Re: [xmca] VYGOTSKY

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Hi Haydi--

I believe that projects such as the Nicaraguan sign language project
are very relevant to the issue you/LSV raise. It is the inventiveness of
"next generations" that appear to be the driving force behind the evolution
of language complexity.

http://www.nicaraguansignlanguageprojects.org/

If this is interesting, there are other projects of this kind that could
provide
material for further discussion.

mike

On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 8:42 AM, Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> Merry all with your Christmas Time !
>
> WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT WITH A CHILD , SPEECH IS ALREADY
> PRESENT IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT BUT WITH THE GENUS (SPECIES) , WE SHOULD
> FIRST OF ALL THINK OF HOW THE VERY SPEECH CAME INTO BEING .
>
> THESE SELECTED PARAGRAPHS OF "TOOL AND SYMBOL IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT" TALK
> FOR THEMSELVES :
>
> Best
>
> Haydi
>
> This social nature of all the higher psychological functions has until now
> escaped
>  the attention of scholars, to whom it never occurred to regard the
> development of
>  logical memory or voluntary activity as part of the child 's social
> formation, for in its
>  biological beginning and at the end of its psychological development it
> appears as an
>  individualfunction.
>
>  The most important and basic of genetic laws, to which the
> study of the higher psychological functions leads us, reads that every
> symbolic
> activity of the child was onceasocial form of co-operationand preserves
> through-
> out its development, to its highest point, the social method of its
> functioning.
>
>
>
> On
> the other hand , the operation here alsogoesbeyond the limits of natural,
> intra-
> cortical processes, also adding to the psychological
> structureenvironmental elements
> that begin to be used as active agents governing the psychological process
> from
> without.
>
>
>
> Obviously, such a superior symbolic operation as the use of signs for
> remembering
> is the product of the most complex historical development; comparative
> analysis
> shows that such types of activity areabsent in all species of animals ,
> including the
> highest, and there is reason to believe that it is the product ofspecific
> conditions of
> social development.
>
>
> It would be equally
>   wrong to believe that the symbolic attitude to some stimuli is
> reachedintuitivelyby
>   the child, derived as it were from the depths of the child 's own
> spirit, or that
>   symbolization is the primaryand further irreducible Kantian facultas
> signatrix, from
>   the beginning a part of human consciousness capable of creating and
> comprehending
>   symbols.
>
>
> This means that they are not simply
> invented or passed down by adults, but rather arise from something that is
> originally
> not a sign operationand that becomes one only after a series of
> qualitativetransfor-
> mations, each of which conditions the next stage and is itself conditioned
> by the
> preceding one and thus links them like stages of an integral process,
> historical in
> nature.
>
>
> We found that the earliest flowering of the most complex sign operation
> occurs as early as in the system of purely natural forms of behaviour, and
> thus that the
> higher functions have their 'pre-natal' period of developmentlinking them
> with the
> natural foundation of the child's psyche. Objective observations showed
> that between
> the purely natural layer of the elementary functioning of psychological
> processes and
> the higher layer of indirect forms of behaviour, there lies a huge area of
> transitional
> psychological systems; in the history of behaviour, an area of primitive
> forms lies
> betweenthe natural and the cultural. We qualify these two points, that is,
> the idea
> of the development of higher psychological functions and their genetic
> connection
> with the natural forms of behaviour, as 'the natural history of the sign',
>
>
> To change (or swap) meanings
>   for the child means to change the properties of objects.
>
> Social forms of behaviour are more complicated and are in advancein their
> develop-
> ment in the child; when, however, they become individual, they are
> 'lowered' and
> begin to function according to simpler laws. Egocentric speech per se, for
> instance,
> is structurally lower than normal speech, but as a stage in the
> development of thou-
> ght it is higher than social speech in the child of the same age.
>
>
> form of behaviour
>
>   whenever a persThe two schools of psychology described above as the
> school of pure spiritualism,
>  on the one hand, and that of pure naturalism, on the other, led co the
> creation of two
>  absolutely independent methods of psychological research; in due time
> they both
> acquired a certain degree of finality and both must become the subject of
> complete
>  revision as soon as their philosophic basis undergoes criticism.
>
>
> Thus, if the first of these saw a specific object for psychological
> research in the
> states ofconsciousness, proposing that these higher forms were a special
> property of
>  the human spirit, closed cofunher analysis, then pure phenomenology,
> inner descrip-
>  tion and self-observation could be the only adequate methods for
> psychological
> studies. One aspect, however, proved to be fatal to spiritual attempts to
> create a
> method for the study of pychological processes: the higher psychological
> functions
> always evaded spiritualistic attempts to establish their origin and
> structure. They
> proved once and for all to be beyond the grasp of spiritualistic
> description because of
> their socio-historicgenesis and indirect structure. These methods found a
> particularly
> unsuitable soil in child psychology, and it may be said that they suffered
> defeat in
> that field even before their philosophic premises were subjected to
> criticism and
> revision.
>
>
> And consider-
>    ing the study of these to be its task, by bringing to the surface the
> auxiliary operations
>    with the help of which the subject masters this or the other problem,
> it brings them
>    within reach of objective study; in other words, it objectivizes them.
> We regard the
>  objectivizarion of inner psychological processesas incomparably more
> correct and
>   adequate, where the goals of psychological research are concerned, than
> the method
>   of studying ready objective responses, for only the former guarantees
> scientific
>   research the actual exposure of specific forms of higher behaviour as
> opposed to
>   subordinate forms.
>
>
> We are of the opinion that the solution of this problem is related to that
> change
>   of principle viewpoint in contemporary psychology upon which Lewin 63
> insists
>  and which he defines as the transition from the 'phenotypical to the
> conditional-
>  genetic' point of view. Further, we believe that psychological analysis,
> penetrating
>   beyond the external manifestation of phenomena and revealing the inner
> structure of
>  psychological processesand , particularly, the analysis of the
> development of higher
>  forms , compels us to acknowledge the unity, but not the identity , of
> higher and lower
>                                                                     y
>  psychological functions.
>
>
>  As they put it, a living creature is
>  not only a system that meetswith stimuli, but also a system that pursues
> aims
> (Ch. BUhler).
>
>
> Some of them, as for instance Lewin, see the solution of this
> problem in the concept of 'needs', i.e. in the fact that objects of the
> external world
> may have a definite relationto needs. They may have a positive or negative
> 'Aufforderungscharakter' .
>
>
> We can speak of a higher on masters his own behavioural processes (in the
> first place, when the
>  person can control his reactions ). The individual, subjecting the
> process of his own
>  responses to his will , thus enters into a principally new relation with
> the environ-
>  ment, arrives at a new functional use of environmental elements as
> stimuli signs, by
>  means of which relying on external means, he guides and regulates his own
> behaviour
>  externallymasters himself externallyforcing the stimuli signs to
> influence him and
>  to provoke and stimulate the desired responses. Inner regulation of
> purposeful activ-
>  ityoriginates an external regulation. Responsive action provoked and
> organized by
>  man himself ceases to be responsive and becomes purposeful.
>      In this sense, the phylogenetic history of man's practical intellect
> is closely tied,
>  not only to mastering nature, but also to mastering himself. The history
> of labour and
>  that of speechcan scarcely be understood without each other. Man not only
> invented
>  tools, by means of which he conquered nature, but he invented also
> stimulithat
>  motivated and regulated his own behaviour and by means of which he
> subjugated his
>  own forces to his will. This becomes apparent at the earliest stages of
> the development
>  of man.
>
>
> 'Thus, on Borneo and the Celebes,' says Bticher," 'special sticks made to
> dig the
> soil were found , each having a small stick attached to its top part. When
> the digging
> stick is used as a hoe to sow rice, the small stick produces a sound .'
> This sound is
> something like a work call or command, the aim of which is to produce a
> rhythmic
> pattern to regulate work .The sound of the small stick , fixed atop the
> hoe stick,
> replaces the human voice or, at any rate, performs an analogous function.
>     This intertwining of sign and tool which found its concrete symbolic
> expression in
> a primitive hoeing stick shows how earlythe sign (and later, its highest
> form, the
> word) begins to participate in the use of tools by man, and how early it
> begins to fulfill
> a highly specific function, to be compared with nothing else in the
> general structure
> of these operations that stand at the very beginning of the development of
> human
> labour. This stick is fundamentallydifferent fromthat used by apes,
> although                             without doubt they are related to each
> other genetically. If we ask ourselves in what
>  does this fundamental psychological difference between man's tool and
> that of an
>  animal rest, we must answer this question with yet another question,
> first formulated
>   by Kohler in connection with his discussion of a chimpanzee's
> activities, activities
>  geared to the future and guided by a notion of the external conditions
> that must
>  manifest themselves in the near or distant future. Kohler asks: to what
> limitation of
>  capacities in the chimpanzee must we ascribe the fact that they do not
> demonstrate
>  even the slightest element of cultural development, this notwithstanding
> evidence of
>  them manifesting many elements usually found only in civilization (even
> if they be
>  the most primitive)?
>
>
> The fact that he makes the tool in advanceis without the least doubt
>  related to thebeginning of culrure.
>
>
> Thus, there are two types of activity between which the psychologist
> must discriminate in principle: one is the behaviour of animals, the other
> that of man;
> activity as a product of biological evolution and activity originating in
> the process of
> man's historical development.
>
>
> The temporality of life, cultural development, work - in short, everything
> that
> distinguishes man from animals in the psychological field - all this is
> intimately
> related to the fact that, parallel to his conquest of natureover the
> course of his
> historical development, man also mastered his own self, his own behaviour.
> The stick
> mentioned by Bucher is a stick for future use. This is already a work
> tool. As Friedrich
> Engels so aptly put it, 'labour created man himself'," i.e. created the
> higher psycho-
> logical funerions which distinguish man as man. Primitive man, using his
> stick, by
> means of outer sign masters the processes of his own behaviour and
> subordinates his
> activityto the aim which he forces external objects to serve: tool, soil,
> rice.
>     In this sense, we may once more touch on Koffka's remark, briefly
> noted earlier.
> He asks: is there any sense in calling the actions of a chimpanzee in
> Kohler's
> experiments volitional actions? From the point of view of old psychology,
> this
> activity, being non-instinctive, non-automatized and, what is more,
> intelligent, must
> without doubt be classed as volitional action. But new psychology answers
> this
> questionin the negative- and with reason. In that sense, Koffka is
> absolutely right.
>
>  Only man's action, subordinated to his will power, can be qualified as
> volitional
>  action.
>     In his excellent analysis of the psychology of purposeful activity,
> Lewin makes a
>  clear-cut definition of free and volitional intention as a product of the
> historico-
>  cultural development of behaviour and as a specific feature of man's
> psychology. He
>  says:
>
>     The fact that man displays extraordinary freedom in what concerns the
> formation of any,
>     even the most senseless intention, is astounding in itself ... This
> freedom is character-
>     istic of cultural man. It is incomparably less characteristic of a
> child and, probably, of
>     primitive man , too; there is reason to believe that this, more than
> his highly developed
>     intellect, distinguishes man from the animals which stand closest to
> him. This division
>     corresponds to the problem of self-control (Beherrsch ung),
>
>
> The development of this 'freedom of action ', as we have tried to show
> above, is in
> direct functional dependence on the use of signs. The specific word-action
> relation
> which we have constantly been studying , occupies a central placein the
> ontogenesis
> of practical intellect in man , this notwithstanding the fact that in the
> field of higher
> functions ontogenesis repeats phylogenes is to an even lesser degree than
> in the field
> of elementary functions . Anyone who from this point of view follows the
> develop-
> ment of free action in the child will agree with K. BUhler's statement
> that the history
> of the development of child volition has not yet been written. In order to
> lay the
> foundations of this history we must first of all establish this relation
> between word
> and action, which lies at the beginnings of the formation of the child's
> will. Simul-
> taneously this will signify the first resolute step along the way to the
> solution of the
> problem of the two types of human activity which we have mentioned above.
>
>
> To certain psychologists the ancient biblical 'In the beginning was the
> Word' retains
>  all its fascination. New investigations, however, do not leave any doubt
> as to the fact
>  that the word does not stand at the beginning of the development of the
> child's mind.
>
> As Buhler correctly notes along the same lines: 'It was said that speech
> stands at
> the source of man's coming to be; perhaps this is true , but prior to
> speech there is
> instrumental thinking (Werkzeugdenken)'. Practical intellect is
> genetically more
> ancient than verbal; action precedes the word, even intelligent action
> precedes the
> intelligent word. Now, however, while repeating this thought, very true in
> itself,
> there is a tendency to overestimate action at the word's expense. The most
> common
> approach is to conceive the relation between word and action (independence
> of action
> from the word and primacy of action) characteristic of early age, as
> remaining thus
> during all the following stages of development and throughout life.
>
>
>  Together with Gurzmann,69 we say: 'Even if we, following Goethe, refute
> the
>  "word's" high value per se, that is, the "sounding" word 's," and if we
> translate
>  together with him the biblical dictum as "in the beginning was the deed",
> it is
>  nevertheless possible to read this verse (understanding it from the point
> of view of
>  historical development)thus: "in the beginning was the deed'..
>
>
> He points out that only action
> as a more general concept can embrace, on the one hand, expressive movement
> (speech) and, on the other, actions as co-ordinative, parallel,
> co-ordinate, co-relative
> and more particular concepts.
>
>
> 'Speech',
> says he, 'always signifies a higher stage of man's development than even
> the supreme
> expression of action - the deed (die Tat).-72    /critique/
>
>
> He who pays no attention to these facts inevitably presents the
> psychological
>  nature of speech and of action in a false light, for the source of their
> changes rests in
>  their functional junction. Anyone who ignores this fundamental fact and
> who, having
>  the purity of concept classification as his purpose , tries to represent
> speech and action
>  as two never-meeting parallels, willy-nilly limits the real scope of both
> concepts
>  because this scope of content is rooted first and foremost in the ties of
> both of them.
>
>
> The essence of the matter, as demonstrated in investigations of these ties
> between
>  word and action in child-age and in cases of aphasia, lies in the fact
> that speech lifts
> action to its highest stage, action that was previously independent of it.
>
>
>  We cannot dwell, as should be sufficiently obvious from the preceding
> passages,
> on either the evangelical or Goethean formula, no matter which word we
> accentuate.
> But we must remark that all these formulae, Gutzmann's included,
> necessarily
>
>  require a continuation. Each speaks about what occurred at the beginning.
> But what
>  happened later? The beginning is only a beginning, i.e. the starting
> point of move-
> ment.The process of development per se, however, must by necessity
> includea denial
> of this starting pointand movement towardhigher forms of action lying not
> at the
> beginning but at the end of the whole process. How does this process
> occur? The
> attempt to answer this question induced us to write this article. In it we
> have tried
> to show how the word, becoming intellectualized and developing on the
> basis of
> action,lifts this action to a supreme level, subjects the child to its
> power, stamps it
> with the seal of will. But since we wanted to express all this in one
> short formula, in '
> one sentence, we might put it thus: if at the beginning of development
> there stands the
> act, independent of the word, then at the endof it there stands the word
> which
> becomes the act, the word which makes man's action free.
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca