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Going to your third: the problem under discussion was this:Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that *everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement that these representational systems were material was a "motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology.
So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not* material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that everything is material. You then said that you could name a representational system which was not material, namely, language.
I responded to you that language was always material, and you now say "no, language is an non-material entity which is "put into a body." I suspect that you are relying on the concept of the 'ideal' which is a social category, not an opposite to "material."
Let's just deal with this. I don't accept that there is a language which is non-material which can then be "put into" a body. Can you explain to me what kind of existence language has before it is put into material.
I won't try to anticipate your answer, but I wonder if this will lead us back to our original problem: consciousness.
Andy Haydi Zulfei wrote:
AndyFirst there were other argumentations . Second : to your question : Consciousness itself . Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then we have two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is that itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect ideals be buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well known , indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is also defunct . I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you show me a palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's representational , secondary , derived . Haydi--- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net>/* wrote: From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the modality in which it is embodied" and then say "language is not material." Of course, anything "aside from" its materiality is immaterial. Show me a representational system which is *not* "embiodied." Andy Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear Andy > Language itself aside from the modality in which it is formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is ideal for the folowing reasons : 1. We have read on many occasions that it's a formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs as something catogirically distinct from the material which is quite quite true , why is it you could accept a formant of this something categorically distinct from *material* could be all the way *material* . This is just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a doubling of *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same way real talers as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) . Real talers or money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy , substantial ; yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that they are representations for something *esle* . The talerness of the talers and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking body to be recognized as such . Aside from the social thought/Cs , the whole things become just use values , valueless , lacking any exchange value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second > condition Lenin mentions either . As of language , the ink , the carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied does not make it *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* , *plastics* of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting content here -- of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates Lincoln , now Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain the same all the time . This latter part you name categorically *material* to this day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock consists of many many parts , that is , many corporals , materials , use values ; but all these should be organized in such a way to represent something else , time measurement . The palpability or the visuality of the clock should not take us where we could say it's something material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce fits this . When you take the ideality of the language away from it , the whole sentence/text/book becomes ink > spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect . Your example of *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the gist quite easily ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the stone so that a language becomes eligible for the readers . What remains as some markings or signs no longer have any materiality ; the remaining stone frame does not have anything to do with the language carved in it . This is also true with the braille texture . It's the organization/ordinance of the texture which is a language not the stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen lipreading each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact , have a telepathy version of language ; you're this way exchanging your mentalities with no materiality at hand . The computer is modality for your vision not for the language you are using . And lastly , because a word is a sign , something for something else , in itself ! just a yelling or a marking denoting nothing as referring to the objects of the world which you so philosophically / inexaustively are defending ! > Best > Haydi > --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" > To: "Haydi Zulfei" <haydizulfei@yahoo.com <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=haydizulfei@yahoo.com>> > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM > > > Language is a material representational system, Haydi. > > Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air), text (markings on a surface or optical projections on a screen or carved in stone) or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental telepathy version of language that I know of. > > Why do you think the written and spoken word is not material? > > Andy > Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational system which is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system which is not material. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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