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2009/9/14 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> > Steve, I think Vygotsky is neither clear nor consistent, but making all due > allowances, he was right; Davydov is clear and consistent, but he is wrong > on occasions. Pity Vyvogotsky did not live longer. But it means we have to > put a consistent and tenable understanding together ourselves. > > Firstly I believe Vygtosky took the "scientific concept" only as a > microcosm of the concept, and recognised that the everyday life of an adult > is full of concepts (i.e. proper concepts). He gives "dog" as an example. In > general concepts originate out of "expert systems" of some kind, i.e., > institutions, but not necessarily science: e.g. sport, the Church, > literature, ... This will not be the first occasion that LSV's use of a > micrcosm has caused people to think that he thinks the micrcosm is the > whole. > > So Vygotsky reognizes many types of concept, and I don't think Vygotsky > limited "rationality" to science. He began life as a literary critic after > all. > > On how individuals acquire knowledge, you are right of course, that > whatever form a child's knowledge takes, it is acquired through > artefact-mediated collaboration with adults, at least until the age of ~7 > when interaction with peers starts to rival interaction with adults. > > One of LSV's strentghs v-a-v Davydov is that LSV really concerns himself > with the transition - this is where wolves in sheeps clothing comes from. > But Davydov simply regards everyday non-conceptual thinking as a barrier to > learning scientific conceptual thought. He doesn't really see a transition > at all. > > Andy > > > Steve Gabosch wrote: > >> It seems as though Vygotsky's theory recognized only one kind of adult, >> rational concept, which he called at various times the "true concept," the >> "scientific concept," etc. In Ch 6 of T&S Vygotsky contrasted his theory of >> the true concept with the "spontaneous" or "everyday" concept, which he >> seems to have associated with various forms of complexive thinking, >> including the pseudoconcept, the potential concept, the preconcept, etc. >> >> On the other hand, Davydov's theory, appreciative of the accomplishments >> and critical of the shortcomings of Vygotsky's work on concept formation, >> recognizes not just one but **two** kinds of rational concepts, which he >> calls the empirical concept (more precisely, the "general >> conceptualization") and the theoretical concept (the "content-based >> generalization"). I find his general arguments for this persuasive, and >> consistent with a philosophical book I have found influential on my thinking >> about concepts - as did Davydov - Ilyenkov's The Dialectics of the Abstract >> and the Concrete in Marx's Capital (1960). >> >> However, so far as I can tell, while Davydov discusses Vygotsky's work on >> complexes, he did not fully incorporate this work into his theory. Why not? >> Or has he? More on this below. >> >> ************* >> >> Andy, in speaking of an "absolutely non-empirical social factor" in human >> activity I take it you are affirming the CHAT principle that cultural >> knowledge is, for a large part, derived by the individual **indirectly** >> through the words, artifacts and actions of other people, through >> **cultural** interaction, and not just **directly** through individual >> **sensory** experience. Is this what you mean? >> >> Also, Andy, you suggest that for you or me, a 'rook' is a concept, but for >> a child, it is probably a potential concept (or might be, may I add, a >> pre-concept, or a pseudo-concept). How is that different from suggesting >> that for concept-trained adults, cev, bik, mur and lag are concepts, even >> though for a child they might be a pseudo-concepts? Not quite understanding >> your argument ... >> >> *************** >> >> The problem may lie in whether we are using the term "concept" in the >> one-rational-concept-system theory of Vygotsky or the >> two-rational-concept-system theory of Davydov. I was using Vygotsky's >> system. One reason I am having trouble easily jumping from LSV's system to >> VVD's is some confusion I am having over terminology, along with Davydov's >> (for me, so far) unsatisfying account of complexive thinking. >> >> Interestingly, Davydov seems to only employ the term "true concept" twice >> in Types of Generalizations. Once as part of a quote from Bruner et al, and >> once in the section in Chapter 6 on Vygotsky's work on concept formation, >> nearby some of the quotes you cite. Here is what Davydov says about true >> concepts: >> >> "From the standpoint of dialectical logic, concepts, as they are >> encountered in our everyday speech, are not concepts in the proper sense of >> the word. They are, rather, general conceptions of things. But it is >> indisputable that they are a transitional stage from complexes and >> pseudo-concepts to true concepts in the dialectical sense of the word [65, >> pp. 196-197]." >> >> In a sense, this may be the same problem that you point to in your essay, >> Andy, where Vygotsky was using the generic term "concept" to refer to both >> all concept formations at all developmental levels as well as to their most >> highly developed forms. Davydov, and perhaps you, may sometimes be doing >> something similar - "concepts," "true concepts," "concepts in the proper >> sense of the word," etc. Maybe a clearer taxonomic nomenclature is needed. >> Or maybe there is something I am not yet quite getting. >> >> Davydov's suggestion that general conceptualizations are **transitional** >> between "everyday" speech, that is, "complexes and pseudo-concepts," seems >> very important to me. Is there a place where he specifically develops this >> idea, or perhaps, where someone else does? Understanding how to fully >> incorporate what we know about complexive thinking into a general theory of >> concept formation might help me to make the leap from Vygotsky to Davydov. >> >> - Steve >> >> >> >> >> On Sep 12, 2009, at 8:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Steve Gabosch wrote: >>> >>>> One, what do you mean by "an absolutely non-empirical social factor" >>>> >>> >>> One. When I say "absolutely non-empirical" I do not try to deny that all >>> knowledge begins from the senses. For example, if I drive on the left >>> because the law requires me to, I still have to be able to read signs, >>> understand speech etc. to know and obey that law. But you wouldn't call that >>> "empirical" would you? Concepts come to us through using artefacts in joint >>> actions with other people, i.e., activity, not passive contemplation. See >>> "Theses on Feuerbach." Conceptual knowledge presupposes all the senses, but >>> is not thereby "empirical." >>> >>> >>> any game. In chess, for example, rooks and pawns are "concepts" - yes? >>>> >>> >>> Two. I thought about exactly this one as well. So if playing a good game >>> of chess, knowing the moves for Kings and Knights etc., and how to play a >>> good strategy, implies *conceptual* thought, then all the primary school >>> children who participate in chess championships are alredy masters of true >>> concepts. And it doesn't stop there, does it? The implication is that >>> *logical thinking* is ipso facto, conceptual thought. But primary school >>> kids in general use logical argument, apply strategies in games, learn >>> arithmetic and grammatical rules, etc, etc. >>> >>> So why is LSV so insistent that conceptual thought is possible only for >>> adolescents? I couldn't find the reference, maybe someone can, but I am sure >>> LSV believes that logical thinking and argument by giving reasons "belongs" >>> to the 7-11 age group, not 15+ - like with LSV's example of a "dog", "rook" >>> may be a concept for you, but for a child "rook" is a potential concept. >>> >>> The point is that "machine-like" logical thought is not conceptual >>> thought. It relies on pre-concepts, or what Davydov calls (charitably in my >>> view) "empirical concepts" or on one occasion "general notions." >>> >>> Does that help? >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, >>> Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 > ea > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > -- Visiting Researcher, Wits School of Education 6 Andover Road Westdene Johannesburg 2092 011 673 9265 082 562 1050 _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca