Re: [xmca] Wolves and Ilyenkov

[Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>]

Ilyenkov can indeed seem very hard to comprehend.  I have appended  
something below that might help.

With a little work parsing some of his passages, I think Ilyenkov can  
actually be quite understandable.  I believe the hardest part of  
understanding Ilyenkov, besides having to sometimes machete one's way  
through his occasionally unwieldy sentence structures, is getting a  
handle on how he conceptualizes reality (as it pertains to humans) as  
simultaneously material and ideal, and dialectical motion (again as it  
pertains to humans) as simultaneously objective and subjective.

I think some of his passages get tricky because he is making sure both  
the material and ideal as well as the objective and subjective aspects  
of whatever he is describing are all being accounted for in their  
"fullness," to use one of his favorite words.  It can take some work  
to fully grasp the ways Ilyenkov sometimes does this.

I happen to find the effort worthwhile.  Davydov, I am discovering,  
was highly influenced by Ilyenkov, as are many others in CHAT.

I have taken several Ilyenkov essays and worked them pretty much in  
the manner I have done below, annotating each paragraph or sentence  
with a paraphrasing of his words and other forms of commentary.  I am  
attempting to reflect, as precisely as I can, the meaning I think he  
intended.  I find this method very helpful.  It does, however, take  
time!

Below is the essay by Ilyenkov that David posted about, the  
Introduction to his book of essays Dialectical Logic (1977).  In this  
version, I have written little annotations, mostly paraphrases of the  
original sentences, followed by the original Ilyenkov sentence.  See  
what you think.  Try reading just what I wrote - it should read pretty  
fast - and then compare it to the Ilyenkov.  It is a short, simple,  
and very interesting little essay, once one gets past the difficult  
phrases.

If someone thinks I am reading something wrong, which I certainly  
might be, please say something.  Just as Ilyenkov says that  
formulating a systematic exposition of dialectical logic is a  
collective effort, so is trying to comprehend Ilyenkov.

*****************************************

original from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essayint.htm

Dialectical Logic, Essays on its History and Theory

by Evald Ilyenkov, written 1974, published in English by Progress  
Publishers 1977

Introduction


[Annotations, consisting of paraphrases preceding the original  
sentences, are by Steve Gabosch. September 2009. –sg]


[1.  A systematically developed exposition of materialist dialectics,  
a ‘Logic’, as envisioned by Lenin, is acutely needed today. –sg]


The task, bequeathed to us by Lenin, of creating a Logic (with a  
capital ‘L’), i.e. of a systematically developed exposition of  
dialectics understood as the logic and theory of knowledge of modern  
materialism, has become particularly acute today.


[2.  Only Marxist-Leninist dialectics has the ability to be the method  
of scientific understanding and practical activity in today’s world. – 
sg]


The clearly marked dialectical character of the problems arising in  
every sphere of social life and scientific knowledge is making it more  
and more clear that only Marxist-Leninist dialectics has the capacity  
to be the method of scientific understanding and practical activity,  
and of actively helping scientists in their theoretical comprehension  
of experimental and factual data and in solving the problems they meet  
in the course of research.


 [3.  Writings relevant to this project are accumulating.  They can  
serve as building blocks toward a future ‘Logic’. –sg]


In the past ten or fifteen years, quite a few works have been written  
devoted to separate branches that are part of the whole of which we  
still only dream; they can justly be regarded as paragraphs, even  
chapters, of the future Logic, as more or less finished blocks of the  
building being erected.


[4.  Cementing these blocks together will take a collective effort. –sg]


One cannot, of course, cement these ‘blocks’ mechanically into a  
whole; but since the task of a systematic exposition of dialectical  
logic can only be solved by collective efforts, we must at least  
determine the most general principles of joint work.


[5.  The collection of essays in this book address some of the general  
principles of this joint effort. –sg]


In the essays presented here we attempt to concretise some of the  
points of departure of such collective work.


[6.  Hegel made an interesting remark about philosophy.  He said that,  
on one hand, the end results of philosophy express the complete facts  
themselves in their very nature, whereas, on the other hand, the mere  
process of bringing these facts to light has no essential  
significance. –sg]


In philosophy, more than in any other science, as Hegel remarked with  
some regret in his Phenomenology of Mind, ‘the end or final result  
seems ... to have absolutely expressed the complete fact itself in its  
very nature; contrasted with that the mere process of bringing it to  
light would seem, properly speaking, to have no essential significance’.


[7.  This is aptly put.  So long as dialectical logic is viewed merely  
as a process for bringing facts and theses to light, it will remain,  
as Hegel said, something of ‘no essential significance.’ –sg]


That is very aptly put.

So long as dialectics (dialectical logic) is looked upon as a simple  
tool for proving a previously accepted thesis (irrespective of whether  
it was initially advanced as the rules of mediaeval disputes required,  
or only disclosed at the end of the argument, in order to create the  
illusion of not being preconceived, that is, of saying: “Look, here is  
what we have obtained although we did not assume it”), it will remain  
something of ‘no essential significance’.


[8.  In other words, if dialectics is reduced to a mechanical device  
for demonstrating an already established thesis, is becomes only a  
pseudo-dialectics, a form of sophistry that is empty of content. –sg]


When dialectics is converted into a simple tool for proving a  
previously accepted (or given) thesis, it becomes a sophistry only  
outwardly resembling dialectics, but empty of content.


[9.  Real dialectical logic does not take on life in the form of  
‘naked results’ nor in the ‘tendency’ of the movement of thought. It  
takes on life only in the form of ‘the result along with the process  
of arriving at it.’  Therefore, we must take this into account in our  
investigation of dialectics. –sg]


And if it is true that real dialectical logic takes on life not in  
‘naked results’, and not in the ‘tendency’ of the movement of thought,  
but only in the form of ‘the result along with the process of arriving  
at it’, then during the exposition of dialectics as Logic, we must  
reckon with this truth.


[10.  The opposite approach, of applying a so-called dialectical  
method with no aim whatsoever in mind, is untenable.  –sg]


For it is impossible to go to the other extreme, taking the view that  
we had allegedly not set ourselves any aim determining the means and  
character of our activity from the very outset in the course of our  
analysis of the problem, but had set out swimming at random.


[11.  We are obliged, therefore, to clearly state at the outset what  
the ‘object’ is that we wish to dialectically analyze. –sg]


And we are therefore obliged, in any case, to say clearly, at the very  
beginning, what the ‘object’ is in which we want to discover the  
intrinsically necessary division into parts.


[12.  Our ‘object,’ that is, our ‘subject matter’, is thought.   
Dialectical logic aims to scientifically represent thought in its  
necessary concrete, developmental, objective existences, including  
those aspects of these existences that are objectively independent of  
will and consciousness. –sg]


Our ‘object’ or ‘subject matter’ in general, and on the whole, is  
thought, thinking; and dialectical Logic has as its aim the  
development of a scientific representation of thought in those  
necessary moments, and moreover in the necessary sequence, that do not  
in the least depend either on our will or on our consciousness.


[13.  In other words, dialectics must show how scientific thought  
develops and reflects.  It must show how scientific thought  
reproduces, in concepts, objects that exist outside of and  
independently of human consciousness and will.  Dialectics must show  
how human scientific thought apprehends objects when it is 1) creating  
mental reproductions of them; 2) reconstructing their self- 
development; 3) recreating objects in the logic of the movements of  
concepts; and then 4) recreating the objects once again in experiment  
or practice. –sg]


In other words Logic must show how thought develops if it is  
scientific, if it reflects, i.e. reproduces in concepts, an object  
existing outside our consciousness and will and independently of them,  
in other words, creates a mental reproduction of it, reconstructs its  
self-development, recreates it in the logic of the movement of  
concepts so as to recreate it later in fact (in experiment or in  
practice).


[14.  Logic is the theoretical representation of scientific thinking.   
–sg]


Logic then is the theoretical representation of such thinking.


[15.  We understand thought to be the ideal component of real human  
activity. –sg]


From what we have said it will be clear that we understand thought  
(thinking) as the ideal component of the real activity of social  
people transforming both external nature and themselves by their labour.


[16.  Dialectical logic is more than a universal description of the  
subjective activities of humans in their transformations of nature.    
It is also a universal description of the material changes taking  
place during activity … and … of the relevant objective reality as a  
whole. –sg]


Dialectical logic is therefore not only a universal scheme of  
subjective activity creatively transforming nature, but is also at the  
same time a universal scheme of the changing of any natural or socio- 
historical material in which this activity is fulfilled and with the  
objective requirements of which it is always connected.


[17.  This is our take on what Lenin meant by the **identity** (not  
just the unity) of dialectics, logic, and materialist epistemology. –sg]


That, in our opinion, is what the real gist of Lenin’s thesis on the  
identity (not ‘unity’ only, but precisely identity, full coincidence)  
of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge of the modern,  
scientific. i.e. materialist, world outlook consists in.


[18.  This approach is also consistent with Engels’ definition of  
dialectics as being the science of the general laws of motion and  
development of nature, human society, and thought. –sg]


This approach preserves as one of the definitions of dialectics that  
given by Frederick Engels (‘dialectics, however, is nothing more than  
the science of the general laws of the motion and development of  
nature, human society, and thought’, i.e. of natural and socio- 
historical development, and not ‘specifically subjective’ laws and  
forms of thought).


[19.  Dialectical logic is not only the science of thinking but is  
also the science of the development of all things, both material and  
spiritual.


We think that one can unite dialectics and materialism in precisely  
that way, and show that Logic, being dialectical, is not only the  
science of ‘thinking’ but also the science of development of all  
things, both material and ‘spiritual’.


[20.  By viewing material reality and human thought as intricately  
connected in a fundamental way, this view of dialectics sees Logic as  
the science of the reflection of the movements of the world within the  
movement of concepts. –sg]


Understood in that way Logic can also be the genuine science of the  
reflection of the movement of the world in the movement of concepts.


[21.  When this fundamental connection is not recognized, as, for  
example, Neopositivists do not, dialectics is inevitably transformed  
into a purely technical discipline. –sg]


Otherwise it is inevitably transformed, as has happened to it in the  
hands of Neopositivists, into a purely technical discipline, a  
description of systems of manipulations with the terms of language.


[22.  Defining Logic in the concrete manner proposed here requires  
that the concepts comprising Logic, especially the concept of  
thinking, must be disclosed. –sg]


The concretisation of the general definition of Logic presented above  
must obviously consist in disclosing the concepts composing it, above  
all the concept of thought (thinking).


[23.  However, attempting to define Logic fully and concretely creates  
a dialectical difficulty.  A full and concrete description of Logic  
requires far more than just a ‘definition’.   This can only be  
accomplished by ‘developing the essence of the matter’. –sg]


Here again a purely dialectical difficulty arises, namely, that to  
define this concept fully, i.e. concretely, also means to ‘write’  
Logic, because a full description cannot by any means be given by a  
‘definition’ but only by ‘developing the essence of the matter’.


[24.  Another concept that comprises Logic, closely allied with the  
concept of thinking, is the concept ‘concept’ itself.  A simple  
definition is possible, but such a definition would not be useful. –sg]


The concept ‘concept’ itself is also very closely allied with the  
concept of thought. To give a ‘definition’ of it here would be easy,  
but would it be of any use?


[25. We understand the concept ‘concept’ to mean ‘the gist of the  
matter’.  We do not understand ‘concept’, as do other approaches, as a  
‘sign’, nor as a ‘term defined through other terms’, nor as simply a  
‘reflection of the essential or intrinsic attributes of things’.  With  
our understanding of concept as being the gist of the matter, in order  
to arrive at a ‘concrete’, Marxist-Leninist understanding of the  
essence of Logic in general and the concept in particular, it would be  
more correct for us to begin with the abstract, simple definitions  
that are generally accepted by everyone. –sg]


If we, adhering to a certain tradition in Logic, tend to understand by  
‘concept’ neither ‘sign’ nor ‘term defined through other terms’, and  
not simply a ‘reflection of the essential or intrinsic attributes of  
things’ (because here the meaning of the insidious words ‘essential’  
and ‘intrinsic’ come to the fore), but the gist of the matter, then it  
would be more correct, it seems to us, to limit ourselves in relation  
to definition rather to what has been said, and to start to consider  
‘the gist of the matter’, to begin with abstract, simple definitions  
accepted as far as possible by everyone.

In order to arrive at the ‘concrete’, or in this case at a Marxist- 
Leninist understanding of the essence of Logic and its concretely  
developed ‘concept’.


[26.  The plan and design of this book of essays is based on the above  
ideas.  While this book at first appears to be a just a study of the  
history of philosophy, the historical material in this book on the  
‘matter of Logic’ is only the means by which the ‘logic of Matter’ is  
outlined according to the approach developed by Marx, Engels and  
Lenin. –sg]


Everything we have said determines the design and plan of our book. At  
first glance it may seem that it is, if not wholly, then to a  
considerable degree, a study in the history of philosophy.

But the ‘historical’ collisions of realising the ‘matter of Logic’ is  
not an end-in-itself for us, but only the factual material through  
which the clear outlines of the ‘logic of Matter’ gradually show  
through those very general outlines of dialectics as Logic which,  
critically corrected and materialistically rethought by Marx, Engels  
and Lenin, also characterise our understanding of this science.

<end>

- Steve





On Sep 7, 2009, at 4:26 PM, David Kellogg wrote:

> I have a confession to make. I have tried several times to read the  
> work of Evald Ilyenkov, and given up in total confusion each time.  
> In trying to make sense of Chapter Five of Thinking and Speech, and  
> then of Carol and Paula's paper, I though I made something of a  
> breakthrough. But now I am not so sure.
>
> It seemed to me that the three basic layers of concept formation  
> (which I think of as a kind of palimpsest, because of course even  
> the most basic layer is still there when we reach the higher levels)  
> correspond to SUBJECT, OBJECT and IDEA, more or less as expressed in  
> Hegel's "Logic".
>
> The syncretic heap is simply formed by the subject's purely  
> subjective activity: "this with that". The complex is formed by  
> concrete, perceptual links, which are abstracted and generalized  
> first as actual features and then as increasingly abstract qualities  
> (which is why color and shape have to come before diameter, height  
> and weight). Only the idea is formed by the resynthesis of abstract  
> qualities into a new quality.
>
> I see this often in data. When we play games, we often start like  
> this:
>
> a) T: Do you like games?
> Ss: Yaaaa! Shinanda! (yes, they are fun!)
>
> b) T: Well, this is a game. The name of the game is "Find the  
> banana!" See...here is a banana. And here is a card. (T introduces  
> cards and hides banana behind one of them.)
>
> c) (Children try to find the banana by asking questions suggested by  
> the cards) T: There it is! Who wins? Why?
>
> We can see that the initial orientation in a) is purely subjective,  
> almost syncretic. The concrete objects introduced in b) are really  
> associative complexes (and that explains the purely factual,  
> objective link between the card and the banana) and the abstract  
> rule expressed in c) really corresponds to a generalization of  
> abstract qualities that inhered in the activities that precededed  
> it: a concept.
>
> I found Paula and Carol's paper very useful in bringing this out.  
> But I ALSO found that the experiment itself OBSCURES the  
> palimpsestic quality of the final concept, because the child really  
> has to start over from scratch a lot. As one of their subjects  
> remarked, it's really quite easy, but it's really quite difficult.  
> It's easy because ALL of the blocks are quite clearly implicated in  
> the final solution, but it's difficult because they are apparently  
> implicated in very different ways (but only apparently) and you have  
> to start over again each time.
>
> Of course, we do not REALLY arrive at concepts by this kind of trial  
> and error. Yet this morning, tackling Ilyenkov unsuccessfully for  
> the millionth time (I think I must read him by trial and error) I  
> came upon the following passage on p. 1 of Andy's new complilation,  
> "The Ideal in Human Activity".
>
> "In philosophy, more than in any other science, as Hegel remarke  
> with some regret in his Phenomenologyof Mind, 'the end or final  
> result seems...to have absolutely expressed the complete fact (?)  
> itself in its very nature (??); contrasted with that (???) the mere  
> process of bringing it to life would seem, properly speaking, to  
> have no essential significance."
>
> Right. OK. The complete fact (whatever that and its nature is) is  
> more important than the method we use to bring it to life. So  
> presumably this is a good excuse for saying that the means by which  
> the child discovers the concept in the blocks exercise doesn't  
> matter; it is the complete fact of the solution that matters. So we  
> can ignore (at least for the moment) the essential differences  
> between the circumstances of concept formation in Chapter Five (the  
> blocks experiment) and Chapter Six (a real classroom). Ilyenkov  
> remarks that "this is very aptly put". Not the word that springs to  
> my mind, I'm afraid; is EVI being ironic?
>
> Ilyenkov himself contradicts this on the very next page:
>
> "When dialectics is converted into a simple tool for proving a  
> previously accepted (or given) thesis, it becomes a sophistry only  
> outwardly resembling dialectics but empty of content. And if it is  
> true that real dialectical logic takes on life not in 'naked  
> results' and not in the 'tendency' of the movement of thought but  
> only in the form of 'the result along with the process of arriving  
> at it', then during the exposition of dialectics as logic, we must  
> reckon with this truth (?)."
>
> So real logic is not naked results or processes of thinking but the  
> result with the process of arriving at it. That's more like it. Now  
> it looks like Chapter Five (where we look at naked results) is very  
> different from Chapter Six. Except that in the NEXT paragraph, he  
> changes his mind again.
>
> "Our one 'object' or 'subject matter' in general and on the whole is  
> thought, thinking; and dialectical Logic has as its aim the  
> development of a scientific representation of thought in those  
> necessary moments, and moreover in the necessary sequence, that do  
> not in the least depend either on our will or on our consciousness."
>
> Damn! So much for a) subject and c) idea, not to mention the  
> palimpsest of results set off against processes that I was trying to  
> set up in my mind. No will, so no syncretism. No consciousness, so  
> no concept. Dialectical logic has to do without both. So what IS  
> there?
>
> Well, this is what Ilyenkov says, but I don't understand a word of  
> it, and I don't even think it is grammatical:
>
> "Dialectical logic is therefore not only a universal scheme of  
> subjective activity creatively transforming nature but is also at  
> the same time a universal scheme of the changing of any natural or  
> socio-historical material in which this (?) activity is fulfilled  
> and with the objective requirements of which (??) it is always  
> connected."
>
> "This activity" is subjective activity, yes? "Of which" presumably  
> means "with which", and "it" refers to subjective activity. Without  
> will? Without consciousness?
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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