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Yes, a complication with my responding to you was that in trying to support my position against Martin's position, you made (in my opinion) the opposite error. So it was hard to say to you: "No, language is material," and to Martin: "No, consciousness is not matter" and make sense.
Let's just look at your claim. You say that language is a system of ideals. Quite correct. But ideals are always material things. When we cognize ideals (i.e., material things with social significance) then not only the material properties, but also the ideal properties of things are reflected in our consciousness.
But Martin was right: all systems of representation are material, including language. I was just saying that in his own terms, he was being tautological. But Martin explained: he was addressing himself to people who believed in non-material systems of representation. So of course, you objected.
Andy Haydi Zulfei wrote:
Andy1. Quite true Andy . Yes , putting some , few , a , two , whatever into the heart of an assertion of *every* , *all* is mere tautology which I shyingly / ashamedly believe Martin is committing not just once but several times . 2. I suppose here you could point out to Martin that he could be taken to be right only if he thought of a materialistic monism and I wonder why you didn't . Yes , materialistic Monism opposes strongly the Cartesian dualistic understanding of matter/mind , body/soul either belonging to a quite unfamiliar separate world/domain . If we reject the Cartesian dualism , it's not plea for others to argue we negate our belief in two distinct but related philosophically categorical domains of materiality/ideality , a thing versus concept of a thing , etc. Once I said while we ourselves are creations of the outdide--matter-- .... , does that mean my consciousness which is real and exists , is matter ? or even material in the sense of palpable , corporeal , stuffy ? No for sure . I added that some philosophers argue Cs is material in the sense of it being an attribute of matter and even this does not evade the categorical distinction . 3. This time , pardon , tautology on your side . It's Martin who should ask you to show him a representational system which is not *material* because he asserts materiality with *every* ... . But when I gave you *language* and some other *systems* as some representational systems being ideal reasoning upon them , it was dear Martin who should have broken the silence , entered the discussion and come up with likely refutations . I already had sided with you . 4. Again I wonder why you who so scholarly argue for the quite legitimate philosophical categorical distinction of the mind/matter , are ready to accept language is material ; and how can you separate thus language domain from the Cs , mind , intellect , ideality , subjectivity domain ? Then Martin will be quite right to think of all these as being material . I'm now reading Dubrovsky's *The Nature of the Ideal* . Maybe it's a borderline category but I'm sure it's philosophical , too . No time to search now . It's a familiar controversy here . I side with the external ideals as being representations of the internal ideals rather than being genuinely material as other world corporeal objects . We have suffered lots of confusion with this *doubling* of materiality . I suppose we have to put them in contrast to each other , otherwise there will remain unsolved problems . Take the best of the bees and the worst of the architects or the *real* talers of Marx along with Gods as examples of ideals -- my previous posts . 5. You do know language came into being because of collective labour . And please have another look at V's last two paragraphs of T&S . And please think of what a syntax of a thought might be with children . And please consider yourself reviewing the lecture you're going to deliver *in* your mind before putting it in its sound/acoustic version . And historical genesis as well . Now may you , in your turn , tell me what kind of existence a consciousness has for which you are seeking an appropriate definition ? I wonder if sleep will reign ! Friendly Yours Haydi--- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net>/* wrote: From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign" To: Cc: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 11:54 AM Haydi, I firmly believe that there is no value in flying on to 101 questions if the very first one remains unsolved. Going to your third: the problem under discussion was this: Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that *everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement that these representational systems were material was a "motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology. So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not* material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that everything is material. You then said that you could name a representational system which was not material, namely, language. I responded to you that language was always material, and you now say "no, language is an non-material entity which is "put into a body." I suspect that you are relying on the concept of the 'ideal' which is a social category, not an opposite to "material." Let's just deal with this. I don't accept that there is a language which is non-material which can then be "put into" a body. Can you explain to me what kind of existence language has before it is put into material. I won't try to anticipate your answer, but I wonder if this will lead us back to our original problem: consciousness. Andy Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Andy > First there were other argumentations . > Second : to your question : Consciousness itself . > Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then we have two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is that itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect ideals be buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well known , indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is also defunct . > I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you show me a palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's representational , secondary , derived . Haydi > > --- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>/* wrote: > > > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material > quality of the man-sign" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM > > Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the modality in > which it is embodied" and then say "language is not material." Of > course, anything "aside from" its materiality is immaterial. Show me > a representational system which is *not* "embiodied." > > Andy > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Dear Andy > > Language itself aside from the modality in which it is > formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is ideal for the > folowing reasons : 1. We have read on many occasions that it's a > formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs as something > catogirically distinct from the material which is quite quite true , > why is it you could accept a formant of this something categorically > distinct from *material* could be all the way *material* . This is > just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a doubling of > *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same way real talers > as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) . Real talers or > money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy , substantial ; > yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that they are > representations for something *esle* . The talerness of the talers > and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking body to be > recognized as such . Aside from the social thought/Cs , the whole > things become just use values , valueless , lacking any exchange > value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second > > condition Lenin mentions either . As of language , the ink , the > carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied does not make it > *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* , *plastics* > of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting content here -- > of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates Lincoln , now > Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain the same all the > time . This latter part you name categorically *material* to this > day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock consists of many > many parts , that is , many corporals , materials , use values ; > but all these should be organized in such a way to represent > something else , time measurement . The palpability or the visuality > of the clock should not take us where we could say it's something > material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce fits this . > When you take the ideality of the language away from it , the whole > sentence/text/book becomes ink > > spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect . Your example of > *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the gist quite easily > ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the stone so that > a language becomes eligible for the readers . What remains as some > markings or signs no longer have any materiality ; the remaining > stone frame does not have anything to do with the language carved in > it . This is also true with the braille texture . It's the > organization/ordinance of the texture which is a language not the > stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen lipreading > each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact , have a > telepathy version of language ; you're this way exchanging your > mentalities with no materiality at hand . The computer is modality > for your vision not for the language you are using . And lastly , > because a word is a sign , something for something else , in itself > ! just a yelling or a marking denoting nothing as referring to the > objects of the world which you so philosophically / inexaustively > are defending ! > > Best > > Haydi > > --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>wrote: > > > > > > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net> > <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material > quality of the man-sign" > > To: "Haydi Zulfei" <haydizulfei@yahoo.com <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=haydizulfei@yahoo.com>> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=haydizulfei@yahoo.com>>> > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM > > > > > > Language is a material representational system, Haydi. > > > > Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air), text (markings > on a surface or optical projections on a screen or carved in stone) > or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental telepathy version > of language that I know of. > > > > Why do you think the written and spoken word is not material? > > > > Andy > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational system which > is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system which is not > material. > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > --> ------------------------------------------------------------------------> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, > Ilyenkov $20 ea > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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