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Dear Andy, Mike and others
Please forgive me if this issue has already been dealt with.
In his study "The origin of intelligence in the child" in
which Piaget studied his own three children from birth he
stated that he was studying behaviour uncontaminated by
"training, apprenticeship or chance". His observations
ceased at the sixth stage of practical intelligence, the
invention of new means through mental combinations. In his
study of the babies' actions on objects he identified
behaviour which he interpreted as mental representation of
problems which the children wished to solve. When Lucien
failed to retrieve a toy using a familiar action - probably
pulling on his blanket - he invented a new way to get the
toy. Piaget thought that this behaviour marked the beginning
of consciousness and that it involved reflection on contents
of mind. If so it is one that higher animals can achieve.
The situations P. described certainly involved cultural
artefacts in the form of things like toys and blankets but
these were used in a way determined by the baby rather than
the artefacts.
Perhaps Piaget's "consciousness" needs another name. What
appears most striking is the change in the character of
consciousness once language comes into use.
Geraldine McDonald
----- Original Message Follows -----
Well, as I see it, we can't have joint artifact-mediated
action as the unit of analysis for thinking, and then have
something different for a thought-form or unit of social
life or whatever ...
Andy
Mike Cole wrote:
sounds like paraphrase of Sfard to me. But still reading
and thinking. mike
On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 9:04 PM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Mike Cole wrote:
One of these is her suggestion that a concept is
" a word or other signifier
WITH ITS DISCURSIVE USE (my emphasis). That
complicates identifying words
and concepts and moves us toward a
Wittgensteinian notion of word meaning.
My take is that a concept is a word (or phrase or
other symbol) + the actions in which it is realized,
so it is constantly re-instantiated every time a
word is used. The artifact is just the universal. A
concept is not real or alive until the universal is
identified with particular actions by individuals. Think
of the Rossetta stone. Under what circumstances were
those hieroglyphs concepts?
Peirce had things to say about this.
Andy
I also think that reading the Davydov materials
posted by Andy is important
because VVD was quite critical of Vygotsky's
notion of concept.
Indeed, this discussion is extremely important. Give
me another 24 hours. ...
--
----------------------------------------------------------
-------------- Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media)
http://www.erythrospress.com/
Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
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