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Re: [xmca] Living metaphor and conventionalized language



David,

Are you asking about 'consciousness' and 'thought'? My reply would be the standard one: consciousness is the dynamic system of psychological functions (as well as being our relationship with the world); thinking is one of those functions.

Was it pointless to ask?  :)

Martin
 
On Aug 12, 2011, at 3:54 PM, David H Kirshner wrote:

> Are these different material processes, or different perspectives on the
> same process, or is it pointless to ask?
> 
> David
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
> Sent: Friday, August 12, 2011 1:08 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Living metaphor and conventionalized language
> 
> Larry, David...
> 
> I don't like the word "internalization" because I can't see that
> anything internal is involved! As LSV put it:
> 
> "Consciousness does not occur as a specific category, as a specific mode
> of being. It proves to be a very complex structure of behaviour" 
> 
> David Bakhurst describes well the 'radical realism' those guys were
> developing:
> 
> "Thought is conceived not as a barrier or interface between the self and
> the world beyond the mind, but as the means by which the individual
> enters into immediate cognitive contact with the material world.
> Thought, the mode of activity of the socially defined subject, reaches
> right out to reality itself" (1991, p. 261)
> 
> If the "inner" is out there in the "outer," we've got the metaphors
> wrong, IMHO.
> 
> Martin
> 
> On Aug 11, 2011, at 12:27 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> 
>> Of course, BOTH "internalization" and "appropriation" are metaphors. I
> don't flee from the "internalization" metaphor the way that Martin does,
> partly because I think of it as referring not to a body but as to a
> nation, a country, a city, a community, a family...or some particle
> thereof. In this sense (a sense which I suppose is better captured by
> "interiorization" than by "internalization", just as "reflection" is
> better captured by "refraction") there is no duality; when you move from
> one nation to another you do not change worlds, nor do you change
> nations when you move from one city to another.
>> 
> 
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