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Huw Lloyd wrote:
On 16 January 2012 23:18, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Huw, I think words do not have "pragmatic force". For that you
have to go something like sentences.
One area I don't think I've come across in my readings of Vygotsky on
this distinction, is the case where sentences comprises a single
word. Yesterday my son put down his spoon on his baby chair, raised
his arms up high and called out "Dada!". I think he was uttering a
sentence.
I think that the idea that "Dada!" is a sentence is not controversial,
Huw. But consider this:
"Thought is always something whole, something with significantly
greater extent and volume than the individual word. Over the course
of several minutes, an orator frequently develops the same thought.
This thought is contained in his mind as a whole. It does not arise
step by step through separate units in the way that his speech
develops. /What is contained simultaneously in thought unfolds
sequentially in speech. /Thought can be compared to a hovering cloud
which gushes a shower of words" {Thinking and Speech, Chapter 7,
LSVCW vol 1}.
Here I take "thought" to be a concept.
Vygotsky says that a word is a sign for a concept. The utterance
of a word does not therefore have pragmatic force on its own, as
you say, but by means of its semiotic properties, contributes to
the pragmatic force of a sentence or other more extended
utterance. That's how I'd see it. The odd thing is that a concept
is a unit which is greater than a sentence, even though a word is
less than a sentence, and yet one is the sign for another.
This seems efficient and effective to me. Although I'm only guessing
at your means of comparison -- complexity of logical predicates in
this case.
"Greater" is not really the right word. I mean that many sentences and
other actions are required to instantiate (and not just invoke) a concept.
The same applies to the relation between activity and action.
I can't follow this unless I know how you're comparing them --- simple
strategies guiding highly intricate tactics/operations?
I mean that many actions are required to instantiate an activity. EG the
activity of building a house, or creating the design for a house,
requires millions of lifting, carrying, hammering, commanding, etc.,
actions.
Thanks, Huw
Andy
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