Re: [xmca] Abstract to Concrete

[Christine Schweighart <schweighartc@gmail.com>]

Dear Larry,
I have not yet responded, but you and Andy have  extensive capacity of
imagining possibilities.As my message wasn't written clearly ( Andy maybe
recalls I have tried to set tasks to 'write scientifically', and so his
setting  into context ( I mean revealing form and source from conversation
to writing, with his link) gives me a lot to reflect with. I can first of
all reflect that in my post was substance for dysymmetry which was
productive for creative thinking, but each has such scope , potentialities.
I am still exploring here Davydov's reading of Ilyenkov, have you read the
Chapter? he has on pp47-48 written on 'ideal' , and its meaning for me is
broadly a significance of  'from social relations'. ( I've heard Marianne
Hedegaard express this value, and now it becomes deeper because of the
aspect of 'potentialities' which now comes  into meaning for me in a new
conscious awareness).

I read Andy's comment to you and thought of difficulties I have always
encountered with 'designing a study' ( a tension that'design' follows
meeting of others ( reflection with, not planning)), and I recognise this
tension as inquiet which  'guided democracy' resonates with.
 ' That begs the question, and leads to an infinite regress.'  Is the
question' how can a designer 'emancipate' if there has been a plan?[ Or as
I heard once catch on 'design freedom spaces' - necessarily in such,
conception of subject is assumed already (to be freeing from...)]' which
comes back many times , and again to conditions, social relations and
reflection.  ...Most impenetrable to talk about as finding expression is in
the attentiveness of listening - and writing is somewhere quite more
complex again (  academic voices are tightly subjectivised affairs)., which
is maybe why I like Andy's illustration through the round table so much. I
want  (imagining is  task setting now:)) to craft a reasoned argument to
'Research' along such a line.
 Christine.



On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Andy, Christine,
>
> I am struggling to follow along with your evolving thoughts and reflections
> but one fragment of the conversation left me wanting to add my 2 cents
> worth. If it is going off topic, or is tangenital to the body of this work
> just ignore  my comments.
>
> Both of you have been questioning if Yrjo's work is focused mainly on
> particular ideal-typical sequences [grades, stages,]  of cognitive acts
> FOR  interventions. The question this invites is to ask if concept
> formation in the wild extends beyond activity as interventions?
> *Interventions* as a concept  implies the use of metaphors such as
> *construction* or *building* models to solve problems.  Models built are
> according to plans.
>
> This fragment from your conversation is what I'm addressing:
>
> "The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented here is
> proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the wild," as that is
> the title he himself chose for the special issue. But it looks much more to
> me like the ideal-typical sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention.
> In general, I find the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or
> "modelled." This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the most
> challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In general I
> would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a moment of discovery
> than a "construction."
>
> As I read this fragment I was asking myself if your conversation is
> shifting the focus of developing *concepts in the wild*  FROM *modelling*
> and *intervening* as functional reasons for solving problems TO  a more
> general concept of concepts that is focusing on *discovering* the way
> concepts originate as *germ cells* in the wild.
>
> Andy, Christine, in playing with the concept of *discovery* as preferable
> to using the metaphor of construction or building models, does the concept
> *discovery* referring to dicovering the germ cell as an *aha* moment LEAP
> beyond the boundaries of  explaining the concept of concepts as focusing
> on*interventions* & *constructing* and *building* from blueprints or plans?
>
> In other words does *discovery* as central to the notion of the process or
> *rhythm* [Dewey's term] of  forming concepts  mean *unveiling* [what is
> overflowing the boundaries] or is it more accurate to perceive *discovery*
> as  *unearthing* what already exists but must be re-discovered?
> [an archeological metaphor].
>
> The notion of rhythm implies REcurrence of an occurence but is this
> recurrence a repeating cycle of relationships that is *mechanical* [can be
> measured and quantified and be predicted because repeatable] and therefore
> the rhythm is predictable or does the rhythm of recurrence transform the
> *relationships*  with EACH recurrence as a new occurence?
> In other words NO repetition as identity but a continuing rhythm with
> changing relational occurrence with EACH recurrence.
>
> Andy, Christine, I am merely *thinking out loud* trying to grok the
> recurring theme of this thread.
> Hope it is not too private a reverie.
>
> Larry
>
> On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 6:30 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > Christine! Thank you very much indeed for those annotations and thoughts
> > on the "ascent from abstract to concrete."
> > I said I was "not sure" about the place of dual stimulation in Action 2,
> > and you have convinced me. What I didn't see is that dual stimulation is
> > precisely what characterises the use of the germ cell /after /Action 2,
> so
> > my doubts must be dispelled. Thank you for that.
> >
> > I also have long thought that the germ cell of Hegelian
> > concept-formation and Vygotskyan theory is the same thing as the
> > "transitional object" which is central to Donald Winnicott's child
> > psychoanalysis. This connection does shed a lot of light on concept
> > formation when it is introduced, as you have done, into the "ascent from
> > abstract to concrete." Most particularly it does away, once for all, any
> > rendering of this process as a "purely congnitive/rational" process, from
> > which all need-and-desire have been expunged. Of course, the object
> appears
> > in Hegel's Psychology, as something with a unity of its own outside the
> > domain of the subject itself, precisely via becoming the object of
> desire.
> > So as you point out, this notion really ties together a lot of apparently
> > disparate theory. Thank you for that!
> >
> > I have collected my observations so far, begun in my conversation with
> > you, Christine, here: http://home.mira.net/~andy/**works/engestrom.htm<
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/engestrom.htm>
> >
> > Thanks for that Christine!
> > Andy
> >
> > Christine Schweighart wrote:
> >
> >> Thank you Andy, there are typos.  My doubt about  dual stimulation does
> >> arise from its role in intervention. When you say 'just here' I'm taking
> >> you to mean just between notions and grasping abstract concept 'germ
> cell',
> >> though as transitory objects in action research are just those kind of
> >> concepts ( theoretical& explanatory, generating  phenomena and also
> >> enabling the transition movement to be revealed) - which isn't a 'wild'
> >> transition' but is intervention based on the value of achieving
> evaluation
> >> using theoretical analysis.
> >>  There's a troublesome reaching back into what is 'notional' with what
> is
> >> already abstract ( but brought in by a researcher/teacher/some other),
> this
> >> does happen , though the resources to enable conditions favourable for
> >> exploration in intervention settings are often far different to  'Ok
> what's
> >> the idea your so keen on, who's any good at it, let's give it a go'.
> >> When you emphasise that 'Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades"
> >> rather than "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind
> of
> >> cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a "new
> stable
> >> form of practice" , this seems to be very true , but it's also of a
> form of
> >> theoretical thinking to be so. Maybe I'd see them differently, ( my
> >> influences/background's different.:)
> >> •         The first action is that of..
> >>  expressing disquiet with some situation or practice
> >>
> >>     •         The second action is that of ..
> >> identifying relationships that are significant to those attending to the
> >> expressions or feeling of disquiet
> >>  ( Here origins and explanatory mechanisms are drawing on theoretical
> >> thinking already - so either this is present in  practice , from varius
> >> discipines but not necessarily affording analytical insight across
> groups
> >> etc. So  what is set out below as  'second'  is problematic
> >>     /Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical transformation
> >>     of the situation in order to find out origins and explanatory
> >>     mechanisms./
> >>
> >>
> >>     •         The third action is that of ...
> >> identifying abstract concepts , and " /modeling a new explanatory
> >>     relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable medium.
> >>     This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of the new
> >>     idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation and
> >>     offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it./" ( as there
> >> are various potentialities)
> >>
> >>
> >>     •         /The fourth action is that of ....
> >> examining the  ( relevant aspects through) model/ *S*,
> >>
> >>     /..... experimenting on it in order to fully
> >>     grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations../
> >>
> >>  in relation to actual living practice.
> >>
> >>     •         The fifth action is that of ...
> >>
> >>    / concretizing / developing thinking and taking action to evaluate
> and
> >> refine /by means of practical applications, enrichments,
> >>     and conceptual extensions./
> >>
> >>
> >>     •        / The sixth and seventh actions are those of reflecting on
> >>     and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes into a
> >>     new stable form of practice./
> >>
> >>
> >> Though  still focussing on moving from notions and dual stimulation
> there
> >> are conditions conducive and if the germ cell isn't already there , then
> >> such rational thinking isn't what is affording (the aha moment),  'the
> >> conditions' are other aspects. Not to draw too much out here, I was
> >> deepening my reading of Ilyenkov ( I'm still in Chapter 1), by reading
> VV
> >> Davydov's Chapter 2 inActivity Theory and Social Practice , ' Activity
> >> Structure and Content - and his view that nothing can be said about
> >> activity without understanding how 'spititual or organic desire' and how
> >> it's tranformed into a need.  Needs and desires make the basis on which
> >> emotions function.  He says later the general functions emotions
> perform is
> >> that they enable a person to set a certain vital task; but they enable a
> >> person to decide from the very beginning whether physical , spiritual
> and
> >> moral  means to fulfil a task are available, if not the task isn't taken
> >> up.  Seems that these aspects might be relevant to 'conditions'  for
> >> whatever 'actions'  of whole process.
> >>
> >> In this vein 'transitional object' might be more aking to Winnicott's.
> >> Though in schooling teaching 'formal concepts' what happens?
> >>
> >> Christine.
> >>
> >>
> >> On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:
> >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >>
> >>     Enjoy your Ilyenkov, Christine. If you come across any typos,
> >>     please send them to me.
> >>
> >>     Yes, the third action is the formation of the "germ cell" -
> >>     getting to the abstract heart of the problem - and is therefore
> >>     exactly what Ilyenkov is talking about in the passage you cite.
> >>     But whether the concept of double stimulation helps just here I
> >>     don't know. And also, I personally think it is worth devoting some
> >>     time to grasping the *whole process* of concept formation and this
> >>     paragraph of Engestrom's is one of the few places where a writer
> >>     attempts to do this and analyse it. So I would encourage people to
> >>     work on that whole process, rather than picking out one action,
> >>     important as that also is.
> >>
> >>     The ideal-typical line of development which Yrjo has presented
> >>     here is proposed as ideal-typical of "concept formation in the
> >>     wild," as that is the title he himself chose for the special
> >>     issue. But it looks much more to me like the ideal-typical
> >>     sequence of cognitive acts for an intervention. In general, I find
> >>     the germ cell is *discovered* not "constructed" or "modelled."
> >>     This moment, the "Aha! moment," has always been one of the most
> >>     challenging ones for "logicians" to describe. It is a *leap*. In
> >>     general I would say it is a sudden insight that more resembles a
> >>     moment of discovery than a "construction."
> >>
> >>     One the other hand, I think the danger in presenting the concept
> >>     of concept as an ideal-typical line of development (something
> >>     which I also advocate) is that the reader may easily slip into the
> >>     illusion that the given moment (here the discovery of the germ
> >>     cell) or action, is a once-off moment. In fact, the germ-cell may
> >>     be discovered in what turns out to be a misconception, but may
> >>     nonetheless run the full gammet up to objectification and "a new
> >>     stable form of practice" before falling into contradiction with
> >>     itself and entering into conflict with a new germ cell, and being
> >>     sublated into a new, deeper concept of the problem which figures
> >>     in "action 1." This applies to all Yrjo's actions listed here.
> >>
> >>     But one of the great merits of Engestrom's writing is that his
> >>     reseach reports are equally much teaching and learning
> >>     instruments, and this neat seven-step program functions as an
> >>     excellent guide to practice. But one should remember that a real
> >>     concept is not an ideal-typical concept (NB readers of Vygotsky).
> >>     Each of those steps (Hegel called them "grades" rather than
> >>     "stages" sometimes) includes and sublates others in a kind of
> >>     cascade. It is not a neat sequence of events, culminating in a
> >>     "new stable form of practice" signalling the end of the
> >>     intervention and time to settle up and go home. The process of
> >>     concept development never stops.
> >>
> >>     Andy
> >>
> >>     Christine Schweighart wrote:
> >>
> >>         Hi Andy,
> >>         In  the third action, developing an abstraction - Yryo's work
> >>         uses a generic model in dual stimulation. This draws upon his
> >>         historical development as argued in his research.
> >>          Is it not also possible to explore this third action as an
> >>         abstraction without that particular model structure,  I ask
> >>         because I'm reading this section of Chapter 1 of Ilyenkov:
> >>         http://www.marxists.org/**archive/ilyenkov/works/**
> >> abstract/abstra1d.htm<
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1d.htm>
> >>         "The task of logic as a science grows out of the real needs of
> >>         the developing cognition of the phenomena of the surrounding
> >>         world. The question with which a thinking man turns to logic
> >>         as a science is not at all the question of how abstractions
> >>         should be made in general, how one can learn to abstract the
> >>         general from the sensually given facts. To do that, one need
> >>         not at all ask the logicians’ advice, one merely has to have a
> >>         command of one’s native language and the ability to
> >>         concentrate one’s attention on the sensually given
> >>         similarities and differences.
> >>
> >>         The question with which one turns to logic and which can only
> >>         be answered by logic involves a much more complicated
> >>         cognitive task: how is one to work out an abstraction which
> >>         would express the objective essence of facts given in
> >>         contemplation and notions? The manner in which processing a
> >>         mass of empirically obvious facts yields a generalisation
> >>         expressing the real nature of the object under study – that is
> >>         the actual problem, whose solution is identical with that of
> >>         the problem of the nature of concepts as distinct from
> >>         abstract general notions."
> >>
> >>         and it strikes me that dual stimulation might be upon notions
> >>         from 'action 2' ...
> >>
> >>          Christine.
> >>
> >>         On Thu, Nov 15, 2012 at 8:54 AM, Andy Blunden
> >>         <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> >>         <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
> >>
> >>             Taylor & Francis allows xmca only discuss one article per
> >>         issue,
> >>             but I see no reason why we couldn't discuss this excerpt
> from
> >>             Engestrom's paper. It concerns "rising from the abstract
> >>         to the
> >>             concrete," which we were recently discussing, but without
> >>         resolution.
> >>
> >>             --------------------------
> >>
> >>             Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is achieved
> >>         through
> >>             specific epistemic or learning actions. Together these
> actions
> >>             form an expansive cycle or spiral. An ideal-typical
> >>         sequence of
> >>             epistemic actions in ascending from the abstract to the
> >>         concrete
> >>             may be described as follows:
> >>
> >>             •         The first action is that of questioning,
> >>         criticizing, or
> >>             rejecting some aspects of the accepted practice and existing
> >>             wisdom. For the sake of simplicity, we will call this action
> >>             questioning.
> >>
> >>             •         The second action is that of analyzing the
> >>         situation.
> >>             Analysis involves mental, discursive or practical
> >>         transformation
> >>             of the situation in order to find out origins and
> explanatory
> >>             mechanisms.
> >>
> >>             •         The third action is that of modeling a new
> >>         explanatory
> >>             relationship in some publicly observable and transmittable
> >>         medium.
> >>             This means constructing an explicit, simplified model of
> >>         the new
> >>             idea, a germ cell, that explains the problematic situation
> and
> >>             offers a perspective for resolving and transforming it.
> >>
> >>             •         The fourth action is that of examining the model,
> >>             running, operating, and experimenting on it in order to
> fully
> >>             grasp its dynamics, potentials, and limitations.
> >>
> >>             •         The fifth action is that of implementing the
> model,
> >>             concretizing it by means of practical applications,
> >>         enrichments,
> >>             and conceptual extensions.
> >>
> >>             •         The sixth and seventh actions are those of
> >>         reflecting on
> >>             and evaluating the process and consolidating its outcomes
> >>         into a
> >>             new stable form of practice.
> >>
> >>
> >>             --------------------
> >>
> >>             MCA 19(1) pp. 288-289.
> >>
> >>             Andy
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>     ______________________________**____________
> >>     _____
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> >>
> >>
> >>
> > --
> > ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> > ------------
> >
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
> > http://ucsd.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden<
> http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden>
> >
> >
> >
> > ______________________________**____________
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