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Thanks Martin. My opening paragraph should have read:
>
> Martin argues that we should consider LSV's developmemtal theory as a
> the
> development of consciousness, NOT the development
> of knowledge or tool use. I think this might be better approached from
> and
> AND/BOTH, not an either/or position.
>
You then continue
> ... I'm not opposed to
> treating this as an and/both, except that I think that V was extending the
> Hegelian opposition to the assumption that knowledge is mental
> representation.
This goes back to the just-prior comments of David and my response. Why do
you say this?
You have already argued that consciousness is in the interaction, or emerges
in interaction
and I was trying to grab that to find a way to get comfortable with the idea
that his general
psychology=child history=developmental psychology-as-the Uber psychology cut
off the
idealist half.
> If I'm right, then V was not offering a social kind of
> genetic epistemology.
Wow. Consciousness is only possible as co-knowledge (so-znanie) but its not
social? Who is the con-spirit-or, or what?
mike
> Piaget was wrong to follow Kant and view knowledge as
> mental structures. Knowledge is itself a transformation of consciousness.
>
>
> > ... It is precisely the structure which combines all separate processes,
> > which are the component parts of the cultural habit of behavior, which
> > transforms this
> > habit into a psychological function, and which fulfills its task with
> > respect to the behavior as a whole.
>
> V's position seems to be that consciousness is a structuring of behavior.
> (And if consciousness itself develops, then the structure changes and
> develops too.) In your example, it seems to me, we have two natural
> 'material' processes which are combined and structured and thereby
> transformed into a *cultural* habit, and which presumably transforms the
> form of consciousness too.
> >
> > So if consciousness is emergent from our interactions with our
> environments,
> > and if those interactions form a complex whole, the precise structure of
> > which changes to specifics of goal and means, then studying the genesis
> of
> > mediated interaction = studying the genesis of consciousness.
>
> I think so, yes.
>
> Martin
>
>
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Received on Sun Mar 9 11:48 PDT 2008