[xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 69, Issue 1

[Sibel Güzel <sibel12guzel@gmail.com>]

Merhaba! Kusura bakmayın Gülseren Hanım e-postanızı yeni gördüm.
Saygılarımla ....

2011/2/1 <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu>

> Send xmca mailing list submissions to
>        xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>        http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>        xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>        xmca-owner@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. pretending, imitating, playing and performing
>      (Gregory Allan Thompson)
>   2. Re: pretending, imitating, playing and performing (mike cole)
>   3. Re: Ways With Words (David Kellogg)
>   4. Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>      (Eijck, M.W. van)
>   5. RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>      (Peter Smagorinsky)
>   6. Re: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>      (Andy Blunden)
>   7. Re: RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>      (Ivan Rosero)
>   8. RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>      (Rod Parker-Rees)
>   9. RE: Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>      (Colette Murphy)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 16:41:54 -0600 (CST)
> From: Gregory Allan Thompson <gathomps@uchicago.edu>
> Subject: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Message-ID: <20110131164154.AJL15495@mstore00.uchicago.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> Lois,
> I just had a chance to take a peek at the fantastic article that you
> circulated (lots more to say but no time...), it reminded me of a video from
> an article that was discussed on XMCA about a year ago with regard to Teach
> for America (Atlantic Monthly article "What makes a great teacher"). Much of
> the discussion on XMCA involved policy and TfA, about which I didn't have
> much to say. I was struck by one of the videos of the teachers (his video is
> labeled "The Motivator"):
>
> http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/01/what-makes-a-great-teacher/7841/
>
> He puts on a wonderful performance and the kids appear to be riveted by his
> performance as evidenced by their performances, sometimes imitative, as he
> institutes Operation Get Smart in his classroom (certainly the cameras had
> something to do with everyone's performance, but maybe there is a lesson
> there too). He tells his students everyone in the class has the potential to
> be "the smartest students in the country". There are certainly parts of his
> delivery that could have been better, but it's a hundred times better than I
> could have ever done... And it seemed like a nice example of pretending,
> playing, and performing.
>
> -greg
>
>
>
>
> >Message: 4
> >Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 12:22:56 -0500
> >From: Lois Holzman <lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org>
> >Subject: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing
> >To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Message-ID:
> >       <059CBF2B-7257-4B83-B402-DD6BA12C4B55@eastsideinstitute.org>
> >Content-Type: text/plain;      charset=us-ascii
> >
> >Hi,
> >
> >I'm passing along a short essay by Lenora Fulani and Fred Newman, entitled
> Let's Pretend, that looks at lots we've been discussing here lately in
> relation to schooling and reform efforts.
> >Comments?
> >You can find it at
> http://admin-allstars.promotions.com/sites/default/files/Let's Pretend
> Special Report 010611.pdf
> >
> >Lois
> >
> >Don't forget to check out the latest at http://loisholzman.org
> >
> >Lois Holzman, Ph.D.
> >Director, East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy
> >920 Broadway, 14th floor
> >New York NY 10010
> >Chair, Global Outreach for UX (www.allstars.org/ux)
> >tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324
> >fax 718.797.3966
> >lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org
> >www.eastsideinstitute.org
> >www.performingtheworld.org
> >loisholzman.org
> >www.allstars.org
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >------------------------------
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >xmca mailing list
> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >End of xmca Digest, Vol 68, Issue 30
> >************************************
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 14:52:06 -0800
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <AANLkTimNxRHe5-yc8xaySVBG+qtGgbv5cPRqGcTN2jdg@mail.gmail.com<AANLkTimNxRHe5-yc8xaySVBG%2BqtGgbv5cPRqGcTN2jdg@mail.gmail.com>
> >
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Lets talk. Are you in tomorrow at any time?
> mike
>
> On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 2:41 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson <
> gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote:
>
> > Lois,
> > I just had a chance to take a peek at the fantastic article that you
> > circulated (lots more to say but no time...), it reminded me of a video
> from
> > an article that was discussed on XMCA about a year ago with regard to
> Teach
> > for America (Atlantic Monthly article "What makes a great teacher"). Much
> of
> > the discussion on XMCA involved policy and TfA, about which I didn't have
> > much to say. I was struck by one of the videos of the teachers (his video
> is
> > labeled "The Motivator"):
> >
> >
> http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/01/what-makes-a-great-teacher/7841/
> >
> > He puts on a wonderful performance and the kids appear to be riveted by
> his
> > performance as evidenced by their performances, sometimes imitative, as
> he
> > institutes Operation Get Smart in his classroom (certainly the cameras
> had
> > something to do with everyone's performance, but maybe there is a lesson
> > there too). He tells his students everyone in the class has the potential
> to
> > be "the smartest students in the country". There are certainly parts of
> his
> > delivery that could have been better, but it's a hundred times better
> than I
> > could have ever done... And it seemed like a nice example of pretending,
> > playing, and performing.
> >
> > -greg
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >Message: 4
> > >Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 12:22:56 -0500
> > >From: Lois Holzman <lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org>
> > >Subject: [xmca] pretending, imitating, playing and performing
> > >To: Activity eXtended Mind Culture <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >Message-ID:
> > >       <059CBF2B-7257-4B83-B402-DD6BA12C4B55@eastsideinstitute.org>
> > >Content-Type: text/plain;      charset=us-ascii
> > >
> > >Hi,
> > >
> > >I'm passing along a short essay by Lenora Fulani and Fred Newman,
> entitled
> > Let's Pretend, that looks at lots we've been discussing here lately in
> > relation to schooling and reform efforts.
> > >Comments?
> > >You can find it at
> > http://admin-allstars.promotions.com/sites/default/files/Let's<
> http://admin-allstars.promotions.com/sites/default/files/Let%27s>Pretend
> Special Report 010611.pdf
> > >
> > >Lois
> > >
> > >Don't forget to check out the latest at http://loisholzman.org
> > >
> > >Lois Holzman, Ph.D.
> > >Director, East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy
> > >920 Broadway, 14th floor
> > >New York NY 10010
> > >Chair, Global Outreach for UX (www.allstars.org/ux)
> > >tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324
> > >fax 718.797.3966
> > >lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org
> > >www.eastsideinstitute.org
> > >www.performingtheworld.org
> > >loisholzman.org
> > >www.allstars.org
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >------------------------------
> > >
> > >_______________________________________________
> > >xmca mailing list
> > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
> > >End of xmca Digest, Vol 68, Issue 30
> > >************************************
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 16:13:48 -0800 (PST)
> From: David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Ways With Words
> To: lchcmike@gmail.com, Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
>        <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <783107.8601.qm@web110302.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
> Well, yes and no. That is, David Kirshner's post does clarify a lot of my
> misunderstandings of his work. But it also produces some new puzzles, at
> least for me.
>
> For example, David says that A, perhaps even THE, main difference between a
> domain which is well framed for a skills teaching genre and one which is
> framed for enculturation/acculturation has to do with the way in which the
> domain is defined in words.
>
> An "undefined" domain is conducive to enculturation. He gives the example
> of politeness. But of course there are far more (and even far better)
> definitions of politeness (e.g. wedding procedures) then there are of
> pecan-shelling processes, at least here in China.
>
> It's not clear to me what it means to define a domain. You would think that
> marching together in unison is an almost perfect example of a skill. But
> when we actually try to "define" it, we don't end up giving recipes (e.g.
> "First everybody puts there right foot forward at exactly the same time").
> That kind of thing might help you get the ball rolling but it in no way
> helps with the difficult part, which is what you do when you begin to march
> out of step.
>
> In fact, the "definitions" we give are almost always tautological: they are
> not procedures so much as what Harris calls "constitutive rules"; they are
> descriptions of what it means to walk in unison. "When you begin to march
> out of step you have to look at the kid next to you and adjust your gait to
> his or hers by either slowing down or speeding up." That looks much more
> like conceptual knowledge, rather than procedural knowledge, so it belongs
> to the knowledge-as-concepts genre rather than the knowledge-as-skills
> genre.
>
> But of course nobody actually teaches this way. For one thing, it
> presupposes a kind of descriptive knowledge that usually follows rather than
> precedes performance. If you gotta ask, you ain't never gonna know. For
> another, it assumes that the kid next to you is marching in step. Suppose he
> or she isn't?
>
> So iInstead, we "just do it". You get a bunch of kids together and you get
> them to march more or less in unison, and they create a kind of
> culture-of-marching-in-step, using something like good old "Watch this" and
> "Follow me". That, of course, sounds like an acculturation genre followed by
> an enculturation genre. And of course it begs Salman Rushdie's question: How
> does newness come into the world?
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> PS: Did anyone else feel that Fred Newman and Lisa Fulani's article was
> PIAGETIAN--that is, it separates development and learning, and places the
> former absolutely and logically prior to the latter? I did, and perhaps for
> that reason found it really VERY depressing.
>
> dk
>
> --- On Mon, 1/31/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Ways With Words
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Monday, January 31, 2011, 7:42 AM
>
>
> Both of you messages D&D, are helpful.
> David Ki, do you have a manuscript on the en-ac-ulturation distinction and
> the genre approach?
> mike
>
> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 6:56 PM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>
> > David,
> >
> > Thanks for the lovely wedding anecdote, and also the example of your
> > mother-in-law inducting you into practices of pecan cracking through her
> > verbal instructions. The model of enculturation that most of us have to
> go
> > by comes from the situated cognition literature grounded in examples of
> > craft apprenticeship. In this model, identity development (from
> peripheral
> > to central participation) as well as the production of skills and
> concepts
> > are incorporated into a complex integrative model of learning. This seems
> to
> > be the frame that you are bringing to bear in understanding my
> enculturation
> > genre.
> >
> > It is precisely this integrative assumption that the genres approach
> > resists. The sculpted genres of teaching enable a parsing of the discrete
> > elements interacting even within complex settings. For instance, the
> > shelling of pecans, though certainly a cultural practice, is precisely
> > defined and hence subject to being learned as a skill, outside of
> cultural
> > context. (Contrast this with open-ended cultural practices like
> politeness
> > or approaches to solving of non-routine problems which cannot be
> precisely
> > specified and hence must be learned in cultural context.) Indeed, though
> > your pecan-shelling lesson did transpire in an authentic cultural locale,
> I
> > would want to argue that the structure of the learning support for your
> > pecan-shelling prowess is from habituation instruction, not from
> > enculturation.
> >
> > The key to habituated learning is unconscious (subcognitive) association
> of
> > perceptual stimuli and motor responses. Your mother-in-law's directions
> for
> > how you should hold and operate the apparatus served to make perceptually
> > salient certain aspects of the stimulus and response domains, and your
> > practice served to establish the requisite subcognitive linkages between
> > them. I think we can probably rule out concept teaching, as presumably
> your
> > mother-in-law was telling you what to do, rather than explaining
> principles
> > to you (not discounting the possibility that you, independently, chose to
> > "make sense" of what you were being asked to do). From a genres
> perspective,
> > habituation would be a sufficient explanation to account for your
> newfound
> > skill in pecan shelling. In fact, the requirements for enculturational
> > learning of this "practice" probably were not present.
> >
> > Let me take a moment to unpack the two enculturation-related pedagogies
> in
> > order to be able to continue the genres analysis of your pecan-shelling
> > learning episode. One of the difficulties, given the prior model of
> situated
> > cognition theory and craft apprenticeship, is to imagine how
> enculturational
> > learning could be separated from identity development. However, in the
> > genres analysis, identity becomes a salient concern in the case of
> > alternative identity possibilities. For instance, in entering a craft
> > apprenticeship, one makes a decision to "become" a craftsperson (of a
> > certain sort). Thus one is actively seeking to acculturate oneself to the
> > practices of the culture.
> >
> > This dynamic helps structure the "acculturation pedagogy" genre that I
> will
> > soon distinguish from the "enculturation pedagogy." In acculturation
> > pedagogy, a bona-fide member of the culture models mature cultural
> practices
> > in order that novices seeking to acculturate themselves to the culture
> can
> > emulate those practices. In your case, David, it doesn't seem that you
> > considered this to be a Chinese cultural practice, or even that you
> expected
> > your mother-in-law to be proficient in it. If anything, what you most
> > admired about her was her ability to transfer from her prior experience
> with
> > cracking peanuts and pumpkin seeds to new nuts and new devices. However,
> the
> > ability to transfer was NOT what you were learning. You were learning to
> > shell pecans.
> >
> > Enculturation is an even worse fit than acculturation to your
> > pecan-shelling episode. Enculturation is the process of cultural
> absorption
> > that comes about when one is immersed in a unitary cultural milieu, for
> > instance a child within the national culture adopting the characteristic
> > practices of the culture. This kind of learning is accomplished without
> > conscious intention or awareness. The associated pedagogical genre has
> the
> > teacher work surreptitiously to develop the classroom microculture so
> that
> > it gradually comes to resemble the reference culture with respect to
> valued
> > practices. Students learn not because of an intention to assume a new
> > identity, but because they're immersed in a classroom culture that they
> > gradually become enculturated to, even as it continues to evolve. For
> > instance, a math teacher might seek to shape the culture of argumentation
> in
> > the classroom so that it comes to more closely resemble the kinds of
> logical
> > chains of reasoning that characterize mathematical proof. This is a
> gradual
> > process over a long period of time--not a good fit for your
> pecan-shelling
> > experience.
> >
> > Thanks for engaging with the genres approach. I hope this helps clarify
> > some of the genres, and the way the genres framework is used to analyze
> > situations of learning and teaching.
> >
> > David
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2011 6:20 PM
> > To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > Subject: [xmca] Ways With Words
> >
> >
> >
> > David (Kirshner) is of course quite correct to point out that narrative
> is
> > not a necessary or sufficient element in his "enculturation" educational
> > genre. But it does seem to me that the "enculturation" educational genre
> is
> > distinguished by greater discursivity; it's a much talkier model, and I
> > think it is for this reason we often find it in traditional, more oral
> > cultures. Unfortunately (I think) we also find it in foreign language
> > classrooms, where I think it is fundamentally inappropriate.
> >
> > First of all, it seems to me that enculturation almost necessarily
> involves
> > some kind of legitimate peripheral participation, non-essential but
> > nevertheless participatory roles in an activity that can in theory be
> taken
> > by children and outsiders. This clearly suggests a very hierarchical set
> of
> > roles, which, since they are not set by skills or by knowledge must be
> set
> > by some other criterion (e.g. being a so-called "native speaker")
> >
> > Secondly, it seems to me that enculturation models place a premium on
> doing
> > fairly simple, general, everyday things with great adroitness,
> creativity,
> > and confidence. An obvious example of this would be cooking, something
> which
> > everybody has to do but which can be done either with routinism, or with
> > verve and inspiration, or with the consummate mastery that is born of
> > endless routines illuminated by flashes of inspiration.
> >
> > Thirdly (and as David says, this is where narrative "kicks in")
> > enculturation means learning what Shirley Brice Heath calls "ways with
> > words". If it were simply a matter of "Watch this" "Now you try it", then
> > there would be no difference between the discursive model and the skills
> > model. Even if we add "Now, what was the difference?" we only get a
> skills
> > model plus explicit knowledge, and that is not what the enculturation
> model
> > is really about.
> >
> > That's really all I have to say here. The rest of this post is just two
> > anecdotes to illustrate. and if I had any sense I would just shut up at
> this
> > point. I am sure that many readers will stop reading at this point, if
> not
> > long before. But of course in the enculturation model, ways with words
> are
> > very important, and sometimes anecdotes and illustrations are more
> important
> > than the actual skills and concepts imparted.
> >
> > The other day I was sitting here at this very table cracking newly
> imported
> > American pecans for my mother-in-law, who has had a stroke and can barely
> > speak. She was watching me intently, having never seen either pecans or
> the
> > jar-opening device I was using to crack them, and began to make speaking
> > sounds. I leaned over to listen and suddenly realized she was giving very
> > precise instructions about how to use the device so that the meat would
> not
> > be shattered.
> >
> > Her body no longer obeys her brain, and she has reacquired the skills
> that
> > an infant must have in getting others to obey it instead. But in normal
> > times this simply involves laughing or crying, not "ways with words". The
> > unusual thing about this was the objectivity, the precision, and
> efficiency
> > of her instructions: as soon as I held the jar-opening device the way she
> > told me to, my speed doubled, my efficiency tripled, and not a single
> > nut-meat was broken.
> >
> > I realized that cracking peanuts and pumpkin seeds with immense precision
> > is something she has spent a large stretch of her non-working life doing
> > (she retired from the textile mill where she worked at forty years of
> age)
> > and she obviously had very developed views, transferable to entirely new
> > products and even completely new tools, about how it should be done. In
> > normal times (when we were both twenty years younger) she would have
> simply
> > shoved me out of the way and done it herself. But in this situation,
> > absolutely no other way of transferring her knowledge than a slurred
> mixture
> > of Shaanxi and Henan dialects, to which I am normally fairly impervious.
> >
> > This circumstance is probably not unique; over thousands of years of
> human
> > history there were probably many situations where knowledge had to be
> > transferred in this highly imperfect way from disabled elders to not yet
> > able juniors. And so ways with words turn out to be as important as
> skilled
> > performances.
> >
> > But unskilled performances also have to be included, first of all, to
> > provide the contrast that we have in skills models ("Watch this" "Now you
> > try it") and the explicit knowledge we have in conceptual models ("See
> the
> > difference"), secondly to allow the elders to show the mastery on which
> > their authority must ultimately be based (we cannot always live off of
> the
> > capital of social position), and thirdly to allow some means by which
> > outsiders can teach insiders, as well as insiders teach outsiders, making
> > the enculturation model not entirely a closed system and allowing the
> whole
> > to develop new forms of knowing.
> >
> > Yesterday my brother-in-law and I went to a wedding in a nearby village
> > where he is doing some business with the local village head, whose friend
> > had a son getting married. Village weddings in China are what I would
> call
> > loosely scripted: certain things must be done, but they are not done to
> > schedule; they happen when all the principals are accounted for and there
> is
> > enough of an audience to make it worthwhile. In order to make sure that
> the
> > audience shows up and stays, a huge tub of "saozi mian" (noodles) is kept
> on
> > the boil all day, and anyone can eat as much as they like, whether they
> are
> > related to the bride and groom or not.
> >
> > There are lots of roles that call for little skill, but there are also
> > roles which can be fulfilled very skillfully. For example, when we first
> > arrived at the wedding, they were carrying the bride's gifts to her new
> > inlaws into a room where the inlaws sat before portraits of their
> ancestors
> > to receive them.
> >
> > My brother-in-law and I, along with some neighborhood children, took some
> > of them in (I took a large, purple plastic thermos bottle) and in return
> the
> > male adults were given cigarettes and the children were given milk
> sweets.
> >
> > While my brother-in-law was smoking his cigarette (I stuck mind behind my
> > ear because I don't smoke and I didn't want another pressed upon me), the
> > bride herself arrived. The groom's sister barred and locked the door, and
> > then the spy-hole was prized out so that negotiations could begin.
> >
> > The bride had to knock, of course. The groom's sister, as per tradition,
> > eyeballed the spy hole (she had to stand on tippy-toe) and then, in
> standard
> > Chinese, told the bride's family that the door was barred, and if the
> > bride's family really wanted to cross the threshold, they had to give a
> > "hongbao" (a red envelope, with money).
> >
> > An envelope was produced, but when it the groom's sister opened it she
> > found it only had a light greenish one yuan note in it (I think that's
> about
> > twelve cents at current exchange rates). She complained that the bride's
> > family was "xiaochi" (stingy) and began to open the door.
> >
> > My brother-in-law finished his cigarette and sprang to his feet. He
> barred
> > the door with is wiry frame and let out a torrent of choice insults in
> the
> > local dialect. Egged on by hilarious laughter (from both sides of the
> door),
> > he finished with a rhetorical flourish based on slightly different
> > emphases--he wants a BIG red envelope, and big RED one (one hundred yuan
> > notes are red).
> >
> > Another envelope was produced (with a blue five yuan note) and my brother
> > in law relented. The bride came in and bowed to the ancestors, and they
> went
> > off to enjoy their new marital status, their sumptuous (by peasant
> > standards) new lodgings and the spiffy new plastic purple thermos I had
> > carried up the stairs.
> >
> > As we left, we noticed that another wedding being held nearby. On closer
> > inspection, this turned out to be wedding we had really been invited
> to--we
> > had peripherally participated in the wrong wedding, and nobody cared or
> even
> > noticed. And so the concept of party crashers was introduced to a remote
> > village in Northwest China.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> > --- On Sat, 1/29/11, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Saturday, January 29, 2011, 9:38 AM
> >
> >
> > Children with older siblings observe the way they manage indignant
> parents
> > and can quickly work out what works and when (back in the 1980s Judy Dunn
> > found plenty of evidence of 2 year olds - who had older siblings -
> appealing
> > to parents for support but not when they 'knew' that they were
> responsible
> > for a conflict). They don't need to know HOW or WHY a particular appeal
> > works before they start to use it and they 'join in' well before they
> > develop this sort of understanding (a particularly clear example of the
> > general genetic law). Only children have a tougher job to work out how to
> > manage their parents but they at least have the advantage of plenty of
> > practice.
> >
> > All the best,
> >
> > Rod
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of Robert Lake
> > Sent: 29 January 2011 17:23
> > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> >
> > Yes, I appreciate your comments as well Greg.
> >
> > I only have one thing to add and LSV might appreciate this.
> >
> > My grand daughter was saying "It was an accident" when she was 3.  :-)
> >
> > Robert
> >
> > On Sat, Jan 29, 2011 at 11:17 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > An interesting elaboration of the idea of the retrospective
> construction
> > of
> > > meaning, Greg. I had not thought about it in these terms before.
> > > mike
> > >
> > > On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 11:55 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson <
> > > gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Yes, and the insistence on ascribing motive to practice starts early.
> > My
> > > > favorite is the parent that looks at his two year old who has just
> torn
> > > half
> > > > the pages out of a cherished book of his (substitute lipstick all
> over
> > > the
> > > > dining room table or paint on the new carpet) and chastises the child
> > > "Why
> > > > did you do that?" or better "What were you thinking?"
> > > >
> > > > As if the child has some complex motivation and thought behind what
> > they
> > > > did. The child can only stare back in shock wondering what is
> > happening.
> > > >
> > > > But there is important work being done in those ridiculous questions.
> > Put
> > > > together enough of these moments and by the time they are 7 or so,
> they
> > > get
> > > > it - "It was an accident" and "I didn't mean to do it" become stock
> > > > responses regardless of what happened. And by 12 they have become
> > nearly
> > > > fully competent at manipulating the situation, intentions and all,
> e.g.
> > > "I
> > > > was trying to help my sister... and...". For each event, they are
> able
> > to
> > > > reconstruct a philosophy of the act, so to speak.
> > > >
> > > > -greg
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >------------------------------
> > > > >
> > > > >Message: 2
> > > > >Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2011 11:53:27 -0600
> > > > >From: "David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> > > > >Subject: RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> > > > >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >Message-ID:
> > > > >       <731CECC23FB8CA4E9127BD399744D1EC02E0CDFD@email001.lsu.edu>
> > > > >Content-Type: text/plain;      charset="us-ascii"
> > > > >
> > > > >As with Tollefsen, who reviewed Hutto's book, I'm not quite sure
> what
> > > > >kinds of specialized narrative practices are supposed to be needed
> to
> > > > >establish our folk psychology's rational ascriptions. The ascription
> > of
> > > > >motive to behavior is ubiquitous. Admittedly, it may take one a long
> > > > >time to get good at ascribing particular motives to particular
> > actions.
> > > > >But our social/cultural frame demands such ascription, so presumably
> > we
> > > > >all are going to get a lot of practice.
> > > > >
> > > > >It is one thing to look to narrative as a site for development of a
> > > > >particular cultural practice--the folk psychology ascription of
> > > > >motives--quite another to associate narrative with the fundamental
> > > > >process of enculturation, itself. My approach to enculturation does
> > not
> > > > >take narrativization of one's identity as fundamental. That only
> kicks
> > > > >in in the specialized process of "acculturation"--intentional
> > emulation
> > > > >of cultural practices to fulfill goals of cultural membership. But
> > > > >enculturation functions more fundamentally as a spontaneous adaption
> > to
> > > > >the culture in which one is enmeshed.
> > > > >
> > > > >David
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >-----Original Message-----
> > > > >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > ]
> > > > >On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > > > >Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 7:21 PM
> > > > >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > >Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> > > > >
> > > > >Hi David Ke
> > > > >
> > > > >David
> > > > >Your distinction between history and narrative is interesting.  Do
> you
> > > > >think
> > > > >Bruner collapses the distinction. Hutto's framework on narratives is
> > > > >that
> > > > >they are forms of story-telling that give "reasons for actions" in
> > terms
> > > > >of
> > > > >beliefs and desires which are the folk psychological frameworks that
> > are
> > > > >culturally grounded frames of reference.  He suggests this form of
> > > > >explanation is socioculturally grounded.  My recollection of
> Bruner's
> > > > >work
> > > > >is he suggests it is one of the two basic forms of constructing
> > meaning.
> > > > >Therefore, for Bruner, history would be a particular form of
> > narrative.
> > > > >
> > > > >David, if Hutto's work interests you, I would also google his edited
> > > > >book
> > > > >"Folk Psychology Reassessed" which gives alternative theoretical
> > > > >approaches
> > > > >which are challenging the "theory theory" model and "simulation"
> model
> > > > >of
> > > > >folk psychology.  The edited volume situates Hutto's work in a
> larger
> > > > >stream
> > > > >of thought.
> > > > >
> > > > >On this topic of folk psycholgy I'm currently reading a book
> > "Philosophy
> > > > >in
> > > > >the Flesh" by Lakoff & Johnson that posits BASIC or PRIMARY forms of
> > > > >cognition as fundamentally metaphorical. We imaginally compare a
> > source
> > > > >concept to a target concept.   The SOURCE concept of these primary
> > > > >cognitive
> > > > >structures are ALWAYS based in our physical bodies. Lakoff & Johnson
> > > > >suggest
> > > > >from these primary metaphors more complex metaphorical meanings
> > develop.
> > > > >If
> > > > >this perspective is accurate, then language is not the SOURCE of our
> > > > >most
> > > > >basic metaphors. The source is in the sensory-motor or somatic
> > embodied
> > > > >cognition. Language expresses these basic metaphors.  If there is
> some
> > > > >merit
> > > > >in this position then education and developmental science should
> > engage
> > > > >with
> > > > >basic primary metaphors as foundational in the emergence of
> cognitive
> > > > >capacity and in how these basic metaphors IMPLICITLY structure our
> > folk
> > > > >psychology.
> > > > >
> > > > >>From this perspective of primary metaphor as embodied  it is not
> too
> > > > >big a
> > > > >step  to reflect on primary intersubjectivity as a precursor to
> > > > >secondary
> > > > >intersubjectivity.  I have a hunch these 2 constructs are intimately
> > > > >related.
> > > > >
> > > > >Larry
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >On Wed, Jan 26, 2011 at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg
> > > > ><vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >> Wow--I have to get that book! Thanks, Larry.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> The way I understand David Kirshner's work is this: there is
> really
> > > > >only
> > > > >> ONE of the three meta-discourses in education that is narrative,
> at
> > > > >least
> > > > >> narrative in the sense of oriented towards the action of a hero in
> a
> > > > >problem
> > > > >> space who evaluates and achieves some kind of resolution.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> That's his THIRD meta-discourse, the one which sees education as a
> > > > >process
> > > > >> of becoming a participant, a member, a practioner and as mastering
> a
> > > > >> particular set of discourses that accompany membership.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> It seems to me that his first meta-discourse, which sees education
> > as
> > > > >a
> > > > >> process of mastering skills, is not narrativist, because it
> focuses
> > on
> > > > >> problem solutions and pretty much ignores the hero and the
> > evaluation
> > > > >of the
> > > > >> problem space.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> His second meta-discourse, which sees education as a process of
> > > > >acquiring
> > > > >> conceptual knowledge, is not narrativist either, because it sees
> > this
> > > > >> knowledge as being not embodied in a particular hero and because
> it
> > > > >sees the
> > > > >> knowledge as being quite separable from the solution of problems.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I don't think this means that DHK would consider the third
> > > > >meta-discourse
> > > > >> the most complete. I think it's only the most complete if we view
> it
> > > > >from a
> > > > >> narrativist point of view, and that is no coincidence, since it
> > > > >co-evolved
> > > > >> with a lot of Bruner's work.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I have a question about the difference between narrative and
> history
> > > > >(as in
> > > > >> "cultural historical"). It seems to me that everything we say
> about
> > > > >> narrative (its structure, it's "I-ness" and even its
> past-to-present
> > > > >> orientation) is radically UNTRUE of history (because history is
> not
> > > > >> structured around heroes in problem spaces, it is not "I" shaped,
> > and
> > > > >it is
> > > > >> oriented present-to-past). Why, then, do people of our peculiar
> > > > >historical
> > > > >> epoch treat the two as synonymous?
> > > > >>
> > > > >> David Kellogg
> > > > >> Seoul National University of Education
> > > > >>
> > > > >> --- On Wed, 1/26/11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > >> Subject: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> > > > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >> Date: Wednesday, January 26, 2011, 2:38 PM
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I have attached a book review for others interested in a
> perspective
> > > > >on
> > > > >> folk
> > > > >> psychology that assumes a perspective inspired by Jerome Bruner's
> > work
> > > > >on
> > > > >> narrative practices,  Hutto is positing a 2nd person dialogical
> > > > >grounding
> > > > >> for understanding "reasons for actions"  He suggests this mode of
> > > > >> understanding is most pronounced when actions are unpredictable.
> > > > >Hutto
> > > > >> suggests there are other more direct embodied forms of recognition
> > and
> > > > >> engagement that are not narrative based.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I see some affinity in this perspective to David Kirschner's
> > approach
> > > > >to
> > > > >> learning theory as narrative based genres.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Larry
> > > > >>
> > > > >> -----Inline Attachment Follows-----
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> __________________________________________
> > > > >> _____
> > > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> __________________________________________
> > > > >> _____
> > > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >>
> > > > >__________________________________________
> > > > >_____
> > > > >xmca mailing list
> > > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >------------------------------
> > > > >
> > > > >_______________________________________________
> > > > >xmca mailing list
> > > > >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >End of xmca Digest, Vol 68, Issue 27
> > > > >************************************
> > > > __________________________________________
> > > > _____
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > *Robert Lake  Ed.D.
> > *Assistant Professor
> > Social Foundations of Education
> > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> > Georgia Southern University
> > P. O. Box 8144
> > Phone: (912) 478-5125
> > Fax: (912) 478-5382
> > Statesboro, GA  30460
> >
> > *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> > midwife.*
> > *-*John Dewey.
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 14:52:39 +0100
> From: "Eijck, M.W. van" <m.w.v.eijck@tue.nl>
> Subject: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> 226A018E3BF58F40BBE738812621232001A779A47317@EXCHANGE10.campus.tue.nl>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She
> wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by
> inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this
> in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually
> able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking
> and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following
>  up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and
> neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say
> something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am
> not 100% certain.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Michiel
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:55:58 +0000
> From: Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>
> Subject: [xmca] RE: Thinking and speaking different things
>        simultaneously
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> 17119644E5258145931499091942C41E0A87E5@SN1PRD0202MB074.namprd02.prod.outlook.com
> >
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> I can't answer this question, but would like to invite your daughter to
> apply to our Ph.D. program. p
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Eijck, M.W. van
> Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2011 8:53 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>
> Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She
> wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by
> inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this
> in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually
> able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking
> and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following
>  up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and
> neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say
> something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am
> not 100% certain.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Michiel
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2011 01:47:36 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things
>        simultaneously
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <4D481D08.3090308@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
>
> Particularly on the basis of the last chapter in T&S, I would say that
> Vygotsky has no argument against this.
>  From personal experience I can say that it is possible. I can read
> aloud while thinking something completely different.
>
>
> Andy
>
> Eijck, M.W. van wrote:
> > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She
> wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by
> inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this
> in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually
> able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking
> and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following
>  up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and
> neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say
> something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am
> not 100% certain.
> >
> > What do you think?
> >
> > Michiel
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
> <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 7
> Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 06:48:24 -0800
> From: Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] RE: Thinking and speaking different things
>        simultaneously
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <AANLkTinUsvzxAbXmH5=bQWyobB6+pC5cGaom8n6HdpHG@mail.gmail.com<bQWyobB6%2BpC5cGaom8n6HdpHG@mail.gmail.com>
> >
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> How about when we lie?
>
> Especially to someone who we think might really be hurt by the "truth",
> especially when it has to do with giving that person details regarding
> their
> competence at some task (because they ask for details!!!), and you have to
> think about what they did wrong and make it sound like it wasn't really
> wrong (because they actually know or have a strong clue what it is), and
> you
> have to invent things they did right which they didn't really do right...
>  All in real time.   I wouldn't claim these situations actually involve
> saying something other than what you are thinking, but the physical
> discomfort, the hesitation, and the general slow-down in turn taking that
> I've experienced during these moments suggests to me that whenever these
> things take place we come close to embodying a double bind, it's very
> physically and emotionally uncomfortable.
>
> Ivan
>
> On Tue, Feb 1, 2011 at 5:55 AM, Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu> wrote:
>
> > I can't answer this question, but would like to invite your daughter to
> > apply to our Ph.D. program. p
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of Eijck, M.W. van
> > Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2011 8:53 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
> >
> > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She
> > wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think
> (by
> > inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried
> this
> > in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually
> > able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the
> speaking
> > and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are
> following
> >  up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and
> > neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to
> say
> > something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I
> am
> > not 100% certain.
> >
> > What do you think?
> >
> > Michiel
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 8
> Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 14:58:56 +0000
> From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things
>        simultaneously
> To: "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
>        Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> 6CD19ED93A7A8F4593955A11621242C237105D6B73@ILS133.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Might not reading aloud involve rather different processes from more
> 'autonomous' speech production, possibly suggesting that the latter might be
> more strongly implicated in verbal thinking while we may be able to engage
> autopilot for (some kinds of) reading aloud?
>
> Ivan's question about the 'double bind' of trying to maintain smooth fluent
> speech while grappling with tensions between 'how we see it' and 'how we
> want someone else to think we see it' may relate to the use of voice
> analysis in lie detection (I remember reading somewhere that the Dutch
> police at one time were recruiting blind people to listen to witness
> statements to pick out people who were likely to be lying).
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: 01 February 2011 14:48
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>
> Particularly on the basis of the last chapter in T&S, I would say that
> Vygotsky has no argument against this.
>  From personal experience I can say that it is possible. I can read
> aloud while thinking something completely different.
>
>
> Andy
>
> Eijck, M.W. van wrote:
> > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She
> wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by
> inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this
> in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually
> able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking
> and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following
>  up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and
> neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say
> something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am
> not 100% certain.
> >
> > What do you think?
> >
> > Michiel
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
> <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 9
> Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 15:09:57 +0000
> From: Colette Murphy <c.a.murphy@qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things
>        simultaneously
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>,
>        "ablunden@mira.net" <ablunden@mira.net>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> 8E291993ECA7D24E8178F50975000E2B25916977F7@EX2K7-VIRT-1.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
> And - re lying, doesn't it seem easier to think and speak opposites, rather
> than to think and speak totally unrelated ideas?
> Colette
>
> Dr Colette Murphy
> Senior Lecturer
> School of Education
> 69 University St
> Queen's University
> Belfast BT7 1HL
>
> tel: 02890975953
> ________________________________________
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf
> Of Rod Parker-Rees [R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk]
> Sent: 01 February 2011 14:58
> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture,  Activity
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>
> Might not reading aloud involve rather different processes from more
> 'autonomous' speech production, possibly suggesting that the latter might be
> more strongly implicated in verbal thinking while we may be able to engage
> autopilot for (some kinds of) reading aloud?
>
> Ivan's question about the 'double bind' of trying to maintain smooth fluent
> speech while grappling with tensions between 'how we see it' and 'how we
> want someone else to think we see it' may relate to the use of voice
> analysis in lie detection (I remember reading somewhere that the Dutch
> police at one time were recruiting blind people to listen to witness
> statements to pick out people who were likely to be lying).
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: 01 February 2011 14:48
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Thinking and speaking different things simultaneously
>
> Particularly on the basis of the last chapter in T&S, I would say that
> Vygotsky has no argument against this.
>  From personal experience I can say that it is possible. I can read
> aloud while thinking something completely different.
>
>
> Andy
>
> Eijck, M.W. van wrote:
> > Yesterday my 8 year old daughter asked me an intriguing question. She
> wondered whether it is possible to say something out loud and to think (by
> inner speech--not images) something different simultaneously. We tried this
> in practice but we did not succeed in assessing whether we were actually
> able to do it. As far as I could assess, it appeared to me that the speaking
> and the thinking are not really occurring simultaneously but are following
>  up each other very swiftly. Actually, from both Vygotskyan and
> neurolinguistic developmental perspectives I think it is impossible to say
> something out loud and to think something different simultaneously, but I am
> not 100% certain.
> >
> > What do you think?
> >
> > Michiel
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
> <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
> End of xmca Digest, Vol 69, Issue 1
> ***********************************
>

Attachment: 166916_175445877577043 bireysel ocak.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document

Attachment: odemebelgesi ocak.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document

__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca