Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech complexity ; From 2-?: Zinchenko on internalization and externalization

[Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>]

I want to pick up on a very interesting comment by Dot regarding  
internalization in her July 23 response to Peter:

"It is the development of psychological functional organs (as opposed  
to morphological organs) that can be studied as the result of  
internalization, not internalization itself (although a number of  
neuroscientists are doing very interesting work)."

********************

I happen to be reading an article by V. P. Zinchenko, "From Classical  
to Organic Psychology: In Commemoration of Lev Vygotsky's Birth,"  
based on a talk he gave in 1996.  It appears in the 2002 collection  
edited by Dot and Anna Stetsenko, Voices Within Vygotsky's Non- 
Classical Psychology.

V.P. Zinchenko's article touches on the psychological functional  
organs idea touched on by Dot, and how it relates to internalization.   
I will be sharing VPZ's thoughts on this and other aspects of  
internalization in a series of quotes from the article.

VPZ explains that **internalization** is best understood in terms of  
the process of **externalization**.  This is a potent concept Anna  
Stetsenko promoted in a 2005 paper in the MCA Journal, which we  
discussed here on xmca at the time.

In my opinion, VPZ's article sheds rather more light on the core  
questions involved in the cultural-historical exploration of  
internalization than Peter's little "romp" seems to.  See what you  
think.

**********************

My selection of 12 or so quotes and combinations of quotes of various  
lengths touches on topics such as:

1. what are functional psychological organs
2. mediation and the construction of functional psychological organs
3. how internalization is intertwined with externalization
4. the basis of internalization
5. some of the limitations of Soviet activity theory
6. some historical reasons for the limitations of Soviet activity theory
7. replacing the concept of "internalization" with "differentiation of  
movement"
8. the relationship of subjectivity and externalization
9. Vygotsky's concept of the sign and externalization
10. word and deed as equal partners in psychological processes
11. the problem of the naturalistic interpretation of internalization
12.  Vygotsky on thinking and action


1.  VPZ explains the concept of the functional psychological organ,  
first by referring to Ukhtomsky (1978).

"Ukhtomsky believed that subjective, mental entities are objectivized  
in the "body" of the functional organs of an individual (i.e., virtual  
organs as particular skills, as opposed to morphological organs such  
as an arm).  These functional organs are just as real as the usual  
morphological ones.  Ukhtomsky (1978) defined functional ogans as "any  
temporary combination of forces that are capable of achieving a  
specific outcome," p. 95) or as activities distributed in time and  
space.  He wrote that an individual's functional organ is similar to a  
dynamic mobile agent.  As exampls of functional organs Ukhtomsky  
mentioned psychological phenomena, such as memories of the past,  
intentions, and an integral view of the world.  He emphasized that  
these are novel formations [*novoobrazpvaniya*], which arise when  
individuals interact with the environment, in their activity, as they  
actively come forard to meet the demands of their environment." pg 7.

"Scholars such as N.A. Bernstein, A.V. Zaporozhets, A.N. Leontiev, and  
A.R. Luria broadly used and developed the concept of functional  
organs, or an individual's novel formations.  They believed that an  
individual's functional organs have certain bodily properties, for  
example, they have a biodynamic sensuous affective "tissue."   
Functional organs or psychological functional systems should be viewed  
as matter (tissue) that eventually constitutes the spiritual organism,  
the anatomy and physiology of the human spirit itself." pg 8.

"In Vygotsky's writings, the term *psychological functional system* is  
analogous to the notion of *functional organ*."  pg 8.


2.  VPZ goes on to relate functional psychological organs to  
mediation, and how mediators or psychological tools enable the  
construction of these organs.

"Meditation constitutes the very core of cultural-historical  
psychology.  Meditational acts (now being intensively studied by B.D.  
Elkonin and his colleagues) contain the secret of development, the  
secret of how real forms are transformed into ideal ones, and vice  
versa.  When objects, tools, and signs are incorporated into natural  
psychological forms (to retain Vygotsky's term, which he was  
repeatedly criticized for), the latter are transformed into ideal  
cultural ones.  These forms then acquire an object, tool, sign, word  
or symbol - related to the instrumental, mental capacity of  
operations, actions, and activity in a broad sense.

"What does the concept of *transformation* actually mean?  
Transformation is the process in which novel functional organs are  
constructed.  This process is performed by means of mediators that  
Vygotsky called "psychological tools," or "psychological  
instruments."  pg 9.


3. VPZ sees that part of the problem with discussions of  
internalization is how the naturalistic interpretation of the internal  
(which, of course, Vygotsky directly opposed) tends to dominate  
discussions of internalization.  The process of internalization  
involves not just moving **in** but also moving **out**.

"As long as we are bound to a naturalistic understanding of what the  
internal is (that is akin to the Freudian naturalistic understanding  
of the unconscious), internalization will continue to be viewed as  
*growing into* emptiness, into *nowhere*.  Leont'ev was aware of the  
flaws of such a naturalistic interpretation, and in his later work he  
insisted that in the processes of internalization the internal plane  
is born, that is, it emerges for the first time.  However, Leont'ev  
did not study this process.  Nonetheless, what he said is sufficient  
to conclude that internalization involves simultaneous *growing into*  
and *growing out*.  In other words, internalization should not be  
taken to mean that activity is plunged into some "depths" of the  
internal plane.  Internalization should not be likened to the Freudian  
mechanism of repressing memories into the unconscious." pg 15


4.  VPZ offers the following summary of internalization, which  
parallels Vygotsky's concept of the sociocultural transformation of  
lower mental functions into higher:

"With regard to internalization, the crux of the matter is that in  
order for a process to grow, and for it to be able to then generate  
anything new, this process must first exist and go through certain  
transformations." pg 16.


5.  VPZ suggests that Soviet activity theory's concept of  
internalization was inhibited by a naturalistic interpretation of  
internalization that caused researchers to ignore some key insights by  
Vygotsky into internalization.

"A naturalistic interpretation of internalization delayed research  
into object-related activity and object-related actions as such." pg 16

"Orientation, memorization, decision-making and the like happened to  
be viewed as representing a higher level, whereas execution and  
performance were reduced [by activity theorists such as AN Leont'ev,  
A.V. Zaporozhets and others, see pg 15 -sg] ] to elementary, lower,  
even primitive processes.  Naturally, everybody wanted to do research  
at the higher levels and abandon the "lower" ones as quickly as  
possible.  Many did so in their pursuit of the theory of  
internalization, according to which practical actions connect with  
concrete, rough, visible objects *growing into* a subtle ideal matter  
[culturally meaningful material -sg], and are then transferred into an  
internal plane.  This view was partly inspired by Vygotsky's division  
of mental processes into natural and cultural, or lower and higher  
ones. What was ignored in this approach was that Vygotsky viewed  
movement exactly as a higher process, similar to the process of  
perception, memory, and attention, and he also linked movement to the  
development of symbolic activity (Vygotsky, 1984, p 54 [Collected  
Works, (Vol 6): Scientific legacy.  Moscow: Pedagogy.])." pg 16.


6. VPZ offers an explanation for this narrow naturalistic approach to  
internalization in Soviet activity theory.

"It is not the fault but the misfortune of Soviet psychology that the  
concept of "object-related activity" has never been theoretically  
developed.  Pyatigorsky has recently drawn attention to this fact.   
This task was tackled by E. Ilyenkov [Russian philosopher; 1924-1979]  
and V. Davydov [1930-1998], and E. Yudin [1930-1976]. Yet, the  
philosophical concept of object-related activity, as well as the  
concepts of external and internal, remain [continue -sg] to be  
implemented in psychology in a quite naturalistic manner.  Indeed, why  
did psychologists (including S.L. Rubenstein [1889-1960] and A.N.  
Leont'ev [1903-1979]) prefer such concepts such as "object-related  
activity," "object-practical activity," "object-sensuous activity," to  
that of "spiritual/mental-practical activity," which would be in line  
with Hegelian and Marxist philosophy?  The answer to this rhetorical  
question is quite clear from a sociological perspective.  These  
psychologists simply had no choice.  In the hostile Soviet ideological  
climate, the issues of spirituality (i.e., immaterial aspects of  
reality) were not on the agenda.  Instead, practice was placed at the  
center of everything and was regarded as the origin of knowledge, as  
the criterion of truth, and as the highest value.  During those times,  
to even introduce the concept of object-related activity was nearly a  
heroic deed, a kind of challenge to society, a protest against an  
epoch that entailed a bizarre combination of slavery and empty  
activism on the one hand, and true enthusiasm and creativity on the  
other.  This concept, however, lost many of its important spiritual/ 
mental, and ideal dimensions.  The "soul" of objects of activity was  
lost, as well as the symbolic functions enshrined in them in the  
process of their creation.  Even works of art had to meet the criteria  
of socialist realism and other ideological requirements.  As a result,  
activity had to be characterized not in spiritual/mental, but in  
material terms." pg 17.


7. VPZ suggests that the concept of internalization can be replaced by  
the concepts of differentiation of movement, joint action and social  
activity (which I would like to see more explanation about, by the  
way).  He says that this "differentiation of movement" is not just  
about **internalization** per se, but also needs to include  
**externalization**.

"Returning to object-related activity, if we assume from the very  
beginning that *material* is as much ideal as it is material, as much  
object-related as it is mental (and even spiritual/mental); and if we  
assume that movement lives not in its external form, but also in its  
internal form; and, if we admit that object-related action is not only  
mediated by external instruments or semiotic menas, but also contains  
within itself, in its internal form, an image, purpose, intention,  
motive, word; and ultimately, if we assume that the object-related  
activity is itself a kind of ideal form - then in this case, the  
concept of internalization will become unnecessary for theoretical  
psychology.  One should not, however, be too zealous in rejecting this  
concept even though it is already beginning to be replaced with the  
concept of *differentiation* of movement, object-related (or joint)  
action, and object-related (or social) activity (see Gordoyeva, 1995;  
Zinchenko, 1995a).  In such differentiation, the germ cells of mental  
formations that are present from the start in object-related activity  
are not internalized *to* anywhere; but, on the contrary, are  
objectivized and externalized; that is, they grow outward and become  
independent of object-related activity." pg 18.


8. After quoting Rubenstein, VPZ continues his discussion of the  
limitations of reducing activity to its components.  He points away  
from this narrower application of activity theory toward the richer  
prospect of researching subjective, internal forms via  
**externalization**.  He explains that subjective, internal forms of  
activity can generally only be conceptualized by the person and  
observed by others **after** they have been externalized.

"Thus, one should not focus so much on reducing activity to its  
components, but focus on how the external forms are elaborated and how  
internal forms of activity and its constitutive actions are  
developed.  It is important to note that internal forms represent the  
realm of the subjective, and yet they resist being described as  
internal.  This is like the situation with a myriad of emotions and  
feelings, shades of color, smells, and so on, which are so hard to  
conceptualize.  Such things can be conceptualized only after they have  
been objectivized, externalized." pg 18


9.  VPZ continues, relating this idea of externalization to Vygotsky's  
ideas.

"Such an interpretation sits well with Vygotsky's assumption that  
through the use of mediators, higher mental processes are brought  
outwards, transformed into external activity, and that a person's  
behavior is transformed into an object that can then be mastered.   
Vygotsky's idea that signs move from the inside outwards should not be  
taken literally.  It is just such literal interpretations that gave  
rise to the commonly accepted notion of internalization.  However, the  
core of Vygotsky's view is that by means of signs, the mental  
functions are brought outwards, are objectivized, and transformed into  
external (more exactly, into observable) actions and activities." pg 18.


10.  Turning to the question of word and deed, and thought and action,  
VPZ suggests that Vygotsky viewed them as equal partners.

"To discuss the problem of how word and deed are interrelated, one  
does not need to reflect so much on what is at the beginning and what  
is at the end.  Rather, one needs to consider Vygotsky's line of  
reasoning, according to which the word (thought) and deed (action)  
appear as equal, both of which are struggling on equal terms.  The  
passages from Vygotsky, cited above, on the relations between thought  
and action, tell the same story."  pg 21


11.  A key problem with the naturalistic interpretation of  
internalization is it does not take into account creativity.

"The largest problem is that the logic of internalization- 
externalization [in the common, naturalistic interpretation -sg]  
eliminates the creative nature of the developmental process, without  
which new formations cannot arise.  This logic leaves no place for  
intuition, insight, and ultimately, for revelation."  pg 21


12.  I will finish off this long series of quotations with some of  
VPZ's comments that themselves include some relevant quotations from  
Vygotsky.  The essential idea here is that the internal and external,  
thinking and action, the word and the deed, are are inextricably co- 
mingled co-partners in psychological processes, all of which are  
inherent aspects and products of human activity.  The Vygotsky (1983)  
quotes are from the Vygotsky's Collected Works (Vol.5): Foundations of  
defectology.  Moscow: Pedagogy.

(VPZ:)  "In essence, my argument has been the following: External  
(object-related) and internal (mental) activities are equally  
psychological, equally related to objects, equally ideal and cultural,  
equally deserving of psychological scrutiny.  The differences that  
exist between them can in no way be related to the philosophical  
problems of what is primary and secondary, or to the fundamental  
problem of the origins of mind.  Vygotsky (1983) was aware of this  
understanding:

(Vygotsky:) "We also know that both types of activity - thinking and  
real action - are not separated from each other by an impassable gap;  
actually, in reality, at each and every step, we observer how thought  
is transformed into action and action is transformed into thought.   
Hence, both of these dynamic systems - the more dynamic one related to  
thinking, and the less dynamic one related to action -  are not  
isolated from each other.  In actuality, the transition of the fluid  
dynamics of thought into the more rigid, solid dynamics of action and  
vice versa ... should and actually occur all the time. (p 249)"

(VPZ:)  "Vygotsky (1983) then went on to make this statement even more  
specific:

(Vygotsky:) "As Schiller says, ideas readily live in harmony with one  
another, yet they violently collide in space.  Therefore, when a child  
begins to think in a given situation, this not only means that the  
situation changes in how it is perceived and interpreted, but above  
all, that the whole dynamic changes.  The dynamics of a real  
situation, when converted into the fluid dynamics of thought, reveal a  
situation's new features, new opportunities for movement, association,  
and communication among subsystems.  However, this direct motion of  
dynamics from the actual situation to thought would be quite useless  
and unnecessary, if the reverse, the backward transition from the  
fluid dynamics of thought into rigid and firm dynamic systems of real  
action also did not exist.  The difficulty of implementing a set of  
intentions is directly related to the fact that the dynamics of an  
idea, with all its fluidity and freedom, must be transformed into the  
dynamics of real action. (p. 250)" pg 19.

(VPZ:)  "It should be noted that in these excerpts we find nothing  
about external and internal, or internalization and externalization.   
And the opposition between object-related and psychological actions is  
not mentioned either.

(VPZ continues:)  "Leont'ev went to great lengths to show that the  
external and internal planes are characterized by structures that are  
fundamentally similar.  Some of his followers transformed this careful  
formulation into the claim that external and internal forms of  
activity are identical.  Vygotsky (1983) had no illusions with this  
regard:

(Vygotsky:) "The dynamics of thinking do not simply mirror the dynamic  
relations that rule in real actions.  If thinking changed nothing in  
dynamic action, it would be absolutely useless.  Certainly, life  
determines consciousness.  Consciousness arises from life and  
represents only one of its varied aspects.  But having emerged,  
thinking itself starts to determine life, or, more exactly, thinking  
life determines itself through consciousness.  As soon as we separate  
thinking from life, from dynamics and needs, as soon as we deprive  
thinking of its agency - we thereby close off any possibility of  
revealing and explaining thinking and its most fundamental purpose,  
that is, to define a mode of life and behavior, to vary our actions,  
to direct them and release them from the power of particular concrete  
situations. (p. 252)" pg 19-20.

<end of quotes>

Cheers,
- Steve





On Jul 23, 2009, at 8:23 PM, Dot Robbins wrote:

> Dear Peter, David, Andy, Mike, and all,
> Thank you Peter, for opening a discussion on internalization.  It is  
> an extremely difficult discussion. Thank you Mike, Andy, David for  
> helpful points.

> Well, in being very honest, I am disturbed by many of the claims/ 
> accusations regarding Vygotsky, such as : “Crudely put, the  
> internalization model assumes that the signhood of language units  
> has already been established by ‘society’ and that these already  
> signifying units then implant themselves into the individual’s  
> psyche.” So many points I hope more people will have time to  
> discuss. I am not sure why the word “linguistics” was used. I have  
> never heard of a Vygotskian linguistics before as such….and, the  
> words “language theory” and “semiotics” have taken on an incredibly  
> polarizing position for many….

> Clearly, viewing certain aspects of Vygotsky’s thoughts on language  
> within a fragmented framework is something that needs to be  
> discussed in general….it is very sad for me to often see ideas  
> within polarized debates, where, for example, activity is dislocated  
> from signs; or internalization is subordinated to appropriation (in
> some cases), etc.

> Here, I was especially  discouraged to read the few words on  
> Luria….I felt so sad that Luria’s approach to language was not  
> considered in a deeper fashion….I am not trying to simply  
> criticize….but, we must be aware that a very extended reading of  
> Vygotsky in context is so extremely important….it would be helpful  
> to place his thoughts within the history he lived in and was  
> influenced by….W. von Humboldt, A. A. Potebnya, up to the semiotics  
> of Sergei Eisenstein….to then include art, aesthetics, poetry,  
> defectology, etc.

> For me, understanding Vygotsky must take place on a higher  
> metacognitive, metatheoretical level….to solve any problem, as I  
> understand Vygotsky, we must stand higher, taller than the problem.  
> There will never be a clear explanation of internalization, nor  
> consciousness, etc. within concrete thinking alone, and certainly  
> not within linguistic theory. I would think that the attack would be  
> against
> Western linguistics, not Vygotsky.

> If we want to understand Vygotsky’s thoughts on language and  
> semiotics (people do not need to be so opposed to semiotics, because  
> it is not used as a single explanatory theory….however, there is no  
> cultural activity without the meaningful use of signs, etc.), we  
> cannot overlook the theories of A. A. Leontiev. For those  
> interested, please check the Journal of Russian and East European  
> Psychology (Vol. 44, Nrs. 3 and 4, 2006).

> Regarding internalization…..many have written on that, and I have as  
> well (2001, 2003), and we need to re-read many ideas of many people.  
> Most of all we must transcend 3-dimensional thinking. There are many  
> levels of internalization (Andy stated this), just like the ZPD, etc. 
> …..And, until we start to view Vygotsky’s thoughts on language from  
> a metacognitive perspective, then fragmented, concrete dialogue   
> will be simple arguing for the sake of argument, in my opinion…it is  
> what we do
> with these theories that matter.

> If we want to get closer to some understanding of “internalization,”  
> I would think that linguistics would not be the place to go to for  
> answers.

> It is the development of psychological functional organs (as opposed  
> to morphological organs) that can be studied as the result of  
> internalization, not internalization itself (although a number of  
> neuroscientists are doing very interesting work).

> I will close with a quote from E. V. Aidman and D. A. Leontiev :  
> (“From being motivated to motivating oneself: A Vygotskian  
> perspective. In  Studies in Soviet Thought, 41,1991): “It is  
> stressed that the interiorization process is not merely a move of a  
> function from without, but rather the process of building the inner  
> (mental) structure of consciousness. The word ‘interiorization’  
> should be thus considered as a metaphor depicting the result rather  
> than the process of development of higher psychological functions” (p.
> 143). ....

> Again, I want to stress the need to read A. A. Leontiev and A. R.  
> Luria when speaking of language theories....I have attached an un- 
> published, old paper on Luria, with no time to re-read it, and with  
> no references....the reason I am sending it (and feel free not to  
> look at it) is to simply see the overall complexities needed in a  
> discussion of language theories within the Vygotskian framework.....

> I agree with Peter that so little has been written on this important  
> aspect of Vygotsky....and, I appreciate Peter's attempt to push us  
> all in this direction.

> With warm regards to all,
> Dot
>
>
>
>
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