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These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes, and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving. Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards. If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site, please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
Of course the whole beauty on Peirce's idea is that signs and sign activity
are natural and ubiquitous. But the concept of semiosis arose only in the
1890s in the US, and is something used in the analysis of natural processes
like chemical reactions, social processes like scare-mongering, etc., etc.,
etc. The distinction between a thing and the concept of the thing, which is
after all a thing as well, becomes important only at a certain point if you
insist on the objective existence of the thing as a justification for the
validity of the concept of the thing.
Andy
At 09:29 PM 9/09/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>For Peirce, thought is sign activity. To say that signs are merely tools
>for thought spurs the question: what, then is thought itself?
>
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Received on Sun Sep 9 19:05 PDT 2007
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