Re: [xmca] Humans are signs/ideal

[Nancy Mack <nancy.mack@wright.edu>]

I love this piece.
I give students the option of doing a quote paper like this in my grad class about Bakhtin and Vygotsky after they create a quote collection from the texts that we are reading.
It creates a more dialogic interaction with the original text.
Too often secondary references are valued over a close reading of a primary text.
Bravo!

Nancy Mack

English Department
Wright State University

http://www.wright.edu/~nancy.mack





----- Original Message -----
From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
Date: Sunday, September 27, 2009 7:31 am
Subject: Re: [xmca] Humans are signs/ideal
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> A Virtual Interview with Evald Ilyenkov on Consciousness and Will
> 
> I was re-reading Concept of the Ideal tonight, spurred by Martin 
> and  
> by Andy, and started to compile some quotes to back up my 
> assertion to  
> Andy that Ilyenkov says social consciousness determines 
> individual  
> consciousness (especially 4. thru 7.).  That is the main 
> point of the  
> quotes below.  Also, the other week, some issues regarding 
> llyenkov  
> and consciousness and will came up, and that fit in a little.
> 
> Before I knew it (I have the article in a word .doc, so it was 
> easy) I  
> had a bunch of quotes, and then I played around with some of 
> them and  
> wound up creating a little dialogue with passages from 
> Ilyenkov's  
> essay.  To have a little fun, I interviewed him in the 
> voice of an  
> imaginary xmca-er who is somewhat new to the Russian philosopher ...
> 
> 
> A Virtual Interview with Evald Ilyenkov on Consciousness and Will
>  From The Concept of the Ideal by EV Ilyenkov
> http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm
> <So, Mr. Ilyenkov, just about everyone on xmca says “culture 
> is in the  
> middle” and that culture mediates human life.  What do you 
> think?>
> 1. "Psychology must necessarily proceed from the fact that 
> between the  
> individual consciousness and objective reality there exists 
> the  
> “mediating link” of the historically formed culture, which acts 
> as the  
> prerequisite and condition of individual mental activity. 
> This  
> comprises the economic and legal forms of human relationships, 
> the  
> forms of everyday life and forms of language, and so on."
> 
> 
> <OK!  Cool!  So, I have some questions for you 
> about how your theories  
> relate to individual consciousness, to consciousness and 
> will.  What  
> life activity causes consciousness and will to arise in the 
> human  
> individual?  Is it, for example, their encounters with 
> nature per se,  
> or labor somehow, or what?>
> 
> 2. “The consciousness and will that arise in the mind of the 
> human  
> individual are the direct consequence of the fact that what he 
> is  
> confronted by as the object of his life activity is not nature 
> as  
> such, but nature that has been transformed by the labour of 
> previous  
> generations, shaped by human labour, nature in the forms of 
> human life  
> activity.”
> 
> 
> <Nature shaped by labor.  Awesome.  Now, what 
> causes consciousness and  
> will to arise?  Does this happen naturally?  Or is it 
> caused by  
> something else?>
> 
> 3. “Consciousness and will become necessary forms of mental 
> activity  
> only where the individual is compelled to control his own 
> organic body  
> in answer not to the organic (natural) demands of this body but 
> to  
> demands presented from outside, by the “rules” accepted in the 
> society  
> in which he was born. It is only in these conditions that 
> the  
> individual is compelled to distinguish *himself from his own 
> organic  
> body*. These rules are not passed on to him by birth, through 
> his  
> “genes”, but are imposed upon him from outside, dictated by 
> culture,  
> and not by nature.”
> 
> 
> <Interesting.  Let me ask you about how ideality fits 
> in.  Is ideality  
> connected with consciousness and will?>
> 
> 4. ““Ideality” is, indeed, necessarily connected with 
> consciousness  
> and will, but not at all in the way that the old, pre-
> Marxist  
> materialism describes this connection. It is not ideality that 
> is an  
> “aspect”, or “form of manifestation” of the conscious-will 
> sphere but,  
> on the contrary, the conscious-will character of the human 
> mentality  
> is a form of manifestation, an “aspect” or mental manifestation 
> of the  
> *ideal* (i.e., socio-historically generated) *plane of 
> relationships  
> between* man *and nature*.”
> 
> 
> <Alright, I hear you saying that one is a manifestation of 
> the other.   
> How about if there aren’t any people possessing consciousness 
> and will  
> around at all – could we still talk about there being ideality?>
> 
> 5. “… there can be no talk of “ideality” where there are no 
> people  
> socially producing and reproducing their material life, that is 
> to  
> say, individuals working collectively and, therefore, 
> necessarily  
> possessing consciousness and will. But this does not mean that 
> the  
> “ideality of things” is a product of their *conscious will*, 
> that it  
> is “immanent in the consciousness” and exists only in the  
> consciousness. Quite the reverse, the individual’s consciousness 
> and  
> will are functions of the ideality of things, their 
> comprehended,  
> *conscious ideality*.”
> 
> 
> <Hmmm.  Let me ask this from another angle: what does 
> the world of  
> artifacts created by humans have to do with consciousness and will?>
> 
> 6. “The existence of this specifically human object — the world 
> of  
> things created by man for man, and, therefore, things whose 
> forms *are  
> reified forms of human activity* (labour) … — is the condition 
> for the  
> existence *of consciousness and will* And certainly not the 
> reverse,  
> it is not consciousness and will that are the condition 
> and  
> prerequisite for the existence of this unique object, let alone 
> its  
> “cause”.”
> 
> 
> <I’m still trying to get this straight.  Which are you 
> saying is the  
> cause and which is the effect?>
> 
> 7. “Consciousness and will are not the “cause” of the 
> manifestation of  
> this new plane of relationships [that is, the ideal plane of 
> life  
> activity -sg] between the individual and the external world, but 
> only  
> the *mental forms of its expression*, in other words, its *effect*.”
> 
> 
> <Thanks.  Look, I’m trying, but I sometimes get this 
> ideality thing  
> mixed up and confuse it with consciousness and will.  Why 
> is that?>
> 
> 8. “… since in its developed stages human life activity always 
> has a  
> purposeful, i.e., consciously willed character, “ideality” 
> presents  
> itself as a *form of consciousness and will*, as the law guiding 
> man’s  
> consciousness and will, as the objectively compulsory pattern 
> of  
> consciously willed activity. This is why it turns out to be so 
> easy to  
> portray the “ideal” exclusively as a form of consciousness and 
> self- 
> consciousness, exclusively as the “transcendental” pattern of 
> the  
> psyche and the will that realises this pattern.”
> 
> 
> <  I … see.  I think.  Okay, one last 
> question.  Since the ideal and  
> individual consciousness are both socially constructed forms of 
> human  
> consciousness, that would make them both, among other 
> things,  
> intersubjective and interdependent, wouldn’t it?>
> 
> 9. “The ideal ... exists outside people’s heads and 
> consciousness, as  
> something completely objective, a reality of a special kind that 
> is  
> independent of their consciousness and will …”
> 
> 
> <Oh.  Well, um, thanks.  Really, I totally 
> appreciate your time, Mr.  
> Ilyenkov.  Speaking of heads, you wouldn’t happen to have 
> an aspirin,  
> would you?>
> 
> Cheers,
> - Steve
> 
> PS Nice notes, Martin.
> 
> 
> 
> On Sep 26, 2009, at 2:31 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
> 
> > Tony,
> >
> > OK, then let's wade in! I'm posting below my notes on 
> Ilyenkov's The  
> > Concept of The Ideal (there are some italics so I've made it 
> rich  
> > text; let me know if this causes problems), and starting a 
> new  
> > thread topic. The first section of these notes makes some 
> general  
> > points, then I get serious and try to summarize the argument. 
> I've  
> > left my bracketed expressions of confusion, questions, etc. in 
> the  
> > notes. I don't think it's an easy read, but it's easier than 
> the  
> > original!
> >
> > If I remember correctly, in our previous discussion of this 
> text  
> > Andy and Steve argued that Ilyenkov considers only 
> obviously  
> > symbolic objects, such as statues and coats of arms, to ideal. 
> I  
> > argued that Ilyenkov says that every material aspect of social 
> life  
> > is ideal. I still stand by this reading (though as I said 
> before,  
> > this text is somewhat unclear on this point). After all, 
> Ilyenkov's  
> > central example of a material object that is at the same time 
> ideal  
> > is the commodity. While a commodity may be a symbol (I can buy 
> an  
> > American flag at the grocery store, for example), there 
> are  
> > obviously many commodities that are not symbols of this kind 
> (a pork  
> > chop). Something is ideal when its existence represents the 
> form of  
> > something else.
> >
> > One part of this text that we didn't get to discuss before is 
> where  
> > Ilyenkov makes the case that a child has to become ideal 
> (as  
> > Ilyenkov defines this) to be a member of society. My notes on 
> this  
> > are towards the end, after skipping over some sections, 
> chiefly for  
> > lack of time. This is where he seems to be moving in the 
> direction  
> > that Pierce was going in when he suggested that a human is a sign.
> >
> > You'll see the principal argument is that the child needs to 
> impose  
> > forms on their ow activity, and regard themselves as another 
> person  
> > would regard them, as representing or standing for the 
> 'general  
> > another.' In doing so, the child must distinguish himself from 
> his  
> > own body. The child's existence comes to represent the general 
> form  
> > of human being (in their particular culture, I presume).  
> That's to  
> > say, the child becomes ideal. It's a very interesting analysis.
> >
> > Martin
> >
> > On Sep 26, 2009, at 1:45 PM, Tony Whitson wrote:
> >
> >> On Sat, 26 Sep 2009, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>
> >>> To forge a link to Tony's post from Pierce, I think also 
> proposes  
> >>> that humans are ideal, or to be more precise become ideal 
> in  
> >>> ontogenesis. Rather like saying a human is a sign. But 
> that's a  
> >>> big topic.
> >>
> >> It is a big topic, but it happens to be what I am working on 
> right  
> >> now, and it is intimately involved with understanding 
> consciousness.>
> > ============
> > The Concept of the Ideal.
> >
> > EI argues that the ideal is to be found in the material things 
> of a  
> > human culture (form of life). Things have a form that 
> “represents”  
> > something else - no, I think it’s that things have an 
> existence that  
> > represents the form of something else. So the coat 
> represents  
> > (embodies, expresses) the value-form of the cloth from which 
> it was  
> > made. But it is actually the form of human activity, 
> epecially  
> > labor, that gives existence to these (social) things.
> > So, EI writes, Plato and Hegel were partially right to think 
> that a  
> > world of ideal forms exists independently of the individual 
> mind.  
> > For this plane of ideality is the product of *collective* 
> human  
> > activity. As such it confronts the individual as 
> something  external  
> > and objective, which must be assimilated, adapted too. More 
> than  
> > this, it is in adapting to this plane of cultural objects that 
> human  
> > consciousness and will are formed. They are effects of this 
> realm of  
> > ideality, not its origin. (This is where Kant went wrong, 
> along with  
> > common sense.)
> > Ideality, the ideal, exists only in the continual movement 
> between  
> > the form of activity and the form of a thing. This is why 
> a  
> > *dialectical* explanation is necessary. Take a thing out of a 
> form  
> > of activiy, and it no longer exists, it is merely a dead 
> material  
> > object. A word, taken out of “the organism of human 
> intercourse” is  
> > no more than a mere acoustic phenomenon.
> > Why does consciousness come from assimilating this cultural 
> plane? I  
> > proposes that this human form of life requires looking at 
> oneself as  
> > though as at another. Looking at oneself as another might 
> look.  
> > Considering oneself as a “representative” of the human species 
> (or  
> > at least the society). The individual needs to become “a 
> special  
> > object” to participate in this ideal objectivity, to make its 
> rules  
> > and patterns the “rules and patterns of the life activity of 
> his own  
> > body.”
> > There  are passages that sound very like Foucault:
> > “The individual is compelled to control his own organic body 
> in  
> > answer not to the organic (natural) demands of this body but 
> to  
> > demands presented from outside, by the ‘rules’ accepted in 
> the  
> > society in which he was born. It is only in these conditions 
> that  
> > the individual is compelled to distinguish himself from his 
> own  
> > organic body.”
> > And WILL is, first of all, “the ability to forcibly 
> subordinate  
> > one’s own inclinations and urges to a certain law, a certain 
> demand  
> > dictated not by the individual organics of one’s own body, but 
> by  
> > the organisation of the ‘collective body’, the collective, 
> that has  
> > formed around a certain common task.”
> > We generally are unable to see the distinction between the 
> natural  
> > properties of things and the properties they have as embodied 
> social  
> > labor. We see, for example, the stars first as a “natural 
> clock,  
> > calendar, and compass.” That’s to say, our human activities 
> are  
> > taken to be objective proprties of the natural world.
> > [MP: I think EI runs into a problem here. How can we humans 
> ever  
> > draw a distinction between the natural and social 
> properties?  
> > Science will always assimilate objects to its social and  
> > instrumental concerns. At times EI seems to see and accept 
> this, at  
> > other times he seems to want to be able to draw the line, and 
> at one  
> > point defines this as the task of philosophy.]
> > There’s an account of reflection in all this. He seems to 
> equate  
> > reflection with “the relationship to oneself as ‘another’” 
> [MP:  
> > though he may be attributing this definition only to Fichte 
> and to  
> > Hegel]. He explicitly brings up the mirror, quoting Marx. But 
> the  
> > point of the quote is that man doesn’t have a mirror in which 
> to see  
> > himself, so his reflection must take the form of recognition 
> in (and  
> > so as) another. (As, because the other sees me as an other to them.)
> > This is reflection in the sense of thinking about, becoming 
> aware  
> > of, - but there’s the implication that this requires an 
> ‘other’ to  
> > be accomplished. One becmes aware of self this way. Does one 
> become  
> > aware of anything the same way? Marx writes that the ideal is 
> the  
> > material world reflected by the human mind. (By, not in).
> > Ideas and images are ideal only when they have become 
> separated from  
> > individual mental activity. 8. An “image” is “objectified” in 
> words,  
> > but also (“and even more directly”) in “in sculptural, graphic 
> and  
> > plastic forms and in the form of the routine-ritual ways of 
> dealing  
> > with things and people, so that it is expressed not only in 
> words,  
> > in speech and language, but also in drawings, models and 
> such  
> > symbolic objects as  coats of arms, banners, dress, 
> utensils, or as  
> > money, including gold coins and paper money, IOUs, bonds or 
> credit  
> > notes.”
> >
> > ==
> > EI begins by distinguishing the concept from the terms. That 
> is, the  
> > “range of phenomena” must be defined before turning to the 
> essence  
> > of the phenomena. That makes sense - until you’ve decided 
> what  
> > phenomena the term is to be applied to, one cannot start to 
> analyse  
> > the phenomena.
> > EI notes that this task isn’t so easy, because there’s a  
> > circularity: the terms are used based on an understanding of 
> the  
> > essence. He notes that this is a common problem, and 
> debate  
> > dissolves into ‘the meaning of the term.’
> > The term ‘ideal’ is used today mainly as ‘conceivable,’ 
> ‘immanent in  
> > Cs.’ This implies that what is outside Cs is material. This 
> seems  
> > ‘at first sight’ reasonable - but it’s not!
> > Certainly we can’t talk about anything ideal when there are 
> no  
> > people involved. The ideal is ‘inseparably linked’ to notions 
> of  
> > culture, purposeful activity, the brain. Marx seems to 
> have  
> > recognized this when he wrote that the ideal is ‘the material 
> world  
> > reflected by the human mind…’
> > But it doesn’t follow that ‘ideal’ = ‘in Cs.’ For example, 
> Marx in  
> > Capital defines the value form as ’purely ideal’ even though 
> it  
> > isn’t ‘in Cs.’ The value form (price, money) is ideal because 
> it is  
> > distinct from the material form of the commodity in which it 
> is  
> > found. Here something ‘ideal’ is outside and separate from 
> human Cs.
> > This will seem puzzling. The suggestion that the ideal can 
> exist  
> > outside Cs may make it seem imaginary, or that Marx is 
> flirting with  
> > Plato’s and Hegel’s ‘objective idealism’ of ‘incorporeal entities.’
> > But it’s not that simple. Marx’s use of the term is closer 
> to  
> > Hegel’s, and far more meaningful than the popular use. 
> Dialectical  
> > idealism is “far nearer the truth” [sic] than vulgar 
> materialism.  
> > Hegel grasped the fact of the ‘dialectical transformaton’ of 
> the  
> > ideal into the material and vice versa. Marx recognized this, 
> though  
> > he also saw that Hegel had inverted the relation of mind to 
> nature,  
> > of ideal to material.
> > Let’s consider the history of the term ideal from Kant to Hegel.
> > Kant adopted the ‘popular’ interpretation of the concepts of 
> the  
> > ideal and real, and so fell into a pit. He doesn’t define 
> ideality,  
> > but simply uses it as a synonym for Cs as such. Materiality 
> is  
> > acheved in cognition via the senses. Kant made “a perfectly 
> popular  
> > distinction.” The ideal is everything we know about the world 
> except  
> > its existence. The latter is non-ideal, and so innaccesible to 
> Cs  
> > and knowledge.
> > Kant’s example of the talers is important. Imaginary coins, 
> he  
> > argues, doesn’t exist. The fact that we can imagine god 
> doesn’t mean  
> > that God exists.
> > Want Kant doesn’t notice is that even real coins will not be 
> real in  
> > another country with a different currency. As Marx pointed 
> out,  
> > Kant’s example actually shows how diferent things are ‘real’ 
> in  
> > different forms of life - in “the general or rather 
> common  
> > imagination of man.” Kant’s definition of ideal and real 
> cannot draw  
> > distinctions that are important for us to make.
> > In fact, belief in the ‘reality’ of coins is no different 
> from  
> > simple belief in the reality of gods. Both are examples 
> of  
> > festishism: attributing  immediately perceptible 
> properties to an  
> > object which it does not in fact have, and which “have nothing 
> in  
> > common with its sensuous percetible external appearence.” This 
> is  
> > taking a symbol literally. When people come to recgnize that 
> an idol  
> > is only a symbol of god, and a coin a symbol of value, “then 
> man’s  
> > consciousness takes a step forward on the path to 
> understanding the  
> > essence of things.”
> > Hegel agreed with Kant that Protestantism was a higher stage 
> of Cs  
> > than festishistic Catholicism. Hegelians criticiced Kant for 
> lapsing  
> > into idolatry with his talers example. They were “only 
> symbols,”  
> > “only representatives,” in their essence entirely ideal, 
> although  
> > material in their existence. And of course they were 
> outside  
> > individual Cs.
> > This was to define ideal and real in a very different way. It 
> was  
> > associated with alienation, reification. What people take to 
> be real  
> > has a real existence. If I believe I have money in the bank I 
> will  
> > take on debts.
> > This point of view recognizes that there is a “Social Cs” that 
> isn’t  
> > just multiplied individual Cs, but “a historically formed 
> and  
> > historically developing system of ‘objective notions.’” It 
> contains  
> > “structural forms of patterns of social Cs” [MP: lots of 
> examples  
> > given here] that make demands and impose restrictions that, 
> from  
> > childhood, the individual must reckon with, more so than 
> mere  
> > external’things’ or even the organic desires of his body. 
> These  
> > patterns must be “assimilated” by the individual through 
> experience  
> > and education.
> > And so Hegel sees value in Platos’s notion that the individual 
> must  
> > come to terms with a “world of ideas” that is distinct from 
> the  
> > “world of things.” Plato, he reasoned, had in effect 
> recognized the  
> > role of “the state” - that’s to say, culture.
> > Plato began a line of thought in which “the world of ideas” 
> has been  
> > viewed as “stable and internally organized,” an “objective 
> reality”  
> > that is distinct from and even opposed to the individual, 
> and  
> > dictates how the individual should act.
> > Of course this was still a “semi-mystical” way of thinking. 
> But it  
> > recognized that the activity of an individual depends on  
> a prior  
> > system of culture, in which the individual life “begins and 
> runs its  
> > course.”
> > For Plato, the relation of the ideal to the material was 
> formulated  
> > in terms of the relation of stable forms of culture to the 
> world of  
> > ‘individual things,’ which included the physical body. This 
> meant  
> > Plato had to clearly distinguish between ideality and psyche, 
> which  
> > previously had been equated (by Democritus, for example). 
> Ideality  
> > came for the first time to define a certain class of 
> phenomena, a  
> > reflection of objective reality in mental (human & social) 
> activity,  
> > rather than Cs in general.
> > Rubinstein [this is a bit confusing]: ideality is when an idea 
> or  
> > image is objectified in words, or in “sculptural, graphic 
> and  
> > plastic forms and in the form of the ritual-routine ways of 
> dealing  
> > with things are people” [8].
> > That’s to say, “‘Ideality’ in general… [is] a characteristic 
> of the  
> > materially established (objectivised, materialised, reified) 
> images  
> > of human social culture.” That’s to say, a “special object” 
> that is  
> > often (mistakenly?) identified with material reality. It 
> is  
> > “comparable” with material reality, but it is a “special  
> > ‘supernatural’ objective reality.” [MP: Is this EI’s view, or 
> his  
> > summary of another position?]
> > Individual mental states, in contrast, are determined by 
> numerous  
> > diverse factors, and on the plane of culture are “purely  
> > accidental.” This is why Kant doesn’t consider Cs of weight, 
> for  
> > example, to be ideal. For Kant, the ideal is universal, 
> impersonal  
> > and complusive. He doesn’t stick consistently to this 
> terminology  
> > (as the talers example shows), but even here we start to see 
> the  
> > objective character of the forms. But Kant was unable to get 
> past  
> > the view of the social as simply the multipled individual.
> > Hegel stated the problem differently. Culture is not an 
> abstraction  
> > that expresses universality among individuals, but the 
> crystalized  
> > result of individual wills which is not contained in any of 
> them  
> > separately. Culture is not built from parts which are 
> identical. The  
> > patterns that Kant viewed as innate and universal to all  
> > individuals, Hegel viewed as cultural patterns which the 
> individual  
> > must assimilate from without to become social.
> > A culture opposes the individual (the individual physical 
> body) as  
> > “in itself and for itself,” something ideal within which 
> things have  
> > meaning and role that are different from what they have 
> “as  
> > themselves” outside culture. For Hegel, the ‘ideal’ definition 
> of a  
> > thing coincides with its role and meaning in culture, not in 
> the  
> > indiviual Cs.
> > This view is broader and more profound than Kant’s, or the 
> popular  
> > notion. The ideal and material are not ‘opposites,’ in 
> ‘different  
> > worlds,’ but merely ‘different.’
> > Hegel starts with the obvious fact that for the individual 
> Cs,  
> > material culture is what is at first real, even material. It 
> is the  
> > thought of prior generations ‘reified’ or ‘objectified’ in 
> matter.  
> > These are material in their ‘present being,’ but in their 
> oigin they  
> > are ‘ideal’ because they embody the collective thinking of a people.
> > Like Plato and Popper and Berkeley, Hegel here treats culture 
> as the  
> > only object that an individual must deal with. The world 
> outside  
> > culture is removed from view. The ‘real world’ is an 
> “already  
> > ‘idealized’ world.”  This “secret of idealism” shows up 
> in Hegel’s  
> > treatment of nature, which he describes using the language 
> of  
> > physics of his time. Like the logical positivists, he 
> identifies  
> > ‘nature’ with the language people use to talk about nature.
> > [But] The main problem of philosophy is to distinguish the 
> world of  
> > culture from “the real world as it exists outside and apart 
> from its  
> > expression in these socially legitimated forms of 
> ‘experience.’” 12
> > Here is where the distinction between ideal and real 
> (material) has  
> > a scientific meaning. Objective reality is what is revealed 
> by  
> > scientific research.
> > … Words are material. It is temping to think that their 
> subjective  
> > image is what is ‘ideal.’ But Hegel shows us that a name, like 
> a  
> > gold coin, is a general representation. The representation 
> has  
> > nothing in common with what it represents. Like a 
> diplomat  
> > representing his country, the verbal symbol or sign (or 
> syntactical  
> > combination of these ) represents not itself but 
> ‘another.’  
> > Representation is a relationship in which one thing performs 
> the  
> > function of [being] representative of another - of, in fact, 
> the  
> > universal nature of that other thing. This relationship is 
> what is  
> > called ideality in the Hegelian tradition.
> > Marx uses the term in this way, although in his writing the 
> range of  
> > phenomena is “dialectically opposed” to the Hegelian usage. 
> The  
> > meaning of the term is the same, but the concept is 
> different.  
> > Marx’s understanding of the essence of the phenomenon was 
> different.  
> > When he analyzed money, what Marx described as ideal was the 
> value- 
> > form of labor in general. Certainly this didn’t mean that 
> value  
> > exists only in Cs. The form of value is ideal because the 
> palpable  
> > form of the thing (a coat) is “only a form of expression” of 
> another  
> > thing (linen). The form of the coat represents (embodies, 
> expresses)  
> > the value of the linen. The form of the coat is the ideal 
> form, the  
> > represented form, of the value of the linen. The linen (as 
> value)  
> > “now has the appearance of a coat.” As value, the two are 
> equal.  
> > “The body of commodity B acts as a mirror to the value of 
> commodity  
> > A” (Capital, p. 59). Value is the ‘substance’ that is embodied 
> here  
> > and there.
> > [MP: But the linen is turned into the coat. What is preserved 
> in  
> > this transformation is the value?]
> > The form of value is ideal. The form of the thing represented 
> is  
> > different, and is not ideal. This “difference” is not Cs or 
> will.  
> > What is represented as a thing is the the form of people’s 
> activity.  
> > [MP: This moved very quickly! I need to reread Capital]
> > Here is the answer to the riddle of ideality. “Ideality, 
> according  
> > to Marx is nothing else but the form of social human 
> activity  
> > represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human 
> activity  
> > represented as a thing, as an object” 15
> > Ideality is like a stamp on the substance of nature. All 
> things  
> > acquire a new ‘form of existence’ that is not included in 
> their  
> > physical nature - their ideal form. Ideality has a social 
> character  
> > and origin. It is the form of a thing, but outside the thing. 
> Or the  
> > form of an activity, but outside that activity. It is the form 
> of an  
> > activity. It is the form of a thing. It cannot be fixed as one 
> or  
> > the other,
> > [MP: I really dislike this. It presumes the physical nature 
> is  
> > knowable, without explaining how. It seems to detach social 
> meaning  
> > from material properties. The stamp metaphor makes things seem 
> like  
> > passive recipients of an imposed form.]
> > Ideality exists only when people are working 
> collectively.  
> > Individual Cs and will depend on the ideality of things,  
> > comprehended and so conscious. Both Marx and Hegel offered a 
> theory  
> > of ideality which took into account the emergence of human 
> self-Cs.  
> > Hegel recognized that self-examination requires self-
> opposition - of  
> > Geist in the form of objects. First “embodied” in the word, 
> then in  
> > the “inorganic body of man,” that’s to say culture, civilization.
> > For Hegel, ideality exists only as objects which are 
> reified  
> > activity. Ideality, for him [MP: but not for EI and Marx?] 
> “took in  
> > the whole range of phenomena within which the ideal,’ 
> understood as  
> > the corporeally embodied form of the activity of social man, 
> really  
> > exists” 17
> > This is why the comodity can do what it can do. It is ideal 
> through  
> > and through. Things “whose category quite unambiguously 
> includes  
> > words, the units of language, and many other ‘things’” 17. 
> [MP: But  
> > if the ideal includes “many other things” then it doesn’t 
> include  
> > “all” things!]  …this “category of ‘things’” [here again 
> it is not  
> > all things but just one category]
> > Here EI returns to Marx and the commodity, to emphasize that 
> there  
> > is nothing in common substantially between the ideal and what 
> it  
> > represents. And to emphasize that the relationship of ideality 
> is  
> > established outside the head, behind the back, in the 
> practices.  
> > This means that trying to reflect on the relationship doesn’t 
> get  
> > one very far. The objectivity of the ideal is a fact, and 
> ‘idealism’  
> > is not a schoolboy’s mistake but a sober statement of 
> this  
> > objectivity without, however, explaining it. Idealists appeal 
> to an  
> > incorporial form that controls things, and determines whether 
> they  
> > will be a form or not, but that cannot be located.
> > Materialism explains the objectivity of the ideal.  
> Marx’s analysis  
> > of value is “a typical and characteristic case of ideality 
> in  
> > general.” Where classical philsophy [Hegel] appealed to 
> “pure  
> > activity” [Geist?], political economists recognized the 
> centrality  
> > of labor, and saw value as embodied labor. But they couldn’t 
> see the  
> > form of value. Marx “gained the theoretical key” from Hegel, 
> and saw  
> > the form of value as the reified form of labor - “a form of 
> human  
> > life activity.”
> > [MP: But what does it mean to speak of the form of activity? 
> If I  
> > make a coat from linen, does the coat actually have the form 
> of my  
> > activity? What did Marx say about this?]
> > Since human activity is purposeful, it is easy to 
> misunderstand this  
> > form as the product of (individual) Cs and self-Cs. (And 
> then  
> > criticize Hegel for projecting subjective mental activity into 
> the  
> > ‘external’ world.) But Marx recognized that logical thinking 
> stems  
> > from the universal forms of existence of objective reality. 
> [MP:  
> > Culture, or nature? This is confused.]
> > [some sections skipped over here]
> > [MP: The following paragraph is directly copied]  
> “Ideality exists  
> > only when people are working collectively. Individual Cs and 
> will  
> > depend on the ideality of things, comprehended and so 
> conscious.  
> > Both Marx and Hegel offered a theory of ideality which took 
> into  
> > account the emergence of human self-Cs. Hegel recognized that 
> self- 
> > examination requires self-opposition - of Geist in the form 
> of  
> > objects. First ‘embodied’ in the word, then in the ‘inorganic 
> body  
> > of man,’ that’s to say culture, civilization.”
> > Marx “by no means accidently uses the comparison of the 
> mirror.” Man  
> > is born without a mirror, and first sees and recognizes 
> himself in  
> > other men. Peter compares himself with Paul, as the type of 
> human  
> > being. Human activity involves “reflection,” which for 
> classical  
> > German philosphy meant “self-consciousness,” but for Marx 
> meant “the  
> > relationship to oneself as to ‘another.’” Marx didn’t believe 
> that  
> > humans differ from animals in having Cs and will and so 
> have  
> > culture. Rather, he believed that because humans (collectvely) 
> have  
> > culture, they come individually to have Cs and will. Man, 
> unlike the  
> > animals, has to master purely social forms of life activity. 
> Where  
> > an animal is born with inborn forms of activity, the human 
> child is  
> > born confronted by the complex system of culture which 
> includes  
> > modes of activity which he has to assimilate, even though they 
> may  
> > be very different from the biological reactions of his body.
> > Even the satisfaction of biological needs requires that the 
> child  
> > adopt conventional modes of activity. Eating with a spoon, 
> sitting  
> > at a table. These are external, social forms which the child 
> has to  
> > “convert into the forms of his individual life activity.” 
> This  
> > external objectivity is not nature, but culture, nature 
> transformed,  
> > given new form, by the labor of previous generations.  
> These social  
> > forms are the objectivity to which the child is compelled to 
> adapt  
> > all the functions of his organic body.
> > To do this, the child must distinguish himself from his own 
> body. He  
> > has to develop a new relationship to himself, “as to a 
> single  
> > representative of ‘another.’” The child has to become “a 
> special  
> > object” in order to impose the rules and patterns (the forms) 
> of  
> > culture on the life activity of his body. In mastering these 
> forms,  
> > the child becomes  a “representative” of the human race. 
> The  
> > individual’s organic body “changes into a representative of 
> the race.”
> > It is this specific relationship that brings about the 
> specific  
> > human forms of mental activity of consciousness and 
> will.  
> > Consciousness arises because the individual must view himself 
> as if  
> > with the eyes not only of another person, but with the eyes of 
> all  
> > other people. The child must “correlate” his actions with 
> those of  
> > others, and this calls for will: the ability to subordinate 
> one’s  
> > organic inclinations and urges to the social demands of a 
> common  
> > task. In the process of labour man transforms  material 
> things,  
> > including his own body, his own nervous system and brain. 
> These  
> > become means for his purposeful activity. Will and Cs are 
> products,  
> > effects.
> > [MP: Notice that EI is saying here that the child becomes 
> ideal, on  
> > his own definition of ideality. The child becomes a 
> representation  
> > of something else - the human race. He does this by imposing 
> form on  
> > his own activity. ]
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> 
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca