XMCA Mail 2005_02: dialogical self

These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes,
and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving.
Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards.
If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site,
please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.

dialogical self

Your e-mails fed my thinking about the dialogical self en social situatedness. I
looked at the article again with your remarks in mind.

Let me first repeat that I think the position of B & R interesting and a very good
alternative for Berry’s approach. My problem was with the conceptual
framework. To say that identity is dynamic and socially situated is not the same
as offering a theory that shows, how identity is dynamic and socially situated.

Maybe I ‘d better sketch the background of my question. I ‘m working on a
dynamic conception of culture/cognition. At the moment I’m studying Rogoff’s
theory. So identity is not really my subject, but it interest me nonetheless,
because I think we need a general framework for understanding development as
dynamic and socially situated.

Looking through the article again the thought crossed my mind, that maybe I
didn’t aim my comment at the right authors. Who should provide the theoretical
framework? B&R cite Valsiner en Hermans. Valsiner interprets the relation
individual – world as inclusive separation. As I understand this, the term is
presented as an alternative to dualism, but is also meant to convey the
independent status of (in this case) I-positions inside the human head. After
reading the B & R article I read one of Hermans’ articles. My impression was,
that I-positions in his theory are rather static. (Although he claims them to be
dynamic?) Hermans conceives of self as a dynamic construction on the base of
I-positions like a father or a worker. When I ‘m looking for social situatedness I
want to understand, how I-positions are really dynamic. Let me explain this by
using as an analogy abstract cognitive skills. These used to be interpreted as
abstract competences in the head. I think abstractions as such are just in the
head of the researcher. In the same way I can conceive of I-positions as
dynamic. The I-positions are continuously created within the sociocultural
constraints of the situation. The description of I-positions is in that case just a
tool of the observer. The I-positions are not different parts that organize and
reorganize inside the head. And that just what they according to B&R –
following Valsiner - are: “…. that some forms of negotiations with the different
parts of the self are less demanding and lead us forward toward a more ‘stable’
development, although other forms of negotiations are more paralyzing, severe
and show ‘instability’.” (p 238) So B&R might want to present a really
dynamic conception of identity, but I think Valsiner’s intrapsychological
organization and reorganization still forms the background.