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Andy, Charles As I listened in to your conversation reflecting on "ideal typical paths of development" the question of the place of *genres* was in the backgound of my reading. QUESTION: Andy, do you perceive "ideal typical paths of development as a genre" or having the potential to become a genre? Also do you perceive genres and "traditions" as having a family resemblance and having the potential to become part of the conversation exploring "ideal typical paths of development"? Andy, as your concrete example [of the practice of law], or Charles concrete example [of filling out tax forms as a practice] indicate, concepts develop within activity settings within historical events THROUGH TIME within *life worlds*. Your referencing Brandom [a student of Rorty] is fascinating. Your comment was: What I am interested in is an approach at the fundamental level which can do justice to the subtlety and complexity of your discourse. Let me cite from the American Pragmatic philosopher, a student of Richard Rorty at Pittburg, Robert Brandom: "Traditional term logics built up from below, offering first accounts of the meanings of the concepts associated with singular and general terms (in a nominalistic way: in terms of what they name or stand for), then of judgments constructed by relating those terms, and finally of properties of /inferences /relating to those judgments. This order of explanation is still typical of contemporary representational approaches to semantics ... Pragmatist semantic theories typically adopt a top-down approach because they start from the /use /of concepts, and what one does with concepts is apply them in judgment and action." [/Articulating Reasons/, Brandom 200, p. 13] Andy this *Traditional* [classical?] genre known as a nominalistic "way" as the *starting* point seems to point to an approach that Taylor refers to as *strict* [sedimented] dialectics. The terms are known PRIOR to constructing the framework or theory that is built up using known products. Andy, your inviting us to consider a new starting point within praxis or *shared projects* [as anticipated projections] you are wanting to start with *ideal typical formations* It is interesting you mention Rorty. I want to attach a paper which may be tangential to this thread, but he is exploring pragmatism as grounding PARTICULAR genres in practice WITHIN effective history. Andy, it may have some relevance for exploring *ideal typical forms of development* For me this a fuzzy concept but hope with your willingness to *hear me into speech* that I will develop further. Larry Larry However, how do you understand the relationship between these concepts? On Mon, Nov 12, 2012 at 7:16 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > Thanks Charles. The example I gave was intended to challenge the idea that > concepts can be understood in terms of a typology or system of > classification. Rather I think the approach should utilise "ideal typical > paths of development." And this is what I see Vygotsky doing. > > That said, your further explanation of how you understand "scientific" as > what I would call an ideal typical case of "not only the secular > institutions and disciplines of the academy and professions, but also those > of the spiritual domain, the performing and graphic arts, commerce games > and sports, politics, criminal culture, and other domains that have a > robust alignment of practice..." I think that small qualification goes a > long way to giving people cause to think when they read Vygotsky. > > > Andy > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > >> I look forward to your elaborations and will view your video. >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> >> Date: Monday, November 12, 2012 6:27 pm >> Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >> >> >> >>> I'm sorry for being so obscure, Chuck. I am still working on how to >>> explain my position. But all I am proposing is my reading of Vygotsky on >>> Concepts as set out in "Thinking and Speech." Nothing more. I certainly do >>> not think concepts are "philosophic phantasms," although this is the most >>> common response to discovery of the kind of points I am raising: >>> "Well, if concepts are not like this, then they must be philosophic >>> phantasms and not worth chasing after." >>> >>> I am fine with locating yourself in this world in a pragmatist way, >>> etc., etc. I do nothing different. Though I am not sure what you mean by >>> "communal" and other allusions to "community." Maybe my video >>> >>> https://vimeo.com/groups/**129320/videos/35819238<https://vimeo.com/groups/129320/videos/35819238> >>> >>> explains it better. Yes, I think there is a "more grounded approach," >>> though those are not words of mine. I am certainly not trying to "deal >>> with concepts in an abstract way," in fact that is a fair definition of >>> what I am opposing. >>> >>> Andy >>> Charles Bazerman wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Andy, I am not sure I see what you are driving at, and thus I do not >>>> know how to continue the discussion. I know you have written and just >>>> published a book on concepts, but I have not read it. Are you >>>> suggesting that there is a more grounded approach to concepts or that >>>> concepts dissolve and that we should not chase after them as philosophic >>>> phantasms? I am trying to deal with concepts not in an abstract >>>> philosophic way >>>> >>> but in a pragmatist way based on the social circulation of terms and >>> their use in communal practices and then on what evidence we can glean >>> about internal phenomena--and as I say in the essay, my primary activity >>> system and project as a teacher of writing has to do with helping people >>> engage with public circulation of words which people find of value in their >>> endeavors and in their personal understanding of the world which they act >>> within. To that task I bring the resources of Vygotsky and activity >>> theory. I do not claim an epistemic position outside those realms of >>> practice. So what are you trying to persuade me and others of, or what >>> difficulty in my pursuit of my practices within my activity systems do you >>> want me to attend to? >>> >>> >>>> Once I have better bearings of the intersection of our interests, I may >>>> be able to say something more useful. >>>> Chuck >>>> >>>> >>> > > ______________________________**____________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca> >
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