vygotsky worked all these years rapidly and intensively, so it he had a presentation of his death. One after the other, great works, which today constitute the body of the cultural-historical concept, and have long since become part of the treasures of Soviet and world psychological literature, flowed from his pen. Almost every one of them was prepared by degrees, in preliminary sketches and notes Vygotsky had made mostly for himself, not intending them for print. But even this special “inner speech” of Vygotsky’s is usually in the form of independent, coherent, and sometimes finely finished texts, thanks to his

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N.B.: The word korenya (historical psychology) for me means two things: (1) a general dialectical approach to things—in this sense, everything has its history; this is what Marx meant: the only science is history (Archives, F. XI); natural science = the

history of nature, natural history; (2) history in the strict sense, i.e., human history. The first history is dialectic; the second is historical materialism. In contrast to lower functions, the development of higher functions is governed by historical laws (see the character of the Greeks and our character). The uniqueness of the human mind lies in the fact that both types of history (evolution = history) are united (synthesis) in it. The same is true in child psychology (see 2 lines).3

* * *

A constructive method implies two things: (1) it studies constructions rather than natural structures; (2) it does not analyze, but constructs a process (contra a method of grouping unexpectedlv, analysis, tachistoscope; contra the systematic method of the Wurzburgians). But a cognitive construction in an experiment corresponds to a real construction of the process itself. This is a basic principle.

N.B.: Bergson (see collection by Chelpanov, 109).6 Intelligence ——— Instinct

Tools ——— Organs

Human psychology also deals with homo faber [workman in Latin]. Tools are outside the person: organs are within the person. The essence of intelligence lies in tools. Instinct is a capacity to use and construct organized instruments; intelligence is unorganized. It has its merits and its shortcomings. But constructive psychological activity (will) is something fundamentally new—a synthesis of one or another kind of activity. Because organic structures and functions are constructed in the brain using external, unorganized means, instincts are built. See Utkhonski: the system of neurological functions
is an organ. In this sense, man builds new organs, but organic ones, with the aid of instrumental activity.

Janet (Book 6, P. 425) called the nondistinction of speech from other reactions (adaptations to nature) the greatest illusion. This is Watson's mistake: speech = a motor habit, like swimming and playing golf. But this is precisely not how it is: the problem of verbalized behavior is the central problem in the whole history of the cultural development of the child.

N.B. We know the general law: first a means of acting on others, then on oneself. In this sense, all cultural development has three stages: development in itself, for others, and for oneself (e.g., a demonstrative gesture—at first it is simply a failed grasping movement aimed at an object and designating an action; then, the mother understands it as an instruction; and finally, the child begins to point). See S. Bühler: portrait of a child pointing. This is already for oneself. See Marx: Peter and Paul. We become ourselves through others. In its purely logical form, the essence of the process of cultural development consists precisely in this. Marx: on class. The personality becomes a personality for itself by virtue of the fact that it is in itself, through what it previously showed is itself for others. This is the process of the development of the personality. Hence, it is clear why everything that is internal in higher functions was necessarily once external: i.e., it was for others what today it is for itself. This is the key to the entire process of internal and external. See the problem of internalization in Janet and Kretschmer (Bühler): the transfer of selection, testing from within (yet they still do not notice that selection is done by the personality itself). It is not that externality that we have in mind. For us, it speaks about the external process means to speak of the social. Any higher psychological function was external, this means that it was social; before becoming a function, it was the social relation between two people. The means of acting upon oneself is first a means of acting on others and the action of others on one's personality.

In general form: the relation between higher psychological functions was at one time a physical relation between people.

Piaget: the emergence of dispute = the emergence of verbal thinking. All forms of verbal communication between adult and child later become psychological functions. A general law: Every function appears on the scene twice in the child's cultural development, i.e., on two levels, first the social, and then the psychological, first between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child. Cf.: La loi du décalage [The law of "blocking" or shifting—French in Piaget]. This applies to voluntary attention: memory, etc. This is a law.

Consider: indicating to another, to oneself; the claws of a lynx, to another, to itself; considering a letter is to oneself and to another; to read one's own jottings, to write for oneself, means to relate to oneself as to another, etc. This is a general law for all higher psychological functions.

Of course, the transition from outside to inside transforms the process.

Genetically social relations, real relations between people, involve all higher functions and their relationships. Homo dux: a dual person—Latin. Hence the principal method of personification in the study of cultural functions, i.e., voluntary attention: the one side controls, the other is controlled. "Renewed division into two of what had been fused in one" (Cf.: modern labor), the experimental unfolding of a higher process (voluntary attention) into a small drama. See Poltzer: psychology in terms of drama.

Applied to our topic, the word social has many meanings: (1) the most general—all things cultural are social; (2) a sign or symbol independent of the organism, such as a tool, in a social sense; (3) all higher functions evolve in phylogeny not biologically, but socially; (4) the most general meaning—"the mechanism of such functions is a copy of the social. They are internalized relations of a social order, transferred to the individual personality, the basis of the social structure of the personality. Their composition, genesis, and function (mode of action) in a word, their nature—are social. Even transformed in the personality into relate to myself as people related to me. Reflection is a dispute (Böldi, Piaget): thinking is speech (conversation with oneself); according to Janet, a word was a command for others, imitation, or altering a function led to discrimination of the function from action (3, Pp. 155 ff. [3]). (Paradigm: at first one person cries out and fights, and the other does the same in imitation; then one screams and does not fight, and the other fights, but does not scream: supervisor and subordinate.—Note by Vygotsky.) It is always a command. Hence, it is a principal means for mastery. But why does the word have a voluntary function for us; why does the word subordinate motor reactions to itself? Whence comes the power of the word over an event? From the real function to command? Behind the psychological power of the word over psychological functions stands the real power of a boss and the subordinate. The relation of psychological functions is genetically [developmentally], linked to real relations between people: regulation of the word, verbalized behavior = power submission.

Hence: speech [and Janet's law of verbalization—note by Vygotsky] is a central function, social relation + psychological means. Compare direct and mediated relations among people. Hence digestion: imitation and social division of functions as a mechanism for the modification and transformation of functions.

Hence, Laontso's example of labor: both what the overseer does and what the slave does are combined in one person: this is a mechanism of voluntary attention and labor. Hence the secret of willpower, not muscle or spiritual power, but the resistance of the organism to a command.

Hence, my underestimation of the role of whispering, secrets, and other social functions. I neglected the external fudging away of speech.

Hence, in the case of the child, one can follow step by step this change in oneself, for others, and for oneself in speech functions. First, the word must acquire sense (a relation to things) in itself; (an objective connection; and if it is not there, nothing is there); then the child's mother uses it functionally as a word, and, finally, the child does so.
convergence of cerebral processes, to two forms of nervous activity: (1) dominant (catalyzation), and (2) association corresponding to: (1) indication, intensification, accent, and (2) memory techniques. The following is written between the lines with a pencil: concentration, irradiation—all these have their correlates. By bringing objects (stimuli) closer together, I also bring about a convergence of nervous processes (reactions); I control the most internal processes by acting from outside. What do all the organizations, regulations (Baxin), and structures mean compared with this highest type of control—constructive activity? The nature of voluntary attention and any higher function cannot be derived from individual psychology. Consider the problem of autosuggestion and XYZ. [The reference is to the next page of the manuscript, which has these designations (see below), evidently inserted later.]

A total revision of the neurology of higher processes. The localization of functions, not centers.

N.B.: Bergson: memory is what differentiates spirit from matter. The existence of spirit is necessary in general for any intentional process (orientation toward the past). I do not think the mental aspect of a psychological process is indifferent for it, especially with regard to its relationship to an object, which cannot be compared with anything else; but it is not pure spirit, and, most importantly, this is not what distinguishes motor memory from sensor memory. There are transitional forms, but there are no such transitional forms between spirit and matter. A transitional form is memory techniques. Bergson himself likens the memory of the spirit to a memory technique, and Buhler likens a memory technique to the memory of a chimpanzee. Here is the point: orientation to a specific single instance of memorization can exist, but memory (recollection) cannot. Consider a marker and a motive: I know that there are three mnemonic features, but I do not know what [they mean.] Ergo: direction is a necessary accomplishment to recollection, and an independent component of higher memory (the result of the demonstrative, mediating role of a sign).

![Diagram](image)

N.B.: On the social nature of higher mental functions.

The functions of a word according to Janet were first divided and distributed among people, and then became part of the person. Nothing similar could exist in individual consciousness and behavior. First, the social was derived from individual behavior (the individual responds alone and in a collective, imitation generalizes individual reactions). We derive individual functions from forms of collective life. Development proceeds not toward socialization, but toward individualization of social functions (transformation of social functions into psychological functions—e.g., speech, the social print [sic!] according to manuscript, evidently this should be principle). All psychology of the collective in child development in a new light: it is usually asked how a specific child behaves in a collective. We ask, How does the collective create higher functions in a particular child? Earlier it was assumed that a function exists in the individual in a finished, half-finished, or embryonic form, and that it is exercised, developed, grows more complicated, is enhanced, enriched, inhibited, suppressed, etc., in the collective. Now, a function is first formed in a collective in the form of relations among children; then it becomes a psychological function of the personality. Dispute. Formerly it was thought that every child had thought, and that disputes arose from the clash of these thoughts. Today we say that reasoning is born of dispute. The same is true of all functions [end of sheet XYZ].

Posing the principal problems of collective psychology (child psychology) on this basis: everything is the inverse of what is now done.

See note on page XYZ.

Distinguish between:

A direct and indirect signal from a sign gesture to others. Impossible to relate directly to oneself. Indirectly it is possible. Consequently, initially a sign is placed between an object and a subject as an instrument. Later it is placed between me and my memory. The stimulus-object of an operation is not the object to which the stimulus-instrument is applied: this is the most important differ-

![Diagram](image)

ence between a sign and a tool. The object of application of an instrumental stimulus is the brain (Schema 1):

Construction differs from an instrumental operation (W. W. Kragelsky) written thus in the manuscript, but it evidently shows. An instrument (Buhler’s) (see Collected works, Vol. 2, p. 103, etc.) in that it takes place on two levels and has two objects (Schema 2):

![Diagram](image)

If S1 and S2 are in one person, an operation always has two objects: the brain and the object of a psychological task (to remember, etc.). Essentially this is due to the fact that S1 is not a tool (i.e., it does not act physically) and that a task acts psychologically (not on the object, but on beho. If the object is another’s brain, everything is easy. Things become difficult when the object is one’s own brain.

We must reject the implicit identification of a psychological operation with a motor operation (remembering = grasping).

Thus, an instrumental operation is always a social action on oneself, using the means of social communication, and is fully revealed on a social relationship between two people. Formerly we took into account the object of an operation and the tool. Today we also include the object of the action of a stimulus. The stimulus does not act on the object of an operation. The starting and executive mechanism, the will, is the product of social relations: a command, a condition ("One screams, the other fights"—Janet). Between what and what comes the sign: between man and his brain. It sustains an operation aimed at the object, but it is the object is the operation itself, the nervous process. Thus, at the basis of an instrumental operation lies Peter Paul and Paul combined in one person. The relation between stimulus-object and stimulus-means—this relationship!—psychologically natural and the artificially constructed.

Sociogenesis is the key to higher behavior. We find here the psychological function of the word (not its biological function).

The sociometric method: Antistimulation is a special case (extremely special) of social stimulation: socio-personalism in Janet’s terms (see the function of communication in reasoning: Nature).

Signification: a person creates connections from without, and controls the brain, and through the brain, the body. The internal relation of functions and layers of the brain, as a fundamental regulatory principle in nervous activity, is replaced by social relations independent of the person and in the person (controlling the behavior of another) as a new regulatory principle. But how is the creation of connections and regulatory relations between centers and functions from without at all possible? The answer arises when two factors come together: (1) the mechanism of the conditional reflex (according to Pavlov this is a cerebral mechanism, but according to Holodowski, it is an organ' constructed from without), and (2) the factor of social life, i.e., the change of nature, ego, natural connections, and the interaction of individuals of another order than communication of other objects. Hence, there are three stages: (1) a conditional reflex—a mechanism created from without, but = copy of natural connections, corresponding to passive adaptation; (2) domestic animals (slave?), man himself = domestic animal (Thurnwald);
sive formation of connections from without, (5) active participa-
tion in the firming of connections + autostimulation as a special
case of social stimulation. Consider vocal, semivocal, and mute
instruments—the latter correspond to active adaptation to nature
= i.e., human psychology. The question rests in the personal-
ity. Pavlov compared the nervous system with a telephone net-
work, but the whole uniqueness of human psychology lies in the
fact that the telephone and telephone operator are combined in
him in one being, i.e., the apparatus and the control of that
apparatus by man. Nature controls man through the mechanism
of the conditioned reflex, but natural connections can give rise to
any and all kinds of behavioral connections, except a change in
nature itself. The necessity of labor is not included in natural
connections.

What is a telephone operator (let us eliminate the mechanistic
aspect of comparison and the sign =)? They will say: the soul, the
psyche, and, not coincidentally, a telephone operator. Cf. Searl:
Inn = Masch. in. [engineer + machine]. That’s not it. In
deed, one cannot understand the activity of any nervous apparatus
without man. This brain is a man’s brain. This is the hand of a
man. Herein lies the gist of the matter. For example, a nodal point
is a telephone connection made by the telephone operator. Pavlov’s
idea also pertains to show that what is thought is what is
done by the telephone operator (soul), and by the apparatus
itself (body, brain). Ergo: the telephone operator is not the soul.
But then what? The social personality of a person. A person as a
member of a specific social group. As a definite social unit. As a
being in itself—for others and— for itself. See Lichtenberg et al.
Thoughts occur to me and I think. The problem of the ego: even a
child must say: I (see Piaget). All development consists in the
fact that the development of a function goes from me to I. See
Lévy-Bruhl. I’en rêverai [I shall dream of this]. See above and
later on. See also in Vygotsky’s work: (The development of higher
mental functions. Collected works, Vol. 3., pp. 69 and others).
Indeed, the personality alters the role of individual psychological
functions, systems, layers, and strata, establishing connections
that do not, and cannot, exist in the biology of the individual. It is
not the relation of subcortical centers to cortical centers, but the
social structure of the personality that determines which layers
are to dominate. Cf. A dream and the leader of the Kaffirs:
1. The function of sleep is different in animals.
2. In him (the leader of the Kaffirs) sleep acquired a regulat-
ory function through the social significance of dreams (unex-
plainable difficulty, etc., the beginnings of magic, cause and
effect, animism, etc.); what he sees in his dreams, he will do. This
is a reaction of a person, and not a primitive reaction.
3. The relation of a dream to future behavior (the regulatory
function of sleep) amounts genetically and functionally to a social
function (a wizard, the council of the wise men, an interpreter
of dreams, someone who casts lots—are always divided into two
persons). Then the social function is combined in one person.
The real history of a telephone operator (personality)—in the history
of Peter and Paul (see Marx: [On language and conscious-
ness]) in the transformation of a social relation (between peo-
l) into a psychological relation (within a person). The role of a
name in primitive man, in a child, in — [the sentence breaks off
here in the manuscript].
Most basic is the fact that man not only develops: he also
constructs himself. Constructivism. But contra intellectualism
(i.e., artistic construction) and mechanism (i.e., semantic con-
struction).
The task of psychology is to study the reactions of the personal-
ity, i.e., relations of the same dream = regulatory mechanism.
The role of religion, etc. Every ideology (social) is matched by a
psychological structure of a specific type—but in the sense of
subjective perception and vehicle of ideology, in the sense of the
construction of strata, layers, and functions of the individual
relationships of a structure of interests to the social regulation of
behavior. Cf. (A blank spot is left here in the manuscript. There
are four question marks in the margin.)

It is not thought that thinks: a person thinks. This is the starting

point (in margin) Feuerbach: Deborin—Hegel. XXVI. What
is man? For Hegel, he is a logical subject. For Pavlov, it
is a soma, an organism. For us, man is a social person = an
aggregate of social relations, embodied in an individual (psycho-
logical functions built according to social structure). (In margin)
Man is always consciousness or self-consciousness for Hegel
XXXVII. Let’s go further. The Kaffir could: I’en rêverai, because
he actively sees his dream; we would say: I had a dream. Ergo: there
is both a me and an I in every function, but these are primitive
reactions (passive—personal) and personalities (active—person-
al).

Further, as soon as a person thinks, we ask: What person
(Kaffir, a Roman with an onion = dream, the rationalist Burrow,
the neurotic Freud, an artist, etc. etc.)? The process will be
different, although the laws of thought are the same (see Hove-
ding: the laws of association and thought), depending on in what
person it takes place. Cf. not nature (the cortex, the subcortex,
etc.) but social relations of thought (its role in a specific individ-
ual). Consider the role of sleep. It is not a matter of indifference
who dreams, what person dreams. The following are possible:
(1) I can have a dream with ‘I’ or with ‘me,’ (2) one and the
other will take place differently.
Both must be studied: the basis of concrete psychology—a
relationship of the type: the dream of the Kaffir. Abstract:
relations of the type: dream—abstraction (Freud, Wundt, etc.) of
pleasure stimuli.

(Here, in the idea of the social personality, doubtless lies the
role of the mind. Is a commodity = a suprasensuous thing
(Marx) possible without a mind? The essence of the mind from
a positive standpoint is an intentional relation to an object (from
a negative standpoint, inaccessible to others = internal percep-
tion, nonextension). Deborin: thinking without content is empty.
(Cf. Kant: empty and blind. Consequently, in staying thought we
study a relation to objects.) S. J. XXVI. If by pure thought is
meant an activity of reason free of any sensuous perceptions, then

pure thought is a fiction since thought freed from all ideas is
empty thought. . . . Indeed, concepts are nothing other than
processed perceptions and ideas. In a word, thinking is preceded
by sensations, perceptions, ideas, etc., not the reverse. Even
thought itself, in the sense of a higher capacity to form concepts
and categories, is a product of historical development. Cf. the
logical structure of speech [c. XVI—XVII]. Digres-
sion: I am a social relation of me to myself.

Further: Goethe: the problem becomes a postulate (Note:
the problem of creative synthesis pathicore [gestalt theory] became
a postulate). The same is true with I and the personality. It is
primarily something created together with higher functions.
The relationship between sleep and future behavior (the regula-
tory function of sleep for a Kaffir) is mediated by the entire
personality (the aggregate of social relations transferred inwardly);
it is not a direct connection.

Study this in the child.

Digression: See Politzer: psychology = drama. Concurrency:
canine psychology and Dilthey (on Shakespeare). But drama
tually is full of such connection: the role of passion, suggestibil-
ity, and zealology in a particular personality structure. One
character is broken down into two in Macbeth: Freud.
A drama truly full of internal struggle is impossible in organic
systems: the dynamic of the personality is drama.

Sleep of the Kaffir

Future behavior

A wife was unfaithful in a dream (Othello), so she is killed: a
tragedy. A drama is always a struggle of such connections (heat
and feeling, passion, etc.). A drama cannot be otherwise, i.e., it
is a class of systems. Psychology is functional.

Direct. The role of the environment. For biology: the factor of
phenotypic changes. The mechanisms are ready and change in
quantity. Social connections function as natural connections.
ergo: there is no permanently fixed will. but there is a natural range of possibilities for each function, determining the sphere of possible roles for that function. compare: the natural data of an actor (emploi) determine the range of his roles, but nonetheless every drama (= personality) has its roles. commedia dell'arte, fixed roles, play types (columbine, harlequin, etc.) change the drama, but the role is one and the same = itself. a drama with fixed roles = the idea of old psychology. now: within a type there is a variation of roles. sleep in drama (personality) of a kaffir is one role, while for the neurotic it is another: the hero and villain, the lover.

for example: for spinoza thought is the master of passions. for freud and the artist, thought is the slave of passions. psychiatrists know this. in other words, schematically:

1) structure
2) thought
thought

passions

feminine operating with functions as no further reducible units. see pavlov on physics and inhibition. psychiatrists know this very well. the issue is: what role, function, does thinking fulfill in the personality?

autistic thinking differs from philosophical thinking in not in terms of the laws of thought, but by virtue of roles (ethics or emotions).

i. on the psychology of roles. see politzer: drama. social role (judge, physician) determines a hierarchy of functions: i.e., functions change the hierarchy in different spheres of social life. their conflict = drama. see my schema of interests. 31 a similar schema can be created for the particular sphere of behavior (love). compare schemata (schema 3).

(1) judge (professional complex)
(2) husband (familial)
(3) drama: (professional complex)

by no means more mystical and no closer to the soul than regulation of higher nervous activity of the muscles, etc. but the mechanism is more complicated: in the one case there is one part of the body, in the others, what regulates and what is regulated are separate: a regulates b; but here a human being as a social being (a: regulates b; his behavior or cerebral activity). a new and unique regulation and organization of the process—i want only to say that without the human (= telephone operator) as a whole, one cannot explain the activity of the human being's apparatus (brain), that man regulates or controls his brain, the brain does not control man (invisibly); but without the person one cannot understand the person's behavior, that psychology must be developed in the concepts of drama, not in the concepts of processes. when politzer says: it is the person who works, not his muscles, he has said everything that needs to be said. this can be said about the whole of man's behavior. three additional postulates:

1. the difference between a mentally ill and a normal person and between different mentally ill persons is not so much that (a) the laws of mental life are violated in the mentally ill or (b) patients have something (neurosis) that normal people do not have (nervous). rather, normal people have the same thing as the mentally ill: delusions, suspicions. delusions of reference, obsessive ideas, fear, etc. but the role of all this, the hierarchy of the entire system, is different, i.e., another function, not the one that we have, moves onto center stage and acquires regulatory functions. it is not delusions that differentiate the mentally ill person from us, but the fact that he believes in the delusions and feels culpable, whereas we do not. cf. the sleep of the kaffir. in any case, this is the way it is with hysterics, neurasthenics, etc. another system gains control in another situation: the hysteric with the physician, and the hysteretic at home.

2. for freud: the connection between sleep and sexual functions is not primary, but rather a connection of the type kaffir's dream: for the neurotic, sleep serves the sexual instinct. but this is not a general law; it is a law only for the neurotic. for a kaffir, sleep has other functions. thinking is different in the autistic

Hierarchy I

[Hierarchy] II

Passions
Thought

1
2

1
2

P
T

P
T

Wife:

As a person, I love her.
I know that she is bad.
I empathize, but condemn. What will win out?

As a judge, I judge.
I know that she is bad, but
I love her.
I empathize, but condemn. What will win out?

I know that she is bad, but I empathize, but condemn. What will win out?

Task: among adolescents and in ten [31] (concrete psychology) to study the different spheres of behavior (professional complex, etc.), the structure and the hierarchy of functions where they relate to and clash with one another.

Vygotsky: the nature of organization. This is what distinguishes science (mechanics, chemistry, biology, sociology, etc.). But a special type of organization is taken as a primary concept: body, substance, organism, socio, etc. the telephone operator plus the telephone is a special type of organization, a primary concept in higher psychology. 32 Not only the telephone but also the telephone operator develops. the two together: the entire uniqueness of child development.

When I say that the telephone operator plus the telephone (special type of organization) = self-regulation: this regulation is

etc., or something similar.
person. This is the law of concrete psychology (i.e., the special hic et nunc [here and now—Latin], not general psychology. Common sense is by no means exceptional for the other.

3. In child development, a shift in systems of the "Kafker's sleep" type takes place. The sleep of the one-year-old or the 7-, 15-, or 70-year-old does not have the same role. Often infantile qualities do not disappear, but only lose their role, their place, their significance. For example, with the acquisition of culture, a Kafker's sleep would lose its meaning. A shift of roles = a shift of attention (i.e., the center of the structure)—see Adler. Psychoanalysis and individual psychology are unconcerned based on this.

General Psychology is being humanized. Homopsychologie [human psychology—Germany] has emerged with zoopsychology, a psychology of humans arises together with a scientific psychology of animals. This is the sense of Piaget's article. This is the essence of the "drama." This is the sense of human psychology. [In a margin] A prelude to a human psychology.

Animal psychology [as it relates to] human psychology [as psychopathology and zoopsychology] to human psychology. Basov: the psychology of the human within animals is not correct. For Piaget there is no common formula for the psychology of animals and humans, Eric Hama.

What is the relationship among the three ideas: the telephone operator, an instrumental act, and the social structure of the personality? The human being acts on himself in a social way. The way of controlling behavior and the means (i.e., instrumental act) are given. But the telephone operator as well is also an idea of a special form of regulation in accordance with this way.

1. A person acts on another person, necessarily from without, with the aid of signs.
2. A person acts on himself, from within, and with the aid of signs, i.e., in a social manner.
3. In addition to infrastructural regulation of behavior, one may hypothesize autostimulation as a special case of social stimulation (the telephone operator controls the telephone). One cannot draw analogies between the whole of behavior and the activity of a telephone. But apparatus + man.

Notes
2. Compare the idea, which Vygotsky was fond of repeating, that the distinctive features of the situation of the child's mental development is that two lines are united: natural and cultural historical development. See, for example, [The history of the development of logical and mammalian man]. [Collected works]. Vol. 3, pp. 30-34 and others.
3. Vygotsky is apparently referring to a work by Vosk Popov entitled [Bergson and his critics]. In [P. and I. Georgievitch Chichemov from participans in his centenial in Canum and Moscow, 1981, 1915. Articles on philosophy and psychology]. Moscow, 1918. Pp. 101-109. We find in this article an analysis of Bergson's book [Creative evolution], with numerous quotations (Pp. 145-65 of the French edition), to which this fragment of Vygotsky's work refers. For example: "The production of use (use) of instruments is now today at the center of our social life" (P. 150). "Man is not such a homo sapiens as homo faber" (P. 151). "For fauna, only a part of their body is a tool. Instinct corresponds to instruments here" (P. 152). "Instinct is innate knowledge of some kind. Intelligence is the capacity to make tools, i.e., artificial tools" (P. 153). etc. As we see, Vygotsky's distinction between "instinct" and "intelligence" is discussed here in detail. However, in Bergson this distinction is in a purely philosophical, mainly epistemological, form. Vygotsky, on the other hand, tries to discuss [the subject] as a psychologist, using the methods of psychology. Hence, in addition to sentences in which he fully agrees with Bergson's thought, we find not only a further development of these thoughts but also modifications and contrasts of them.

4. When Vygotsky says the term organism in this case, he essentially means organism, i.e., belonging to the organism or body, i.e., within the body. However, the term organism is obviously not used merely coincidentally. In this context, this is not linguistic negligence, but perhaps Vygotsky's desire to stress the special, artificial organization and the subsequent "increased" growth of this organism, its "transformation into an organism" in the case of merely human forms of actual activity, and thus to make clear their "natural" forms existing in animals. Thus, he is not completely satisfied with the term-organism as used in Popov's article, although sometimes he also uses it in this sense.

5. We were unable to identify this work of Franz's to which Vygotsky is referring here and further on.

6. See C. Buhler, B. Tschud-Hart, and R. Herr. [Social psychological study of the child in the first years of life], edited by L. S. Vygotsky & A. R. Leont'ev, Moscow, 1931. Table E Figure 13. Vygotsky knew this.

work from in 1927 German edition.

13. [K. Mars & P. Engell, How, Vol. 3, p. 62: "sweating referring to the person Paul as someone like himself, the person Peter begins to relate to himself, and the person Paul, as the person Paul can also begin to relate to himself, consequently, becomes self for a specific manifestation of the species man.


18. Language is old to consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness existing for other people and only this was existing also for myself, language also old to consciousness. From this point of view, communication with other people: [K. Mars & P. Engell, How, Vol. 3, p. 33]. Vygotsky is referring to Debates on the first volume of Belige [Collected works] (see G. W. Hegel, [Collected works]. Vol. 1, Moscow, 1929)

11. [K. Mars & P. Engell, How, Vol. 3, p. 2]. Vygotsky, in the quote mentioned above, refers to his own, from his own terminology, presented by V. K. Anansev, the well-known scholar of the Ussuri district (see, for example, [Collected works]. Vol. 3, p. 73].

15. Vygotsky liked to repeat the thermoluminesca idea that man himself was the first domestic animal (see, for example, [Collected works]. Vol. 3, p. 83].

16. Here and in what follows, Vygotsky proceeds, in his unique metaphorical manner, to an "ideal" metaphorical form of behavior. The specifically human way to regulate behavior in the mind always necessarily also does not mean the generally structured in itself and actually carried out by the individual for "refining" and finally using specific symbolic objects, and finally learning methods for man to control his mental activity, his organization, and his organization. What is fundamentally important here is the specific human character of the law of mind. Vygotsky's "organism" (or Vygotsky's "simplified" form), in other words, these special "psychological acts" are acts by means of which the mental apparatus is transformed and the laws of functioning are changed (and the "law" by itself, to use Levi-Strauss' expression) and should, if

19. Vygotsky, in his work [The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology]. [Collected works]. Vol. 3, p. 289] 339, indicating the idea of "geographical psychology," which he understood in the "methodology of psychology," in the most general way, as the most fundamental characteristics of such a psychology. Its orientation toward psychopathology in the broad sense of the mind, i.e., in the orientation toward the mind, its transformation, control over, and its development. Vygotsky writes: "The goal of such a psychology is the conception of the culture concept, as Diller says, but psychopathtology, i.e., a scientific theory that would deal with subordination and mastery over the mind, in the artificial control of behavior."

20. This statement by Vygotsky, which seems impossible to the contemporary reader, contains Vygotsky's strict assessment of his own concepts, how it evolved in the early "1909s, i.e., in its mature and classic form, only transitional form and, in many respects, a compromise in terms of realizing the
and the interests of working youth. [In Probleme der Ideologie von der Arbeiterjugend.] Moscow, 1929, No. 4, pp. 25–68, and [The pedagogy of youth]. (Cf. Vygotsky, L. S. [1929], p. 6–8.)

24. Vygotsky was unable to locate this reference.

25. See note 16.