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Andy, You don't suppose that Saussure or Levi-Strauss read Marx? (not sure about Levy-Bruhl) or perhaps the problem was that they read Marx wrongly? Your reading of Vygotsky is many many times deeper than mine and so I trust your intuitions. But making those intuitions clear to others seems to be the problem at hand. I will happily look to your videos for guidance. Many thanks for them and for your comments! -greg On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 11:45 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > Greg, Vygotsky is not French, and in particular not Levi-Strauss or > Saussure. His heritage is German: Marx and Hegel, though he never read > Hegel, he was educated in an atmosphere saturated with Marx and Hegel. > That's how I read him, anyway, right or wrong. > > I think a good point to start with is that the distinction between true > concepts and complexes is *not* a distinction between two types of concept. > When you eventually get to read in T&S about *actual* concepts, you find > that *actual* (i.e., not ideal) concepts have two roots and merge two lines > of development. An actual concept is itself a process of development, > actually, but I am not up on the literature of microgenesis so I can't make > those connections for you. *Vyvgotsky does not have a typology of > concepts*. You cannot understand a word of what Vygotsky says about > concepts (in my opinion) until you accept this fact and read Vygotsky in > the light of it. Some people (eg Anna Sfard) use the word "reification" to > denote the process of mistaking a process for a thing. > I recommend my two videos on this (Part 2 in particular): > > https://vimeo.com/groups/**129320/videos/35393145<https://vimeo.com/groups/129320/videos/35393145> > https://vimeo.com/groups/**129320/videos/35819238<https://vimeo.com/groups/129320/videos/35819238> > > Andy > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> I love your long-ish posts -- we need more of them! >> >> and I followed you until that last part that Vygotsky is not really about >> dualisms at all. I've got a decent handle on the dualisms being hammered >> home part, but can you say more about how these are not dualisms (it didn't >> come til the end of your post - perhaps as with Vygotsky's writings). >> I'd love to put Vygotsky in the same camp as Levi-Strauss who insidiously >> introduces a dualism between engineer and bricoleur with the audience >> expecting that "modern" will be the engineer and the "primitive" will be >> the bricoleur. But then he says that both are both. >> But more commonly, I tend to see Vygotsky as more kin to Levy-Bruhl and >> his somewhat more heavy handed distinction between "primitive" thinking and >> what "we" do. Even if not an alignment of Vygotsky with L-S, I'd love to >> see you further elaborate the argument that Vygotsky is non-dualist (even >> if only with respect to "development" and "learning"). >> >> Meanwhile, I have some microgenetic developments (i.e. a paper) to worry >> about and a new ontogenetic development at home to boot! >> >> very best, >> greg >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 10:03 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net<mailto: >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Mike, in "Tool and Symbol in Child development," Vygotsky goes on >> at great length and detail in distinguishing between the changes >> in the child's functioning associated with the use of tools (e.g. >> a bicycle) and the use of a sign. (and he includes learning by >> rote under the heading of tool- not symbol-use) I hesitate to try >> to summarise this discussion. But he makes a distinction between >> acquiring the habit of using a tool, and adopting a symbol for use >> in controlling one's own and others' minds. I think this is the >> distinction which is /underlying /his elusive distinction between >> learning and development. >> >> Vygotsky's "clear-cut dualism" has to be understood in terms of >> its basis and the use he is making of it, i.e., to explain a >> conceptual distinction in understanding tendencies of >> developmental processes. Ultimately, a dichotomy between tool and >> sign, or even between tool-use and symbol-use is unsustainable, >> least of all in our times - one and the same keyboard can be used >> to control a machine or send a message to the operator. >> Controlling one's own body has to be counted as tool-use in some >> circumstances, and symbol-use in others. >> >> Vygotsky does explicitly recognise that use of a tool modifies the >> mental processes and enlarges the child's sphere of activity, but >> he wants to focus on what he sees as *voluntary* control of the >> child's own behaviour, and he does not see learning to use a tool >> as doing that: you have learnt to ride, but you still need to be >> on a bicycle to do it, I suppose. It is a bit like the distinction >> between a "potential concept" and a "true concept." A potential >> concept can be acquired as a system of actions organised around a >> tool, but it is still only potential. Once the same activity is >> organised even when the tool is not present, but by means of a >> true, semiotic representation of the tool, then you have a "higher >> psychological function." >> >> I don't think there is any easy way of representing Vygotsky's >> thought here in English and I suspect not in Russian either. He is >> not saying that there are two types of psychological activities, >> higher and lower; there are two types of concept, potential and >> true; there are two types of artefact, semiotic and material, even >> though this is precisely what he says on numerous occasions. He is >> talking about opposite tendencies and sources in *processes*, and >> the language doesn't offer us many means of communicating this >> other than saying "there are two types of ..." And because the >> distinctions he is making are brand new and original, he has to >> really hammer the distinction to the point of a "clear-cut >> dualism" in order to make his point, which is, in my opinion, not >> really about dualisms at all. I think the same goes for learning >> and development. >> >> That's my take, >> Andy >> >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> Hi David-- Thanks for all the re-minding. >> >> Why does Vygotsky reject bicycle riding (learning a phonetic >> alphabet to >> read for meaning too?) as an example of a developmental >> change? It is a >> qualitative change in the organization of consituent functions, it >> reorganizes not only the system of psychological/psychomotor >> functions, it >> is mediated by culture, it brings about a simultaneous change >> in the >> person's relationship to his/her environment. >> >> Seems to qualify. What's wrong here? >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 3:16 PM, kellogg >> <kellogg59@hanmail.net <mailto:kellogg59@hanmail.net>**> wrote: >> >> >> Greg-- >> >> >> >> The funny thing is that in Korean there is an identical >> expression: "halka >> malka". And in Chinese the yes/no question is essentially >> nothing but an >> elaboration of "willy-nilly". >> >> >> >> It's hard to imagine that there is NOTHING at the basis of the >> legal-juridical model of human action except >> contractualism, just as it's >> hard to imagine that Saussurean linguistics is ONLY based >> on an infinite >> number of curiously non-negotiable agreements about word >> meanings. >> >> >> >> It seems to me that there's just a kernel of truth here. >> In order to >> engage in any semiotic behavior at all, you have to >> recognize that >> something is a sign. And in order to recognize that >> something is a sign, >> you have to recognize that it was intended to stand for >> something else. And >> in order to recognize that sometime was intended to stand >> for something >> else, you have to recognize that there is intelligent life >> out there after >> all. >> >> >> >> I guess if I were looking for a single "a-ha!" moment, a >> moment where one >> can point to a hair and see a beard, that would be it! >> >> >> >> Mike-- >> >> >> >> "Riding a bicycle" is a perfect example of where our >> bicycle built for two >> meets a fork in the road. >> >> >> >> Bike riding is actually one of the activities that >> Vygotsky explicitly >> rules out as instances of development (along with typing >> and playing golf). >> It is an instance of learning, but not development. So I >> thought we ought >> to reserve the term "microgenesis" for only those types of >> learning which >> in a given social context (that of education) can be >> linked to the >> ontogenesis of mind. And that meant, after the age of one, >> those types of >> learning that are centrally about language. >> >> >> >> Unfortunately, I think that unreadable book review by me >> in MCA is the >> only written record of our conversation on whether >> microgenesis was a kind >> of learning or learning a kind of microgenesis. It was >> mostly over the >> telephone. I had just discovered Mescheryakov's brilliant >> article on >> Vygotskyan terminology (in the Cambridge Companion) and I >> was looking, in >> my usual little-boy-with-a-toy-hammer mode, for ways to >> over-extend it: >> >> >> >> 1) Natural functions are acquired before cultural ones, >> but within >> cultural functions... >> >> 2) Social functions are acquired before individual ones, >> but within >> individual functions... >> >> 3) Extramental functions are acquired before intra-mental >> functions, but >> within intra-mental functions.. >> >> 4) Spontaneous, everyday functions are acquired before >> nonspontaneous, >> academic ones >> >> >> >> I thought all of these could be seen as instances of a >> very general >> principle "Outside-in!" so long as we accept "outside" as >> referring to >> the environmental and "inside" as referring to the >> semiotic. It could then >> be differentiated according to: >> >> >> >> 1) The phylogenetic zone of proximal devleopment (caves >> before houses, >> hair before clothes) >> >> 2) The sociogenetic zone of proximal development >> (discourse before >> grammar, speech before verbal thinking) >> >> 3) The ontogenetic zone of proximal development >> (egocentric speech beore >> inner, finger counting before mental math) >> >> 4) The microgenetic zone of proximal development (in >> English--Germanic >> vocabulary before Latinate and Greek, in Korean, pure >> Korean words before >> those of Chinese origin) >> >> >> >> You pointed out to me that this assumed that microgenesis >> was a rather >> special kind of microgenesis--the kind that linked >> learning to ontogenetic >> development. And you said, correctly, that this was not >> the way the term is >> normally used. You then recommended that I review this >> book, and I did. I >> also wrote an article on the subject (which was >> indignantly rejected by MCA >> but eventually published by the Modern Language Journal). >> >> >> >> * >> http://onlinelibrary.wiley.**com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.** >> 2011.01236.x/abstract<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.2011.01236.x/abstract> >> *<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.**com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.** >> 2011.01236.x/abstract<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-4781.2011.01236.x/abstract> >> > >> >> >> >> The problem with the microgenesis book I reviewed was that >> I didn't really >> find the discussions of exactly when a person could be >> said to have >> perceived a dot as a man very enlightening, and I found >> that some of the >> studies in the book were of activities that were clearly >> not linked to >> mental development in any way (e.g. murder and suicide). >> >> >> >> Of course, people do tend to prefer their own inventions, >> and I found >> myself sticking to my own understanding of microgenesis, >> that is, that >> microgenesis should really be reserved for the kind of >> learning that leads >> to ontogenesis, just as iin Vygotsky the ontogenesis of >> mind is really >> reserved for the kind of growth that culminates in >> sociogenesis or >> socio-re-genesis rather than simply growth in general >> (and, of course, >> sociogenesis should be reserved for forms of culture which >> increase man's >> mastery of his environment as well as of that part of the >> environment which >> is his own behavior). >> >> >> >> Now, I know that this is the kind of selective and >> directed developmental >> view which many people on the list reject. I have been >> thinking a bit about >> why this is so, since it seems to be at the bottom of my >> inability to >> integrate my own thinking with that of people to whom I >> otherwise feel a >> very strong intellectual affinity (e.g. you and Martin). >> It seems to me >> that, since the 2008 collapse in particular, there has >> been a strong >> tendency amongst Western intellectuals to REVERSE the >> millenium old >> assumption that we had about nature and nurture, according >> to which if >> something is natural there is nothing to be done, but if >> something is >> "socially constructed" then it can be easily deconstructed and >> re-constructed. Since 2008, we have had almost the reverse >> prejudice: if >> something is natural, it may easily be altered; our >> tragedy is that we >> cannot seem to change our own behavior. >> >> >> >> Needless to say, there is a great deal of truth in this >> insight; I think >> it is one of the great insights of our time. The problem >> is that I seem to >> be stuck in an earlier time, when the semiotic behavior of >> Chinese people >> was very far in advance of their ability to control the >> environment, >> and mass literacy simply meant that large quantities of >> materials which >> might otherwise have been usefully employed as toilet >> paper, could now only >> be read, simply because in order to shit you have to be >> able to eat. >> >> >> >> (My mother-in-law, who survived the famine, still thinks >> of food as the >> only real private property, and then only when it has >> actually been eaten.) >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> >> >> <kellogg59@hanmail.net <mailto:kellogg59@hanmail.net>**> >> >> ______________________________**____________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> >> >> >> ______________________________**____________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> >> >> >> -- ------------------------------**------------------------------ >> **------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/ >> **> >> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts >> >> >> ______________________________**____________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Department of Anthropology >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson<http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > ______________________________**____________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Department of Anthropology Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca