Re: [xmca] Uptake and Takeaway

And editorials/thought pieces by others are in the pipeline.
What might you wish to write about, Jonna?
mike

On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 12:41 PM, Jonna Kangasoja <
jonna.kangasoja@helsinki.fi> wrote:

> Hi David,
>
> The play issue (MCA Vol. 15 number 2) reached me in Helsinki end of last
> week. There is another very interesting editorial by Wolff-Michael on
> ontology of difference.
>
> best,
> Jonna
>
> David Kellogg kirjoitti 30.6.2008 kello 21.44:
>
>
> Mike:
>>
>> I'll try hard to do as you say, because I think that the issue of affect
>> and intellect (emotion and rational thought) is an almost perfect issue for
>> a guest editorial.
>>
>> But I don't think I am a perfect candidate for the guest. First of all, as
>> you can see from the last line of my contribution below, I'm still confused
>> about the difference between microgenesis on the one hand and learning on
>> the other.
>>
>> Like many sloppy thinkers, I tend to proceed by bold analogy and then
>> fiddle with the results until they fit well enough for whatever practical
>> purpose I have at hand.
>>
>> In this case, I tend to think of the distinction as similar to the
>> distinction we find between Darwinian phylogenetic evolution on the one hand
>> and Marxian socio-historical change on the other, or between Marxian
>> socio-historical change on the one hand and Vygotskyan ontogenetic
>> development on the other.
>>
>> For me time scale is what makes each of these distinctions both
>> distinguishable and indissolubly linked: in each case, the distinction is
>> something like that between climate change and weather change, and the
>> similarity is similarly similar.
>>
>> Phylogenetic evolution is on the scale of hundreds of thousands of years,
>> while Marxian socio-historical change occurs within centuries. Yet
>> FUNCTIONALLY they appear remarkably congruent: the production of coats, so
>> well elaborated in the first volume of Capital, is a logical attempt to
>> accelerate the production of fur to match the colder climes encountered
>> outside Africa, and the production of houses is a socio-cultural response to
>> the dearth of caves.
>>
>> Similarly, Vygotskyan ontogenesis takes place on the scale of years, but
>> functionally it appears as both a reverse-engineering and an extension of
>> the socio-cultural development of clothes, housing, and of course language.
>>
>> In each case the slower process provides the environment for the speedier
>> one, but the speedier process lays down a foundation for the next phase of
>> the slower one. In each case, the speedier process is a functionally similar
>> extension of the slower one by radically more rapid means (cultural vs.
>> natural, semiotic vs. tool-based)
>>
>> I'm afraid I'm still thinking about the distinction between microgenesis
>> and ontogenesis in an analogous way. Ontogenetic development provides the
>> preconditions in which microgenesis unfolds, and in return microgenesis
>> enables the next phase of ontogenetic development. And in that sense
>> microgenesis plays precisely the role that LSV assigns to learning: it leads
>> ontogenesis by socially awakening processes that give rise to psychological
>> development.
>>
>> I understand perfectly what you said about microgenesis being simply a
>> moment of ontogenesis, about it being part of a revolutionary transformation
>> rather than the kind of incremental and easily forgotten experience that we
>> see in learning. But all this suggests to me at this point is some kind of
>> selection akin to evolutionary selection (my sloppy analogy ridden thinking
>> again!).
>>
>> Some transformations live and reorganize the child's mind, in which case
>> we call them microgenetic, but these are a subset of a much broader set of
>> transformations, most of which simply persist without any radically
>> reorganizing effects or even wither and die on the vine. This larger set of
>> transformations are what we call learning. I'm afraid that's the limit of my
>> understanding at this point.
>>
>> The second reason I'm not sure about being the guest editor on affect and
>> intellect is that I think we're going to have a special issue on Gunilla
>> Lindqvist and playworlds soon. The current issue of MCA contains two really
>> smashing articles on this very topic; perhaps one of the authors could
>> contribute a guest editorial developing the affect/intellect issue, so
>> obviously implicated in playworlds, for that issue.
>>
>> I think that would work much better to achieve Wolff-Michael's real goal,
>> which is establishing a kind of inter-issue coherence, so that every issue
>> of MCA appears as an installment of some larger project without end. (Not to
>> be confused with a process without a product!)
>>
>> When is the play issue coming out? Anybody know?
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Seoul National University of Education
>>
>> --- On Sun, 6/29/08, Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Uptake and Takeaway
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Date: Sunday, June 29, 2008, 5:34 PM
>>
>> David et al---
>>
>> I come very late to this note and for the moment wish only to emphasize my
>> appreciation for David
>> taking notice of the invitation for readers of MCA to write editorials.
>> The
>> idea is indeed to take up
>> some issue or issues that have appeared in the past and comment on them
>> with
>> respect to the present.
>> This is a different function than summarizing what is to come.
>>
>> So far as I know, except for David's Xmca note below, there has been no
>> uptake of this takeupable idea.
>> Why not?
>>
>> The door is open. Why not walk in?
>> For openers, David, perhaps you could work your comments below into a
>> guest
>> editorial of your own.
>> After all, there are lots of readers of MCA who are not members of XMCA
>> (and
>> versa vice, alas).
>>
>> mike
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 23, 2008 at 5:35 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I just got the latest MCA and read Wolff-Michael Roth's guest
>>>
>> editorial
>>
>>> (!). It's really a brilliant idea, to have readers pen the editorials.
>>>
>> At
>>
>>> first I thought it wouldn't work, because readers won't have
>>>
>> advance access
>>
>>> to the issue copy and can't do a "round up" the way
>>>
>> Wolff-Michael used to
>>
>>> do.
>>>
>>> But of course that's NOT what Wolff-Michael's got in mind at all.
>>>
>> What he
>>
>>> has in mind is not a round-up but an up-take, something like this
>>> conversation which he uses as data between a schoolchild and the head of
>>>
>> NGO
>>
>>> about a science project involving the measurement of water temperature:
>>>
>>> D: It's like nineteen.
>>> N: Whoo, it's going...so it's GONE UP a degree since this
>>>
>> morning.
>>
>>> Nineteen what.
>>> D: Nineteen degrees fahrenheit
>>> N: Nope.
>>> D: Ah...degree in...Nah. I just fogot it.
>>> N: Nineteen degrees what?
>>> D: Uh, nineteen degrees I forgot.
>>> N: It's not...
>>> D: I keep forgetting everything.
>>> N: OK, alright. That's right. There's no such thing as being
>>>
>> dumb.
>>
>>>
>>> Notice how the words "nineteen" and then "forgot" run
>>>
>> like song refrains
>>
>>> through this little two-part aria. First D says it, and then N uptakes it
>>> and then D uptakes THAT, and so on.
>>>
>>> So now we readers get a chance to UPTAKE an issue from a previous issue
>>> (Nystrand, Slimani) rather than try to foresee the theme of the present
>>> issue. In this case it's Wolff-Michael's own problem of linking
>>>
>> emotion and
>>
>>> intonation. So even the non-editorial writing reder can get something
>>> much
>>> more important than a "round-up" for readers who are too lazy to
>>>
>> go and read
>>
>>> the articles or even the abstracts. We get continuity and coherence!
>>>
>>> That's my (hugely appreciative) uptake of Wolff-Michael's
>>>
>> innovation! Now
>>
>>> here's a comment on the uptaken issue, the link of emotion and
>>>
>> intonation.
>>
>>> There are really three points in the article where I disagree a little,
>>>
>> and
>>
>>> I think they all point to a slightly larger disagreement:
>>>
>>> p. 3: Wolff-Michael argues that N's "nineteen degrees what"
>>>
>> should
>>
>>> normally RISE rather than fall: "...(W)hereas in usual
>>> utterances-intended-as questions the pitch level would rise toward the
>>>
>> end,
>>
>>> the pitch level was falling in her utterance as if she were making a
>>> statement." This rise is indeed characteristic of
>>> "utterances-intended-as-questions" when they refer to already
>>>
>> STATED,
>>
>>> AVAILABLE, OLD information, like this:
>>>
>>> D: It's nineteen degrees Fahrenheit!
>>> N: It's nineteen degrees....? (UP)
>>> N: It's nineteen degrees FAHRENHEIT? (UP)
>>> N: It's nineteen degrees WHAT? (UP)
>>>
>>> But it is NOT characteristic of
>>>
>> "utterances-intended-as-questions" when
>>
>>> they refer UNSTATED, NOT YET AVAILABLE, NEW information, like this:
>>>
>>> A: I'm going to be LATE.
>>> B: Late for WHAT? (DOWN)
>>> A: Late for work!
>>> B: Late for WORK? (Incredulously, up-DOWN) It's SUNday! (DOWN)
>>>
>>> You can see that here the intonation is very consistently DOWN, and the
>>> (up-DOWN) movement simply serves to give the speaker more room in which
>>> to
>>> fall. I think that this is because the default intonation in English (and
>>>
>> in
>>
>>> many other languages as well) is DOWN, and it is this intonation which is
>>> used to impart new information. The marked intonation is UP, and this is
>>> used to cast doubt or critical distance on old information.
>>>
>>> This is why, by the way, rhetorical wh-questions tend to be UPly
>>> intoned,
>>> even when they are written. If I were shamelessly touting my own wares, I
>>> might mention at this point that Jungran Yi and I wrote about this at
>>>
>> least
>>
>>> tangentially in an article in Language Awareness:
>>>
>>> http://www.multilingual-matters.net/la/015/la0150038.htm
>>>
>>>
>>> p. 5: Wolff-Michael says "In the speaking/hearing complement,
>>>
>> collective
>>
>>> knowing and consciousness is expressed. This can be assumed to be the
>>> case
>>> as long as no evidence to the contrary is provided as part of a
>>> situation,
>>> for example, if one of the speakers were to have said, 'What did you
>>>
>> say?'
>>
>>> or "What do you mean?' In such a situation, the sound--and maybe
>>>
>> even some
>>
>>> words has been heard but the marked sense is not evident to the
>>>
>> listener."
>>
>>>
>>> These are two VERY different cases as you can easily tell by reading
>>> them
>>> aloud and noticing that the former has UP intonation while the latter is
>>> normally intoned DOWN. In the former, the sound has indeed not been
>>>
>> clearly
>>
>>> heard, and therefore the UP intonation is used to "scroll back"
>>>
>> the
>>
>>> discourse. But in the latter what is being asked for is new and more
>>> specific information.
>>>
>>> p. 5: Wolff-Michael says that in modern art this kind of "what do
>>>
>> you
>>
>>> mean?" is not possible, because "art is for its own sake, not
>>>
>> signifying or
>>
>>> denoting something else." A great deal of modern art has TRIED to
>>>
>> achieve
>>
>>> the Quixotic feat of not meaning anything. But it is in principle
>>> impossible, a fantasy of the aesthetes in the late nineteenth century;
>>>
>> even
>>
>>> Jackson Pollock admitted that his paintings were INDEXICAL--they meant
>>> the
>>> actions that were used to produce them, and not simple ICONS. It's not
>>> possible to create art without meaning anything; it's like
>>>
>> Chomsky's
>>
>>> supposedly meaningless "Colorless green ideas" (which next to
>>>
>> "This sentence
>>
>>> has never before been written and will never be written again" is
>>>
>> probably
>>
>>> the most widely quoted and thoroughly understood piece of Chomsky ever
>>> written).
>>>
>>> It seems to me a larger disagreement looms in Wolff-Michael's
>>>
>> analysis of
>>
>>> the data. He argues that N's response "There is no such thing as
>>>
>> being dumb"
>>
>>> is a consolatory move intended to allay the negative affect of D's
>>> forgetfulness, and I am sure that is how N sees it. But the object of
>>> interest here is affect, and that means that what really matters is how D
>>> feels about this "consolation".
>>>
>>> It seems to me unlikely that this consolation will genuinely lead to a
>>> zone of proximal development. On the contrary, by explicitly
>>>
>> "uptaking" the
>>
>>> issue of dumbness which was only implicit heretofore, it seem quite
>>> likely
>>> to have the OPPOSITE effect.
>>>
>>> This brings me to the larger disagreement. Wolff-Michael and I are both
>>> interested in affect and how thinking emerges from feeling, linked yet
>>> distinct. But Wolff-Michael is very much focussing on micro-genesis, and
>>> I
>>> think that LSV's main concern (as well as my own) was the role of
>>>
>> affect in
>>
>>> ontogenesis, the way in which rational and objective thought emerges
>>>
>> (again,
>>
>>> linked but distinct) from non-rational and affective feeling.
>>>
>>> Microgenesis is important, and I have no doubt that we can indeed study
>>>
>> it
>>
>>> the way Wolff-Michael has pioneered, through intonation. The problem is
>>>
>> that
>>
>>> as we can see, there are cultural patterns that affect intonation that
>>> are
>>> quite independent of individual affect: they are concerned with the
>>>
>> newness
>>
>>> or giveness or availability of the topicalized information rather than
>>>
>> with
>>
>>> the speaker's affective attitude towards it, and as with any language
>>>
>> use,
>>
>>> the speaker's affect must take these cultural conventions (UP for Old
>>> Information and DOWN for New) into account when the speaker expreses
>>> feelings. So to a certain extent we've got a primacy of thinking over
>>> feeling already, because of the cultural patrimony that the speaker must
>>> speak through.
>>>
>>> On the other hand, it seems to me to be the case that while children
>>> like
>>> D have a procedural understanding of these cultural conventions, their
>>> affective experience is still overwhelming; the logical argument that
>>>
>> memory
>>
>>> is not a measure of intelligence is simply not convincing (and rightly so
>>> given the salience of memory in education and in working life). So the
>>> take-away is not going to be the same as the uptake, and this cold
>>> comfort
>>> (how consolation pries!) is unlikely to create a zone of ontogenetic
>>> affective development.
>>>
>>> Can a zone of microgenetic development be said to be a zone of
>>> development? Isn't it merely a zone of proximal learning?
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------------------------------
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>>> it
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Received on Tue Jul 1 17:15 PDT 2008