Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 77

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

It would help all lot to know what you mean by tertiary artifact, Karen, to
be able to
interpret what you are writing.

I am familiar with Bateson's *Naven*, where ethos and eidos are important
concepts,
and of course, Engestrom uses's the idea of double bind which was important
in later
work.

I fear we are using the same words to cover different phenomena. There is a
lot of overlap in sources, but when you write, for example, that " Activity
systems grow themselves and their members play a part in that process" I
immediately start fussing over the (analytic?) separation of members and
process, since no members, no activity.

Ingold is a person always worth reading.
mike

On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 7:11 PM, Karen Spear Ellinwood <
kse@email.arizona.edu> wrote:

>
>
>  2. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63 (Mike Cole)
> -------------------------
>
> HI MIKE. THANKS FOR YOUR REPLY.
>
>  Warning: this could put you to sleep.
>
>  My thinking is that Consumption in the way I think Engeström means it is a
> process involved in every realm of activity ? production, collaboration
> (exchange), and distribution.  We consume ideas in production and
> collaboration
> - perhaps transform them in the process; we consume the products the system
> creates and distributes. It is a necessary, and I argue (perhaps to my
> chagrin
> ;) that it should not occupy the center, because it does not hold the
> center.
>
>  Activity systems, much like Ingold?s (2006) concept that _history grows
> itself, are autopoietic._ . Activity systems grow themselves and their
> members
> play a part in that process. As systems grow , they develop ethos. Ethos
> is both an artifact of that growth (I?m thinking tertiary) and
> then mediational
> means (tool) for its further development and the learning of its members.
> Applying Ingold's interpretation of autopoiesis to activity system
> analysis,
> the penumbra of activity grows the system?s ethos and individual
> participants
> play a part in its development.  applying CHAT model, development of ethos
> must
> account for conflict or tension among the various members' moral compasses
> as
> much as from any smoother path. Ethos, like everything else, then, is a
> process
> of internalization and externalization. It moderates activity and may
> become the
> mediational means to attract certain people to join activity or to make
> sense of
> motivation or objects in activity. (I'm thinking examples like the ethos of
> the
> GOP vs. Democratic or Green parties.)
>
>   Through the concept of ?ethos?, community can become more visible. I'm
> thinking about community as a group or network of participants; but there
> is
> also the idea of having a ?sense of community?; and of "shared object? as
> the
> motivation of community. Ethos incorporates these various shades of
> community,
> motivating someone to join or leave the fold or being the means to
> developing
> particular practices or models for participation. In a similar vein, Gordon
> Wells noted the role of ethos in a classroom community.
>
>   ETHOS AS A TERTIARY ARTIFACT. whether Ethos is defined by Eisner (_the
> underlying deep structure of a culture, the values that animate it, that
> collectively constitute its way of life_), or by dictionary.com (e.g.,
> _the
> character or disposition of a community_), we can view it as a tertiary
> artifact of activity and a tool for engagement in the system.
>
>  Tertiary artifacts are the mutual embodiment of the relationship
> between imagination and materiality; they ??constitute a ?world? (or
> ?worlds?)
> of imaginative praxis,? (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 207) in which we can ?play
> out?
> our ?broader intentions and affective needs? (Cole & Derry 2005).
> Ethos, generated IN AND THROUGH activity, is a theoretical construct, such
> as,
> ?methodologies or visions or world outlooks which serve as guidelines in
> the
> production and application of secondary artifacts, i.e., models? (Engeström
> 2000/1987, p. 67).  Perhaps, _ETHOS embodies imaginative praxis._  The
> system's
> ethos becomes a tool for thinking, being, and acting.
>
>  A recent article by Pickering (2009) states:
>
>  While an individual ethos is developing, an entire class, for example, can
> be
> communally constructing ethos as well, an ethos that is necessary for
> successful
> group functioning and communication. A central premise of this study is
> that the
> process of learning is a social one that develops through ?coparticipation?
> (Freedman & Adam, 1996, p. 397), and in an online learning environment, the
> socially constructed learning process relies on communally constructed and
> evolving group ethos.
>
>
>
>  Pickering?s use of the term ?ethos?, however, seems to narrow its meaning
> to
> the development of individual and social ?credibility and trust?, which she
> notes is essential to participation in online communities (the context of
> her
> study).   She does not imagine a distinct place for ?ethos? in Engeström?s
> (1987) model but does think to apply the model to the analysis of ethos
> development. She posits that ?RULES? define the ?parameters for developing
> ethos? and that the process of constructing ethos occurs in production and
> distribution. She finds that ?The process of developing community is
> influenced
> by both individual and collective construction of ethos?.
>
>  I think Pickering is on to something when she says that ethos is a useful
> concept for observing and analyzing ?changes [that] occur within an online
> classroom environment, one that is constantly evolving and changing?.
>
>
>
>  I think we can take ethos farther. I think it?s useful in studying any
> environment or system. When defined as ?deeply held guiding principles?,
> it seems more fitting and more flexible in its application to observation
> and
> analysis of systems developmetn that  seems autopoietic, like Ingold?s
> concept
> of history.
>
>   If we see it as tertiary artifact, then we recognize that the system
> produces it - it does not come pre-fab, and we see its operation as a
> psychological tool. The sense of community mediated by ethos is a means to
> identify with a particular community and serves to develop Rules,
> community,
> collaborative, productive and distributive practcies or the identification
> of
> shared desired objects.
>
>
>
>  _Ok, that's enough. I don?t want to take up any more space or put any more
> people than  to sleep_, but, I?ll just add that i also think it useful to
> explore the role of Bateson?s concept of _eidos_ and _etiology_ in CHAT
> methodology.
>
>  THANK YOU - I\'D BE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHAT YOU THINK...
>
>  KAREN
> -------------------------
>
>  MIKE"S COMMENTS ON ETHOS:
>
>  From: Mike Cole
>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Message-ID:
>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>>
>> Hi Karen-- Interesting idea to introduce ethos into the discussion of
>> activity and mediation, solidarity
>> and sociality.
>>
>>  From dictionary.com (not that I mind Eisner!):
>>>
>>
>> 1. Sociology. the fundamental character or spirit of a culture; the
>> underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a
>> group or society; dominant assumptions of a people or period: In the Greek
>> ethos the individual was highly valued. 2. the character or disposition of
>> a community, group, person, etc. 3. the moral element in dramatic
>> literature that determines a character's action rather than his or her
>> thought or emotion.
>> I am not certain, however, that I would agree that ethos can be considered
>> a
>> tertiary artifact (it does not seem to fit with
>> Wartofsky's proposal for what that term means, but the term itself needs
>> elaboration, so maybe it works well) and substituting
>> it for consumption in the Engestrom model seems odd. Playing on the
>> example
>> above, might we not say that in the American
>> ethos, consumption is highly valued? (Contrast the Soviet emphasis on
>> production -- of course, both are required in all
>> societies).
>>
>> Where does Tomasello use the term "joint mediated activity." I can see
>> something like "object mediated intersubjectivity" (or action) in his
>> work,
>> but where does he talk about activity in contrast action, intentionality,
>> or
>> intersubjectivity arise??
>>
>> mike
>>
> -------------------------
>
> -------------------------
> Quoting xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu:
>
>> Send xmca mailing list submissions to
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
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>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>> 1. Re: Vygotsky and Saussure (David Kellogg)
>> 2. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63 (Mike Cole)
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 15:37:21 -0700 (PDT)
>> From: David Kellogg Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Saussure
>> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain;
>> charset=iso-8859-1
>>
>> Martin,
>>
>> Both Andy and I are very interested in Volume Five, the unfinished
>> manuscript on Child Development in the Collected Works.
>>
>> On pp. 272-273 LSV talks about "phones" instead of "phonemes". I think
>> this is a correct translation, and "phonemes" is an incorrect one. I don't
>> have the Russian original, though, so I can't be sure.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Seoul National University of Education
>>
>> --- On Tue, 7/28/09, Martin Packer  wrote:
>>
>>
>> From: Martin Packer Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Saussure
>> To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Tuesday,
>> July 28, 2009, 12:03 PM
>>
>>
>> Andy,
>>
>> In Problems of Child Development LSV writes that language shatters the
>> unity of infant and world. Your examples of the painter and gymnast help us
>> recognize that this rupture cannot be complete or final. Both are kinds of
>> work in which successful practice depends on an embodied embeddedness in
>> concrete reality.
>>
>> But at the same time I think LSV is right to write of rupture, and of the
>> importance of language. First, he's right to insist that the child is born
>> embedded, and so he rejects the built-in mind/world dualism that is
>> presupposed by cognitive science. But, second, he's right to say that in
>> development this immediacy is disrupted so that a mind is formed. The
>> preschool age child is a dynamic part of their situation and responds
>> without pause to its demands. The school age child, he writes, has lost this
>> spontaneity. Language changes the child's relationship to the world in large
>> part by picking out aspects of the situation as a distinct (kind of)
>> 'thing.' It comes 'between' person and world, is an important part of the
>> child's differentiation from other people, and soon will be the basis for a
>> division between 'inner' and 'outer' aspects of the child's personality,
>> dividing her from herself.
>>
>> A good gymnast or painter finds ways to suspend or overcome or forget
>> these divisions. But equally an adult without language would not be able to
>> be a painter or gymnast, even if they could put paint on canvas or spin on a
>> beam, because 'painter' and 'gymnast' are positions in a social reality
>> which someone without language would be unable to adopt.
>>
>> still dancing
>>
>> Martin
>>
>> On Jul 27, 2009, at 11:23 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>
>>  Martin,
>>> We've been round this mulberry bush before, so I suspect David might
>>> agree with you, but I differ.
>>>
>>> As I recall, LSV claims that word-meaning is the unit of analaysis for
>>> intelligent speech and therefore the "microcosm" of consciousness.
>>>
>>> So LSV agreed with Marx, as do I, that practice, or artefact mediated
>>> action is the unit of analysis of consciousness.
>>>
>>> all linguists of course disagree. But I wonder if a painter would agree,
>>> or a gymnast?
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>
>>>> David, ...
>>>> meaningful-sound is a concrete phenomenon, located in place and time.
>>>> And he promises that we will thereby find the unity of thinking and speech,
>>>> of generalization and social interaction, of thinking and communication, of
>>>> intellect and affect. In short, of consciousness.
>>>> No? Yes?
>>>> Martin
>>>> On Jul 25, 2009, at 3:25 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Martin:
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, definitely! If you read pp. 49-50 in the Minick translation of
>>>>> Thinking and Speech, we get Vygotsky's remarks on Saussure's phonology in
>>>>> pure form. Of course, he rejects (again and again) the Saussurean view of
>>>>> semantics; it's nothing but associationism. But since he rejects
>>>>> associationism on the basis of its arbitrariness, its lack of an intelligent
>>>>> link, and its lack of system, he has to reject Saussurean phonemes too, no?
>>>>>
>>>>> No! As you say, there are two points here for Vygotsky to appropriate.
>>>>> The first is that the phoneme is part of a gestalt, specifically, a contrast
>>>>> with some other word (e.g. "back" and "bag"). But the second is that that
>>>>> gestalt is defined by MEANING and not by sound.
>>>>>
>>>>> Here is where Vygosky really parts company, not only with Saussure and
>>>>> structuralism but also with Gestaltism. For Saussure, the relationship
>>>>> between phoneme and meaning is entirely arbitrary; but for Vygotsky it is
>>>>> fully determined by the social situation of development.
>>>>>
>>>>> For Gestaltism, the structural relationship is not unique to language;
>>>>> it's shared with perception. But for Vygotsky the consciousness that is
>>>>> created by thought is never reducible to the consciousness that is created
>>>>> by perception.
>>>>>
>>>>> The question I have is what Saussure would have made of all this.
>>>>> Saussure was actually quite skeptical about his own system; he had good
>>>>> reason to instruct his wife and students not to publish any of his work. And
>>>>> as the article Mike sent around (on the Mandelshtam poem) makes clear, he
>>>>> had big big problems with precisely the concepts at issue: the arbitrariness
>>>>> and linearity of language.
>>>>>
>>>>> Notice that Vygotsky doesn't really use the word "phonetic" very much.
>>>>> The word which is usually translated as "phonetic" is actually "phasal". But
>>>>> in the example Vygotsky gives about the psychological vs. grammatical
>>>>> predicate/subject, where he talks about psychological/grammatical gender,
>>>>> and number, and even tense, it is very clear that for Vygotsky ALL the
>>>>> linear aspects of language, the aspects which (unlike thought) include TIME
>>>>> in their compositionality, are to be considered "phasal", not just
>>>>> phonetics.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>
>>>>> --- On Fri, 7/24/09, Martin Packer  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Martin Packer Subject: Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and
>>>>> speech complexity ; From 2-?
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Friday, July 24, 2009,
>>>>> 8:03 AM
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jul 23, 2009, at 2:46 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>    I think Vygotsky actually finds the single kernel of truth in
>>>>>> Saussure's course when he argues that a science of phonetics needs to be
>>>>>> founded on MEANING MAKING and not on the physical description of noises
>>>>>> people make with their mouths. However, his ability to find this kernel in a
>>>>>> mountain of structuralist chaff should not deceive you; he is no uncritical
>>>>>> consumer of Saussureanism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  David,
>>>>>
>>>>> Coincidentally I was reading yesterday the section in Problems of Child
>>>>> Psychology (vol 5 of the Collected Works) where Vygotsky again makes this
>>>>> point.  It is evidently Saussurian linguistics that V is enthusiastic about:
>>>>> he refers to it as phonology and contrasts it with an older phonetics which
>>>>> focused solely on articulatory definitions. Phonology has the advantage of
>>>>> seeing the sounds of language as a system, and so the child never learns a
>>>>> single sound in isolation but always one sound against the background of the
>>>>> others. V points out that this is a basic law of perception: figure/ground,
>>>>> and also that the ground in the case of oral language is provided by the
>>>>> speech of adults (so the 'ideal' endpoint of development is present and
>>>>> available from the start, as emphasized in the passage that Lois quoted a
>>>>> few days ago).
>>>>>
>>>>> V is critical once again of analyses that divide a phenomenon into
>>>>> elements and in doing so lose the properties of the whole. Phonology, he
>>>>> says, has the advantage that in studying the sounds of a language as a
>>>>> system it doesn't divide it into separate elements, nor does it lose the
>>>>> central property of language, namely that it has meaning. V adds that sounds
>>>>> always have meaning: "the phoneme," he writes "is not just a sound, it is a
>>>>> sound that has meaning, a sound that has not lost meaning, a certain unit
>>>>> that has a primary property to a minimal degree, which belongs to speech as
>>>>> a whole" (271).
>>>>>
>>>>> V's analysis makes a good deal of sense to me. But my own limited
>>>>> knowledge of Saussure - guided in part by Roy Harris' writing - has indeed
>>>>> included the dogma that the sound level of language carries no meaning. You
>>>>> are saying, I think, that V has a reasonable reading of Saussure, if not the
>>>>> canonical one. Can you say more about this way of reading Saussure? V seems
>>>>> to be suggesting that the child does not learn first sounds, then words, but
>>>>> always acquires the sounds of language in the context of the use of words in
>>>>> communicative settings, and this has the consequece that the sounds would be
>>>>> aquired as aspects of a meaningful unit. Am I on the right track here?
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin_______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>> Martin Packer, Ph.D.
>>>> Associate Professor
>>>> Psychology Department
>>>> Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282
>>>> (412) 396-4852
>>>> www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/ <http://www.mathcs.duq.edu/%7Epacker/>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>> Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>
>> Martin Packer, Ph.D.
>> Associate Professor
>> Psychology Department
>> Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 15282
>> (412) 396-4852
>>
>> www.mathcs.duq.edu/~packer/ <http://www.mathcs.duq.edu/%7Epacker/>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 2
>> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2009 17:01:23 -0700
>> From: Mike Cole Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 50, Issue 63
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Message-ID:
>>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>>
>> Hi Karen-- Interesting idea to introduce ethos into the discussion of
>> activity and mediation, solidarity
>> and sociality.
>>
>>  From dictionary.com (not that I mind Eisner!):
>>>
>>
>> 1. Sociology. the fundamental character or spirit of a culture; the
>> underlying sentiment that informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a
>> group or society; dominant assumptions of a people or period: In the Greek
>> ethos the individual was highly valued. 2. the character or disposition of
>> a community, group, person, etc. 3. the moral element in dramatic
>> literature that determines a character's action rather than his or her
>> thought or emotion.
>> I am not certain, however, that I would agree that ethos can be considered
>> a
>> tertiary artifact (it does not seem to fit with
>> Wartofsky's proposal for what that term means, but the term itself needs
>> elaboration, so maybe it works well) and substituting
>> it for consumption in the Engestrom model seems odd. Playing on the
>> example
>> above, might we not say that in the American
>> ethos, consumption is highly valued? (Contrast the Soviet emphasis on
>> production -- of course, both are required in all
>> societies).
>>
>> Where does Tomasello use the term "joint mediated activity." I can see
>> something like "object mediated intersubjectivity" (or action) in his
>> work,
>> but where does he talk about activity in contrast action, intentionality,
>> or
>> intersubjectivity arise??
>>
>> mike
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 11:15 AM, Karen Spear Ellinwood <
>> kse@email.arizona.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> RE: HALF A COCONUT
>>>
>>> in response to Jay Lemke's comments:
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>> I like your term "ur-solidarity" and the idea that this is more than
>>> social
>>> convention.
>>>
>>> My sense is that there is more to the social structure and social
>>> relations
>>> that occur in activity than simply the milieu we join as newcomers,
>>> although
>>> there is that too. I think what happens is that in the activity of
>>> building
>>> social structure is the generation of Ethos - the guiding principles of
>>> social
>>> relations and activity combined. When newcomers arrive, they do not
>>> simply
>>> adopt the Ethos. Rather, if the community ethos is repugnant to them
>>> (which
>>> in
>>> some organizations it might be, of course not this one, but originating
>>> from NY
>>> I can think of a few that might turn off some)...then they would not
>>> join.
>>>
>>> Repugnance, then, would be the outer parameter defining refusal to
>>> join/participate. Curiosity would define the minimal parameter -
>>> attraction.
>>> Some sort of common ground with the ethos or guiding principles as they
>>> are
>>> illuminated or performed in activity by existing members of the community
>>> would
>>> then be grounds for participation - true engagement.
>>>
>>> Once a newcomer joins, she/he contributes to the further development of
>>> Ethos
>>> through engagement in activity. All activity is an expression or
>>> performance of
>>> the community ethos.
>>>
>>> I think ethos is what is at the core of any activity system. It does not
>>> pre-exist, but develops along with and through the initial social
>>> structure
>>> and
>>> activity. It?s a tertiary artifact of activity.
>>>
>>> Theoretically, I borrow more from sociology on the concept of Ethos but
>>> include Tomasello?s concept of joint mediated activity as well.
>>>
>>> Ethos is ?the underlying deep structure of a culture, the values that
>>> animate
>>> it, that collectively constitute its way of life? (Eisner 1994, p. 2)
>>> (emphasis
>>> added). Ethos is the ideational environment in which people interact, a
>>> set of
>>> guiding principles emerging and developing through the dialogic
>>> interaction
>>> of
>>> the members of a shared discourse (Eisner, 1994). Dialogic or
>>> perspectival
>>> representations of ethos emerge through interaction with others and
>>> enables
>>> the
>>> development and sustenance of ?collective practices and beliefs?
>>> (Tomasello
>>> &
>>> Rakoczy, 2003). In this way, we can see it emerges from ?the relationship
>>> between people and [represents] the values and principles underpinning
>>> policy
>>> and practice (Glover & Coleman, 2005). Its importance is that ?an ethos
>>> is
>>> evaluative? and ?manifested in many aspects of the? community and has a
>>> pervasive influence ?in the shaping of human perceptions, attitudes,
>>> beliefs?
>>> (p. 311).
>>>
>>> It is, then, at the heart of the emergence and development of productive,
>>> collaborative, and distributive practices. If we substitute, for example,
>>> Ethos
>>> for Consumption in Engeström?s expression of activity, it would seem that
>>> we
>>> could imagine ethos as a mediational force (means) in all realms of
>>> activity,
>>> production, collaboration (exchange) and distribution forms part of the
>>> context
>>> that is interwoven in actions and activity - it would be the glue that
>>> holds the
>>> center, if you will. In other words, organizations stay together not
>>> simply
>>> because of what they do ? or the success of what they do, but because of
>>> they
>>> believe in the social importance of what they do.
>>>
>>> Obviously ethos doesn't develop overnight and so including it in
>>> understanding the underlying social structure of activity and production
>>> accommodates the respective contributions of newcomers and old-timers in
>>> ongoing activity. It is also imagines ethos as an ?unfinished product?
>>> much
>>> like the concept of co-configuration.
>>>
>>> Karen
>>>
>>> Karen C. Spear-Ellinwood
>>> PhD Candidate, College of Education
>>> Dept. of Teaching, Language & Sociocultural Studies
>>> kse@email.arizona.edu
>>> Cell: 520-878-6034
>>> phone: 520-829-0749
>>>
>>>
>>> -------------------------
>>>
>>> Quoting xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu:
>>>
>>>  Send xmca mailing list submissions to
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>
>>>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>>> xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>
>>>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>>> xmca-owner@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>
>>>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>>>> than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>
>>>> 1. Re: Half a coconut (Jay Lemke)
>>>> 2. elluminators please illuminate! (Mike Cole)
>>>> 3. Fwd: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech complexity ;
>>>> From 2-? (Jay Lemke)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 1
>>>> Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 16:27:40 +0200
>>>> From: Jay Lemke Subject: Re: [xmca] Half a coconut
>>>> To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>
>>>> Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252;
>>>> format=flowed;
>>>> delsp=yes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I certainly understand that both Michael's MCA editorial on this, and
>>>> a lot of the background literature, may not be familiar to many xcma-
>>>> ers. And my timing in retrospect was not good in the midst of another
>>>> ongoing discussion.
>>>>
>>>> In any case, I think there are important issues, and we can maybe find
>>>> a time and occasion to get more into some of them.
>>>>
>>>> As to the always-already ongoing "communitas", the ground of co-
>>>> activity that is suggested as the basis for a sort of ur-solidarity
>>>> that is not simply a social convention, it's always already there in
>>>> the community into which we come, whether by birth or immigration. A
>>>> bit like what newcomers to xmca must sense when they first arrive in
>>>> our online co-activity!
>>>>
>>>> JAY.
>>>>
>>>> Jay Lemke
>>>> Professor
>>>> Educational Studies
>>>> University of Michigan
>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke <http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke> On Jul 25,
>>>> 2009, at 2:15 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Seems like you only got stunned silence back on this, Jay. Part of the
>>>>
>>>>> problem is almost certainly that many readers of xmca do not read
>>>>> MCA, so
>>>>> when we do not have a common text to refer to, we are in a fix.
>>>>>
>>>>> The part of what I take from this that overlaps other matters I am
>>>>> working
>>>>> on at present is the following:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "the notion of an ontological or pre-discursive, actional solidarity
>>>>> seems
>>>>> very close to Victor Turner’s famous _communitas_: originating in the
>>>>> underlying experience of co-activity, which is prior to social
>>>>> structural
>>>>> relations and can be glimpsed when these are set aside (his
>>>>> liminality,
>>>>> Bakhtin’s carnival)"
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure when the "underlying of co-activity" begins. Perhaps
>>>>> its there
>>>>> in utero. Perhaps (a la Trevarthan) its there as
>>>>> primary intersubjectivity at birth. But co-activity also appears to
>>>>> require
>>>>> adjustments upon infant and mother's parts (and more
>>>>> so for fathers).
>>>>>
>>>>> I know this comment does not address the ontology/truth/morality
>>>>> issues
>>>>> involved, but those are beyond my powers to grok
>>>>> without a lot more help!!
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Jul 20, 2009 at 6:02 AM, Jay Lemke wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  I recently had a chance to read more carefully Wolf-Michael Roth's
>>>>>> MCA
>>>>>> editorial on Solidarity and Responsibility.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I know that there was some prior discussion of it here, in a thread
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> the eyes of a coconut, but that seems to have veered off from what
>>>>>> seems
>>>>>> interesting to me in the editorial, which was highlighted by Derek
>>>>>> Melser at
>>>>>> one point. I don't know if I've missed any subsequent discussion,
>>>>>> but don't
>>>>>> find it in the archives, at least with a google search.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So here are some notes on the ideas and arguments in the editorial,
>>>>>> for any
>>>>>> who are interested. (W-M R and I have been on a firstname basis for
>>>>>> a very
>>>>>> long time, but he's "Roth" in the notes because it's shorter!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Notes on Roth editorial MCA
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Solidarity and Responsibility. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 16: 105–
>>>>>> 116,
>>>>>> 2009.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> = Roth appears to argue from Is to Ought, from a holistic-extension
>>>>>> notion
>>>>>> of primal solidarity in being/doing, prior to discursive notions of
>>>>>> voluntary solidarity, for a moral responsibility to respect, indeed
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> privilege uniqueness in the Other, rather than simple not-I
>>>>>> differentiation
>>>>>> and the corresponding notion of a constructed collective and its
>>>>>> artificial
>>>>>> solidarity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> = the notion of an ontological or pre-discursive, actional solidarity
>>>>>> seems very close to Victor Turner’s famous _communitas_:
>>>>>> originating in the
>>>>>> underlying experience of co-activity, which is prior to social
>>>>>> structural
>>>>>> relations and can be glimpsed when these are set aside (his
>>>>>> liminality,
>>>>>> Bakhtin’s carnival)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> = Turner also argues in parallel with Buddhist philosophy (prajna vs
>>>>>> vijnana, or roughly intuition vs discursive reason), that
>>>>>> difference is the
>>>>>> product of social relations and discursive semantics, while what
>>>>>> precedes
>>>>>> them is more holistic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> = the notion of partes extra partes with which Roth characterizes
>>>>>> his view
>>>>>> of the ontology of unique wholes is a bit ambiguous in the
>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>> tradition
>>>>>>
>>>>>> there is a Cartesian version of it which is atomistic – every part
>>>>>> exists
>>>>>> outside of and independent of every other part, and which leads to
>>>>>> a view of
>>>>>> space as consisting of just one damn place after another, only
>>>>>> externally
>>>>>> relatable
>>>>>>
>>>>>> and then there is also the Leibnizian version, which I think is the
>>>>>> one
>>>>>> Roth is using, in which each thing or place is an extension or
>>>>>> diffusion of
>>>>>> its own unique qualities, but in which a principle like that of the
>>>>>> mirroring of monads allows larger scenes to also be wholes, within
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> qualities may extend across what on smaller scales are parts apart
>>>>>> from one
>>>>>> another, hence providing the sort of holism of absolute
>>>>>> differentnesses or
>>>>>> uniquenesses that Roth seems to want
>>>>>>
>>>>>> = Roth takes all this finally to classrooms, schools-as-educating
>>>>>> communities, and the paradoxes of democracy. If we are all unique
>>>>>> within
>>>>>> larger wholes, then it makes sense to pay attention to others’
>>>>>> viewpoints
>>>>>> when decisions are to be made, indeed the more diverse the input
>>>>>> the more
>>>>>> likely a good, or at least an as-thoughtful-as-possible decision.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Some such decisions are not really decisions, outcomes are largely
>>>>>> predetermined by circumstances (habitual, predictable, routine);
>>>>>> but others
>>>>>> require breaking out of predictable patterns, choosing the risky or
>>>>>> unlikely
>>>>>> alternative, creating new options – and so new wholes, within which
>>>>>> we all
>>>>>> become newly unique-again. (Which, by the way, is in itself a good
>>>>>> moral
>>>>>> argument for democratic decision-making, since we are all always
>>>>>> affected in
>>>>>> fundamental ways by decisions. Despite our cultural and masculinist
>>>>>> preference for the illusion of our independence. Being unique and
>>>>>> partes
>>>>>> extra partes does not, in the holistic paradigm, insure our
>>>>>> independence,
>>>>>> just the opposite. This might go some way towards explaining the
>>>>>> popularity
>>>>>> of Cartesian atomism, where we can just ignore the other atoms.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Voluntarist solidarity, Roth is arguing, I think, is dangerous
>>>>>> because it
>>>>>> presupposes the atomist Cartesian ontology of our being: we begin
>>>>>> and remain
>>>>>> autonomous, we choose to come together in communities. What can be
>>>>>> chosen,
>>>>>> can also not be chosen. What is voluntary can be suspended,
>>>>>> delegated to
>>>>>> dictators, elites, teachers, curriculum bureaus.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Holistic solidarity, like communitas, on the other hand arises in our
>>>>>> being and doing together, which is a condition into which we are
>>>>>> born and
>>>>>> from which we never entirely depart (having internalized so much of
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> before we even try to get away). But it is nonetheless a condition
>>>>>> that also
>>>>>> reinforces our uniqueness (or supports it, or from which it is
>>>>>> emergent,
>>>>>> depending on your metaphysics), and from which we can no more get
>>>>>> away than
>>>>>> we can get away from ourselves.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But I am still not entirely sure that Roth is not over-claiming on
>>>>>> how
>>>>>> much democratic Ought is derivable from the holistic Is. Bakhtin is
>>>>>> fairly
>>>>>> casual about the logic of the ideational and the axiological (in
>>>>>> his later
>>>>>> terms), or the twin answerabilities of response and responsibility.
>>>>>> I am not
>>>>>> well enough read in Levinas to say in his case. Personally I don’t
>>>>>> see why
>>>>>> we should want to ground the moral-ethical in the ontological, in
>>>>>> the nature
>>>>>> of things. Isn’t that theology? Because a God exists, we should do
>>>>>> what He
>>>>>> says? Isn’t a secular philosophical version of this kind of
>>>>>> argument just
>>>>>> another desire to privilege the ontological, the factual, the true
>>>>>> over the
>>>>>> Good?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For me the good, the ought, in its many forms and aspects, has its
>>>>>> own
>>>>>> standing, equal with the true, and not subordinate to it. The good
>>>>>> and the
>>>>>> true, or by degrees as we really experience them, the more or less
>>>>>> desirable, the more or less likely, along with the more or less
>>>>>> important,
>>>>>> the more or less surprising, serious/humorous, mysterious/
>>>>>> comprehensible,
>>>>>> etc. all stand as equal partes extra partes in relation to one
>>>>>> another.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As they do in the semantics of our language. And I think as they
>>>>>> also do
>>>>>> experientially and phenomenologically, though the holism of
>>>>>> experience will
>>>>>> be something not so neatly corresponding to semantic categories,
>>>>>> will feel
>>>>>> like something more of a mish-mash, at least as seen from the neat
>>>>>> typologies of language and philosophy done in language.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From here this discussion could go in many directions, so I will
>>>>>> stop for
>>>>>> now and see what others may say.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jay.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jay Lemke
>>>>>> Professor
>>>>>> Educational Studies
>>>>>> University of Michigan
>>>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
>>>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke <http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke>_______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 2
>>>> Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 08:26:31 -0700
>>>> From: Mike Cole Subject: [xmca] elluminators please illuminate!
>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" Message-ID:
>>>>
>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>>>>
>>>> A "seat" licence appears to cost $100.00 for elluminate.
>>>> Those using it-- what does a site licence cost and who pays for it where
>>>> you
>>>> are??
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 3
>>>> Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2009 18:40:10 +0200
>>>> From: Jay Lemke Subject: Fwd: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech
>>>> complexity ;
>>>> From 2-?
>>>> To: XMCA Forum Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain;
>>>> charset=WINDOWS-1252;
>>>> format=flowed;
>>>> delsp=yes
>>>>
>>>> Mike sent this but it went only to me. He wanted it to go to the list.
>>>>
>>>> Jay Lemke
>>>> Professor
>>>> Educational Studies
>>>> University of Michigan
>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke <http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke> Begin
>>>> forwarded message:
>>>>
>>>> From: Mike Cole Date: July 25, 2009 2:26:14 AM GMT+02:00
>>>>
>>>>> To: Jay Lemke Subject: Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech
>>>>> complexity ;
>>>>> From 2-?
>>>>> Reply-To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>
>>>>> Yep, you got at what I was trying to discuss, Jay. And some of the
>>>>> factors that I thought might provoke such spotty
>>>>> "precociousness." I do not know Halliday well enough to know if what
>>>>> you describe explains what I was asking about,
>>>>> the general set of considerations you raise resonate.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kel and I discussed these issues a little by phone (taking
>>>>> advantage of his presence in my time zone for a while).
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems like the absence of kids being able to use speech on behalf
>>>>> of their own motives in the way classrooms ordinarily
>>>>> work -- e.g. they are in the responder role and have to guess at
>>>>> what the teacher is after/about -- would reduce the complexity of
>>>>> the thoughts to which they can give expression.
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe that some of the electronic comm media such as elluminate
>>>>> (as described by people in recent notes) may be an example
>>>>> of conditions under which students can be more in control of what
>>>>> they get to say and as a result get more agentive, excited, and
>>>>> perhaps, even learn more.
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> PS-- Long ago -- like in the early 1980's -- some of my colleagues
>>>>> at LCHC found that if they had an asynchronous discussion
>>>>> group that accompanied the live class, some of the students who
>>>>> never responded, or did so only with difficulty, were leaders
>>>>> in the a-synchronous interactions. My guess was that the shift in
>>>>> medium changed the constraints on communication, "freeing"
>>>>> some who could not manage the pace of the classroom. Not entirely
>>>>> unlike the frequent comment that many people who mostly
>>>>> read but do not write on xmca are knocked over by the pace and rapid
>>>>> shifting.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Jul 24, 2009 at 10:35 AM, Jay Lemke wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I am replying to Mike's much earlier message about context and
>>>>> speech complexity, though I've read the subsequent discussion,
>>>>> mainly because I remain interested in the original issue he brought
>>>>> up. I know the discussion has shifted, as it so often does, more to
>>>>> critiques of ideas of internalization, but that seems to have
>>>>> happened in part because one reading of Mike's question led to the
>>>>> suggestion that internalization was an important part of the answer.
>>>>>
>>>>> My version of his question is this:
>>>>>
>>>>> How do we understand the phenomenon of young speakers producing much
>>>>> more complex forms of speech in activities in which they appear to
>>>>> have more intrinsic motivation and authentic interest, compared to
>>>>> activities in which they are just following someone else's lead?
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not an expert on early childhood language development, but I am
>>>>> a developmentalist in the sense that I analyze meaning-making across
>>>>> all timescales as a building up of later meanings on top of earlier
>>>>> ones to reach greater complexity and efficacy. Just as in biological
>>>>> development the complexity and efficacy (for something) of later
>>>>> stages depends on the foundations laid in earlier ones (hence the
>>>>> link with evolution).
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe it is a well-known phenomenon in language development --
>>>>> and I mean that term as shorthand for increasing complexity and
>>>>> efficacy in (self- or other- directed) speech as an integral
>>>>> component of some larger activity -- that new speakers occasionally
>>>>> produce much more "advanced" speech than the average of what they
>>>>> produce in some time frame (i.e. speech more like the average in a
>>>>> much later timeframe). I think this is also true of other sorts of
>>>>> longer-term learning processes. There are just time when it all
>>>>> comes together for us and we perform with an apparent capability
>>>>> well ahead of our usual performances. We appear to leap forward, and
>>>>> then fall back.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this just luck? sometimes perhaps, and sometimes it is the over-
>>>>> interpretation of the observer, reading more meaning into the speech
>>>>> than may have been "intended" (another shorthand). But we also know
>>>>> that in the case of speech, receptive understanding encompasses such
>>>>> more complex forms, even if active production rarely or never-before
>>>>> has shown them. And that of course has something to do with the more
>>>>> complex forms being present in the environment, the community, the
>>>>> co-activity with others. So the fact that it may not be
>>>>> reproducible, or that it may not recur across different settings,
>>>>> may not necessarily mean that it was not "intentional" (i.e.
>>>>> functionally and deliberately meaningful on the part of the new
>>>>> producer).
>>>>>
>>>>> It may have arisen in play, in exploration of wording-possibilities.
>>>>> It may have arisen in a less-self-monitoring context where
>>>>> inhibitions against more complex production for fear of errors,
>>>>> ridicule, communication failure, etc. were much reduced (like
>>>>> speaking a foreign language when just a little drunk). It may have
>>>>> been driven past all inhibitions or obstacles by intense desire or
>>>>> need.
>>>>>
>>>>> Or it may have been abetted by particularly supportive
>>>>> circumstances. My own hypothesis about what Mike seems to be
>>>>> describing is that precocious speech is more likely to occur when
>>>>> more complex meanings are easier to build up on top of already
>>>>> familiar meaning-speakings. Halliday gives some examples of this for
>>>>> spoken dialogue, where very complex verb tenses will appear that are
>>>>> far more complex than those normally (or ever) seen in written text,
>>>>> because speakers build up time-relational meanings on top of prior
>>>>> speakers sayings. This is micro-developmental, on the logogenetic or
>>>>> text-production timescale (seconds to minutes).
>>>>>
>>>>> What circumstances support such short-term climbing to new heights?
>>>>> it may be a particular speech-partner, it may be a particular
>>>>> familiar topic, it may be a rush of need or desire to make the more
>>>>> complex meaning, which is a meaning that has become appropriate to
>>>>> the moment in the ongoing activity because we have been able to get
>>>>> that far in terms of building connections on connections, meanings
>>>>> (including those made by nonverbal gestures, actions, etc.) on
>>>>> meanings.
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems reasonable to me that there ought to be a strong social-
>>>>> situational correlation between activities in which we are heavily
>>>>> personally invested, or just really enjoy or want or need, and those
>>>>> in which the other factors I've suggested are available to support
>>>>> climbing unusually high up the ladder of meaning complexity -- i.e.
>>>>> of meanings built on other meanings.
>>>>>
>>>>> What do you think?
>>>>>
>>>>> JAY.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Jay Lemke
>>>>> Professor
>>>>> Educational Studies
>>>>> University of Michigan
>>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
>>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke <http://www.umich.edu/%7Ejaylemke> On Jul 20,
>>>>> 2009, at 6:06 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Lois--
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I appear eerily unable to communicate the issue that is the focus
>>>>>> of my
>>>>>> attention which is not whether kids imitate the language around
>>>>>> them, but
>>>>>> for the difference in performance of the same kids, within hours or
>>>>>> so of
>>>>>> when they first say something complicated, to "revert" to a
>>>>>> simplified
>>>>>> version of that utterance at about the level of what they do when
>>>>>> asked to
>>>>>> repeat
>>>>>> an utterance dreamed up by an experimenter to test some theory of the
>>>>>> process of grammatical development.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The kids are performing in both cases. But in one case they are
>>>>>> performing
>>>>>> to achieve THEIR goals. In the other they
>>>>>> are performing to achieve goals they have little understanding of.
>>>>>> Something or other ideas think furiously.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Neither you nor David, so far as I can tell, addresses the question
>>>>>> I am
>>>>>> asking. Since you both know a ton more about
>>>>>> language acquisition than I figure I am being totally dense. What
>>>>>> am I
>>>>>> missing here?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> About Vygotsky writing *Something which is only supposed to take
>>>>>> shape at
>>>>>> the very end of development, somehow influences the very first
>>>>>> steps in this
>>>>>> development.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *I believe that Vygotsky is stating a very widely held view of the
>>>>>> process
>>>>>> of development, one which can be found in many scientific sources
>>>>>> but which
>>>>>> also has deep roots in the Judeo-Christian (and probably lots of
>>>>>> other
>>>>>> traditions). Here is a version of it from
>>>>>> T.S. Elliot, "East Coker" but I believe it is also intimately
>>>>>> related to the
>>>>>> idea of a spiral of development which is often found in
>>>>>> Hegelian and Marxist thought. Anyway, here is one catholic-convert's
>>>>>> expression of the idea:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In my beginning is my end. In succession
>>>>>> Houses rise and fall, crumble, are extended,
>>>>>> Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place
>>>>>> Is an open field, or a factory, or a by-pass.
>>>>>> Old stone to new building, old timber to new fires,
>>>>>> Old fires to ashes, and ashes to the earth
>>>>>> Which is already flesh, fur and faeces,
>>>>>> Bone of man and beast, cornstalk and leaf.
>>>>>> Houses live and die: there is a time for building
>>>>>> And a time for living and for generation
>>>>>> And a time for the wind to break the loosened pane
>>>>>> And to shake the wainscot where the field-mouse trots
>>>>>> And to shake the tattered arras woven with a silent motto.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In my beginning is my end. Now the light falls
>>>>>> Across the open field, leaving the deep lane
>>>>>> Shuttered with branches, dark in the afternoon,
>>>>>> Where you lean against a bank while a van passes,
>>>>>> And the deep lane insists on the direction
>>>>>> Into the village, in the electric heat
>>>>>> Hypnotised. In a warm haze the sultry light
>>>>>> Is absorbed, not refracted, by grey stone.
>>>>>> The dahlias sleep in the empty silence.
>>>>>> Wait for the early owl.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In that open field
>>>>>> If you do not come too close, if you do not come too close,
>>>>>> On a summer midnight, you can hear the music
>>>>>> Of the weak pipe and the little drum
>>>>>> And see them dancing around the bonfire
>>>>>> The association of man and woman
>>>>>> In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie—
>>>>>> A dignified and commodiois sacrament.
>>>>>> Two and two, necessarye coniunction,
>>>>>> Holding eche other by the hand or the arm
>>>>>> Whiche betokeneth concorde. Round and round the fire
>>>>>> Leaping through the flames, or joined in circles,
>>>>>> Rustically solemn or in rustic laughter
>>>>>> Lifting heavy feet in clumsy shoes,
>>>>>> Earth feet, loam feet, lifted in country mirth
>>>>>> Mirth of those long since under earth
>>>>>> Nourishing the corn. Keeping time,
>>>>>> Keeping the rhythm in their dancing
>>>>>> As in their living in the living seasons
>>>>>> The time of the seasons and the constellations
>>>>>> The time of milking and the time of harvest
>>>>>> The time of the coupling of man and woman
>>>>>> And that of beasts. Feet rising and falling.
>>>>>> Eating and drinking. Dung and death.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dawn points, and another day
>>>>>> Prepares for heat and silence. Out at sea the dawn wind
>>>>>> Wrinkles and slides. I am here
>>>>>> Or there, or elsewhere. In my beginning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> On Sun, Jul 19, 2009 at 8:47 PM, Lois Holzman <
>>>>>> lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi All,Mike's post sent me back to my most recent thinking on
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> imitation
>>>>>>> (two weeks ago!) as well as to my language development research in
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> mid-70s with Lois Bloom. I do recall that my first published article
>>>>>>> (Imitation in Language Development: If, When and Why) was one of a
>>>>>>> handful
>>>>>>> at the time that focused on spontaneous imitation as opposed to
>>>>>>> elicited
>>>>>>> imitation, such as Slobin's study Mike refers to.OUr findings from
>>>>>>> longitudinal data from 6 children from single words to syntax were
>>>>>>> quite
>>>>>>> interesting: by our operational definitions, some of them didn't
>>>>>>> imitate and
>>>>>>> their language development was similar to those that imitated.
>>>>>>> Those that
>>>>>>> did imitate, imitated what they were in the process of learning,
>>>>>>> and not
>>>>>>> what they knew well nor what was beyond them. Today I would say they
>>>>>>> imitated what was in their ZPD and that their imitations were
>>>>>>> part of
>>>>>>> creating that ZPD.
>>>>>>> So it seems to me that the change referred to —to the more
>>>>>>> simplified
>>>>>>> form— could be understood as the child making meaning with what
>>>>>>> has been
>>>>>>> said, playing with it, creating with it, using it. For the social
>>>>>>> situation
>>>>>>> doesn't end just because the child is alone--s/he takes it with
>>>>>>> her/him; it
>>>>>>> becomes part of her/his life world and repertoire.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What I can add about the relevance to school is the importance of
>>>>>>> opportunities for language play, and especially the kind of creative
>>>>>>> imitation Vygotsky believes is critical for very young children.
>>>>>>> For the
>>>>>>> most part schools do not create opportunities for children to play
>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>> language in the way that is described here. We've created this
>>>>>>> thing called
>>>>>>> "vocabulary" which they are obliged to learn. Children are asked
>>>>>>> to get the
>>>>>>> correct or finished version tas quickly as possible—and they are
>>>>>>> typically
>>>>>>> given simplified language to help them do this. There is little of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> playfulness that happens when the language around you is not
>>>>>>> simplified, and
>>>>>>> you are free to play with and use it in a variety of ways.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Perhaps helpful in adding to what I am saying is part of this
>>>>>>> quote from
>>>>>>> Vygotsky, which I wrote about in an article several years ago and
>>>>>>> resurrected for a just completed chapter for Cathrene-Ana-Vera's
>>>>>>> upcoming
>>>>>>> volume:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But is fully developed speech, which the child is only able to
>>>>>>> master at
>>>>>>> the end of this period of development, already present in the
>>>>>>> child’s
>>>>>>> environment? It is, indeed. The child speaks in one word
>>>>>>> phrases, but
>>>>>>> his mother talks to him in language which is already grammatically
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> syntactically formed and which has a large vocabulary*… *Let us
>>>>>>> agree to
>>>>>>> call this developed form, which is supposed to make its appearance
>>>>>>> at the
>>>>>>> end of the child’s development, the final or ideal form. And let
>>>>>>> us call the
>>>>>>> child’s form of speech the primary or rudimentary form. The
>>>>>>> greatest
>>>>>>> characteristic feature of child development is that this
>>>>>>> development is
>>>>>>> achieved under particular conditions of interaction with the
>>>>>>> environment,
>>>>>>> where this …form which is going to appear only at the end of the
>>>>>>> process of
>>>>>>> development is not only already there in the environment … but
>>>>>>> actually
>>>>>>> interacts and exerts a real influence on the primary form, on the
>>>>>>> first
>>>>>>> steps of the child’s development. *Something which is only
>>>>>>> supposed to
>>>>>>> take shape at the very end of development, somehow influences the
>>>>>>> very first
>>>>>>> steps in this development. *(Vygotsky, 1994, p. 348—the article is
>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>> Problem of the Environment, appearing in The Vygotsky Reader)
>>>>>>> Apologies for
>>>>>>> the slightly abridged version of the passage.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Not surprisingly, I "relate" creative imitation to performance....
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Lois
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Lois Holzman, Director
>>>>>>> East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy
>>>>>>> 920 Broadway, 14th floor
>>>>>>> New York NY 10010
>>>>>>> tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324
>>>>>>> fax 212.941.0511
>>>>>>> lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org
>>>>>>> www.eastsideinstitute.org
>>>>>>> www.performingtheworld.org loisholzman.org On Jul 16, 2009, at 5:00
>>>>>>> PM, Mike Cole wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David's note of a few days ago on 3-7 year old changes in
>>>>>>> egocentric speech
>>>>>>> reminded
>>>>>>> me of an old article by Slobin and Welch (reprinted in Ferguson
>>>>>>> and Slobin,
>>>>>>> *Studies of Child Development, 1963)
>>>>>>> *that it took a while to track down. The study is often cited in
>>>>>>> studies of
>>>>>>> elicited imitation where an adult says some
>>>>>>> sentence and asks a little kid to repeat it. Kids simplify the
>>>>>>> sentence in
>>>>>>> normal circumstances ("Where is the kitty"
>>>>>>> becomes "where kitty") and other such stuff. There is a pretty large
>>>>>>> literature on this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But when I went to find the phenomenon in the article that had
>>>>>>> most struck
>>>>>>> me, I could not find it in the recent lit
>>>>>>> on elicited imitation. The phenomenon seems relevant to the
>>>>>>> monologic,
>>>>>>> dialogic etc speech discussion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The phenomenon is this: When a 2yr/5month old child is recorded
>>>>>>> saying
>>>>>>> "If
>>>>>>> you finish your eggs all up, Daddy, you
>>>>>>> can have your coffee." they can repeat this sentence pretty much
>>>>>>> as it is
>>>>>>> right afterward. But 10 minutes later it has
>>>>>>> become simplified a la the usual observation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Citing William James (the child has an "intention to say so and
>>>>>>> so") Slobin
>>>>>>> and Welch remark:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If that linguistic form is presented for imitation while the
>>>>>>> intention is
>>>>>>> still operative, it can be faily successfully imitated. Once the
>>>>>>> intention
>>>>>>> is gone, however, the utterance must be processed in linguistic
>>>>>>> terms alone
>>>>>>> -- without its original intentional and
>>>>>>> contextual support." In the absence of such support, the task can
>>>>>>> strain
>>>>>>> the child's abilities and reveal a more limited competence than may
>>>>>>> actually
>>>>>>> be present in spontaneous speech (p. 489-90).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This kind of observation seems relevant in various ways both to
>>>>>>> language
>>>>>>> acquisition in school settings and to my reccurrent
>>>>>>> questions about the social situation of development. Is it
>>>>>>> relevant to the
>>>>>>> discussion of egocentric and social speech, David?
>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>
> --
> --
> Karen C. Spear-Ellinwood
> PhD Candidate, College of Education
> Dept. of Teaching, Language & Sociocultural Studies
> kse@email.arizona.edu
> Cell: 520-878-6034
> phone: 520-829-0749
> kse@email.arizona.edu
> Cell: 520-878-6034
> phone: 520-829-0749
> Fax: 520-626-8280
>
>  ?To be able honestly to say, in response to a student's question, "I don't
> know. How could we find out?" is probably more important, in creating an
> ethos
> of collaborative inquiry in the classroom, than always being able to supply
> a
> ready-made answer. Even for the most well-informed teacher there are almost
> certain to be aspects of the topic that s/he does not fully understand. To
> be
> able to wonder aloud about these and to be seen to take action to
> understand
> them better not only provides an excellent model for the students to
> emulate,
> it also demonstrates the authenticity of the teacher's commitment to
> inquiry.?
> _In C.D. Lee and P. Smagorinsky (Eds.) Vygotskian perspectives on literacy
> research.. New York: Cambridge University Press, (pp. 51-85)._
>
>  Wells sees this particular ethos as valuing inquiry as a lifelong process,
> encouraging students to ask questions. I think Wells also implies that
> ethos is
> at the heart of a classroom, mediating particular approaches to learning
> and
> teaching. Being at the heart of activity is consistent with the suggestion
> of
> placing ethos at the heart of the activity system model.
>
>
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