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Just a quick fix - I was saying that the Vienna Circle thought that Einstein had showed that science is purely logical. I completely agree with you that it is not. (And so the immanent collapse of Ford and AIG may seem like the end of history, it's actually not! (There was a book a few years back arguing that science had come to its end. Nonsense of course. (But I'm starting to ramble (it's late...)))) Martin On 4/22/09 9:40 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > Yes and No. I was using the word "metaphysics" in the way > Pragmatists use it. Strictly speaking, of course, *all* > thinking contains metaphysical assumptions. So in that you > and Kuhn are right and I was wrong. > > Perhaps I could stop using the word Metaphysics to mean the > reification of thought forms into independently existing > substances, and others stop using the word Ontology to refer > to personal identity formation? :) > > But I disagree with you about your Kantian conclusion that > "science is a purely logical". It was this Kantian belief > (along with Euclid) that was overthrown by Einstein. The > Logical positivists were wrong of course, because they > interpreted the subject in Kantian terms, as an individual > person and their private psyche having direct access to > eternal reason. > > Interstingly Einstein disagreed with Bridgman. Einstein said > that within the context of a consistent theory, not every > entity in the theory has to be subject to an operational > definition. Einstein right, Bridgman wrong. But I think > Bridgman got the right idea nonetheless. > > Where Hegel and you are wrong, I believe, is the presumption > that we are at the end of history (neither of you claim that > of course, but it is a valid implication in both cases.) If > the nature of time and space can be deduced completely from > a critique of the cultural practices at any given time, e.g. > in 1807 before the Michaelson-Morley experiment was > possible, then obviously the practices whose critique will > allow the Special Theory of Relativity to be deduced "by > logic" i.e., critique of practice, are impossible. If > "science is a purely logical" then that presumes that no > further significant developments in social practices (such > as the Michelson-Morlet experiment) can be made. > > BTW Ed, I think we have to treat the Special Theory and the > General Theory differently. There is absolutely nothing > simple about the general theory and its tensor calculus! > > Andy > > Martin Packer wrote: >> Oh Andy, I'm going to have to disagree with you once again! >> >> At least, I'm going to disagree if by your statement here you mean to say >> that Einstein was avoiding metaphysics. That was the interpretation the >> logical positivists made, arguing that Einstein had exposed the fact >> Newtonian physics had hidden metaphysical assumptions, but that, with his >> operational definitions (Bridgman's term, but his ilustrations were from >> Einstein), Einstein had finally showed that science was a purely logical (or >> if you prefer practical) activity, free from metaphysics. What a mess that >> has led us into! >> >> I'm on Kuhn's side on this issue: every scientific paradigm has metaphysical >> assumptions embedded in its practices. So we don't have metaphysics on the >> one hand and practice on the other. We have alternative kinds of scientific >> practice, each with their metaphysical assumptions. (The metaphysics of >> Einsteinian physics include the assumption that space is something that can >> be curved by a mass, for example.) The merits of each of the alternatives is >> what scientists spend their careers hotly debating. Even what *counts* as >> metaphysics is different from one paradigm to another. >> >> But that's probably what you meant! :) >> >> Martin >> >> >> On 4/22/09 8:17 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: >> >>> All Einstein did was, instead of regarding time and space as >>> metaphysical entities existing independently of human >>> practice, he closely examined the practice of measuring time >>> and distance. That's all. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca