Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz

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Isn't the relationship between individual and social consciousness an example of the chicken-egg dialectic? ;) And didn't LSV resolve it through his account of the developmental process? Bruce ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steve Gabosch" <stevegabosch@me.com> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 5:30 AM Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz I think you're right, Andy. Social consciousness can't exist without individuals. I don't see how it could. But just to be sure, I asked EI, as you suggested. "The ideal is nothing else than a concatenation of the general forms of human activity realized by individuals ..." (Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic, Chapter 8, toward the end) Sounds about right to me ... - Steve On Sep 27, 2009, at 5:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > But Steve, in making this very point you counterpose individual and > social consciousness. And tell me (or maybe you can ask Ilyenkov!), > how does social consciousness exist without individual consciousness? > > (There are answers to this question which go to suppositions about > forms of life which may have existed a million years ago, but I'm > talking about real people today.) > > And whenever did I deny that individual consciousness is derivative > of social consciousness anyway? > > Andy > > Steve Gabosch wrote: >> OK, I'm following your responses and points. Thanks. >> So, Andy, to try to narrow this down: are you purposely bundling >> together individual and social consciousness into this single term >> "consciousness"? >> The reason I ask is that Ilyenkov works very hard in the essay >> Martin is reading, The Concept of the Ideal, to distinguish >> individual consciousness and will from social consciousness. >> Moreover, he argues for a very specific relationship between the >> two - that individual consciousness is derived from social >> consciousness, and not the other way around. >> Just as Marx said that social being determines social >> consciousness, Ilyenkov argues that social consciousness determines >> individual consciousness. >> In Ilyenkov's view, social consciousness is what humans are given, >> or confronted with - not individual consciousness. I looked for >> some supporting quotes and wound up with a creative post you'll see >> in the Humans are Signs/Ideal thread. See quotes 4 - 7. >> - Steve >> On Sep 26, 2009, at 6:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> True Steve, I can find: "experience is what is given to us ..." >>> and "the objective world given to us in consciousness ..." but the >>> only definition of "consciousness" around this area is its >>> contrast with matter. I tried to clarify this in this discussion >>> by saying that (as Martin has corrected understood) "What is given >>> us is Cs" i.e., immediately, from the material world or anywhere >>> else. As Hegel says though, "there is nothing in Heaven, Earth or >>> anywhere else which is not both immediate and mediated." So to say >>> that Cs is what is given "immediately" does not deny that it is >>> mediated. >>> >>> Your suggestion to define Cs as "psychic activity of animals and >>> humans" only shifts the problem to "psychic" - what is psychic? >>> and throws in a far-from-basic assumption about what is going on >>> inside my pussy cat's head. I am given my own consciousness, but >>> figuring out what and if my cat is thinking is a problem of future >>> scientific investigation, and hardly suitable for a definition: an >>> outcome not a starting point. >>> >>> You say that I "conflate different things." Yes, I put forward the >>> category without first listing the things which count as "forms of >>> Cs." I think this is the right way to go, from whole to parts. >>> >>> A definition of Cs was what Mike asked for. I don't think it >>> suffices to make a list of things and say "Cs is all these >>> things, ... and maybe some I forgot to mention," not for a >>> fundamental definition. It would be better to say "Let's not >>> define Cs." >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >>> Steve Gabosch wrote: >>>> Andy, >>>> Thanks for looking over those statements by Ilyenkov. What >>>> passage by Ilyenkov causes you to believe he says that >>>> **consciousness** is what is given to humans? He says material >>>> reality, social being and social consciousness are what are >>>> given. He very carefully never uses a catch-all, misleading term >>>> like "consciousness." Well, that's my reading of him. >>>> Here is my problem with the phrase: "what is given to us is >>>> consciousness". >>>> The term "consciousness," as it is used in this phrase, >>>> conflates, obscures and confuses. It conflates fundamentally >>>> different kinds of consciousness and experience (sensation, >>>> individual consciousness, social consciousness, social being - >>>> not to mention dementia, animal psychic activity, sleep, etc. >>>> etc.) It obscures the material basis of these forms of >>>> consciousness. And it confuses their relationships with each >>>> other. >>>> It might help to ask: what **is** given to humans? (at birth, and >>>> thenceforth ...) >>>> Here is the beginning of an answer, helped a bit by Ilyenkov. >>>> From birth the human is confronted by reality on multiple levels: >>>> material reality (their body, objects, gravity), sensation >>>> (hunger, hearing), social being (a system of social and material >>>> relations), and social consciousness (ideality, historical >>>> culture). Soon, another kind of reality emerges: individual >>>> human consciousness. These processes and realities, in their >>>> simultaneously material and ideal forms, reappear every moment of >>>> a human's life. >>>> The phrase "what is given to us is consciousness" seems to >>>> obscure far more than it reveals. What benefits are obtained >>>> from making such a one-sided statement that excludes referencing >>>> the material foundations and relations underlying this >>>> "consciousness"? >>>> I want to emphasize that neither Lenin nor Ilyenkov ever made >>>> such a claim. (In my humble reading, anyway). You may be able >>>> to get Hegel's solidarity with that phrase, but the classical >>>> dialectical materialists argued quite the opposite. >>>> As for a general definition of the term "consciousness", given >>>> the scope of phenomena that would have to be included, I might >>>> venture something like "the psychic activity of animals and >>>> humans." >>>> Sometime when the time is right we might revisit the dialectics >>>> of nature discussion (including problems with the Stalinized >>>> "diamat" version). There are some significant issues there. >>>> Best, >>>> - Steve >>>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 9:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> OK, Steve I've read through your quiz, and evaluated each claim >>>>> attributed to Ilyenkov by asking myself: "Is there are a context >>>>> in which I would agree with this?" >>>>> >>>>> The only one where I have reservations is the "dialectics of >>>>> nature" one: >>>>> >>>>> 28. These laws [dialectics] are understood as the objective laws >>>>> of development of the material world, of both the natural and >>>>> socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I remain of the view that this claim is unclear and has, over >>>>> the 120 years since Engels' Dialectics of Nature was published >>>>> in the 1920s, been the source of a lot of confusion and also >>>>> reasons to not think. In general I am always wary of claims that >>>>> have the form: "human society is like this because nature is >>>>> like this," such as social Darwinism. It basically adds up to >>>>> "God made man in His own image." >>>>> >>>>> There is an element of truth in the claim, but only by making a >>>>> drastic reduction to the meaning of "dialectics" which is >>>>> already verging on meaninglessness anyway. >>>>> >>>>> But I do NOT want to change the subject to dianat!! I want to >>>>> keep focussed on: >>>>> >>>>> 1. How do we define consciousness? >>>>> 2. What's wrong with my suggestion (21/9/2009) based on the >>>>> categorical distinction referred to in the early questions in >>>>> your quiz, which Ilyenkov obviously agrees with: >>>>> >>>>> "Consciousness is what is given to us; matter is what exists >>>>> outside and independently of consciousness." >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote: >>>>>> Ain't no answer sheet! LOL This "quiz" is nothing more than >>>>>> comparing Ilyenkov's actual answers to one's own views. >>>>>> I've simplified this thing. It did need streamlining. There >>>>>> are now 25 Ilyenkov propositions. >>>>>> If my editing is accurate, Ilyenkov's points are preserved in >>>>>> each numbered sentence below. I kept the numbers from the >>>>>> previous version. >>>>>> Martin's very helpful reading of these passages confirms and >>>>>> clarifies my interpretations. Thank you, Martin. I've added >>>>>> headlines (in my words) to clarify Ilyenkov's key themes. As >>>>>> can be seen, I've also used some of Martin's nicely worded >>>>>> summaries for this task (and could have used more - I'm kind of >>>>>> duplicating what he did). >>>>>> Some of these statements by Ilyenkov seem to me to be in >>>>>> conflict with some of the points you have been recently making, >>>>>> Andy. See what you think. >>>>>> This is an 'open book' quiz, by the way - you are welcome to >>>>>> consult any texts ... :-)) >>>>>> from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism**, >>>>>> Chapter One, by EV Ilyenkov, 1979, New Park, material below >>>>>> edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009, downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm >>>>>> Ilyenkov is addressing the epistemological question: What is >>>>>> the relationship between consciousness and the world itself? >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> A. << No middle path is possible.>> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path … >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> B. << Consciousness is derived from, produced from, and >>>>>> secondary to matter.>> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 3. These concepts [that is, the two general concepts which >>>>>> must be clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness. >>>>>> 4. [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the >>>>>> ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc. >>>>>> 6. ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general sense] can only be >>>>>> defined by clearly contrasting it with ‘matter’ [in its most >>>>>> general sense.] >>>>>> 7. [Moreover, consciousness can only be contrasted with >>>>>> matter] as something that is secondary, produced and derived. >>>>>> 9. … [Matter] can only be defined through its opposite, and >>>>>> only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the other >>>>>> arises from it. >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> C. <<For materialists, matter is the basis of epistemology. >>>>>> For idealists, the basis is consciousness.>> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 12. Lenin's position … [is as follows]: for materialism … >>>>>> matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is >>>>>> the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) … >>>>>> 13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is >>>>>> consciousness ... >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> D. <<Just as social being, (that is, material and economic >>>>>> relations) precedes and exists independently of social >>>>>> consciousness, social consciousness (as does matter) precedes >>>>>> and exists independently of individual consciousness.>> <<Btw, >>>>>> Martin has an interesting objection to Ilyenkov's claim that >>>>>> 'primary' things exist independently of 'secondary' things >>>>>> insofar as humans are concerned.>> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 15. [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] … >>>>>> 'collectively-organised' … experience … >>>>>> 16. … the relationship of matter to consciousness is >>>>>> complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the >>>>>> very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something >>>>>> already given, and existing before, outside, and independent of >>>>>> individual consciousness. >>>>>> 17. Just as matter does. >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> E. <<Individual consciousness is formed to a greater degree by >>>>>> social consciousness than it is by the material world. At the >>>>>> same time, as explained by Marx, social consciousness is >>>>>> derived from social being, the system of material and economic >>>>>> relations between people.>> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 20. ... social consciousness ... forms ... [the individual’s] >>>>>> consciousness to a much greater degree than the 'material >>>>>> world' [does]. >>>>>> 22. But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not >>>>>> 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the >>>>>> system of material and economic relations between people. >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> F. Martin summarized the next sentences very nicely as >>>>>> follows: "<We are *given* the world in sensation. But it is in >>>>>> thought that the world is *cognised.*>" >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 24. It is … not true that the world is cognised in our >>>>>> sensations. >>>>>> 25. In sensations the external world is only given to us, just >>>>>> as it is given to a dog. >>>>>> 26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations, >>>>>> but in the activity of thought ... >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> G. <<Lenin explained that dialectical logic is the science of >>>>>> discovering the universal laws of human and natural >>>>>> development. These are the objective laws of development of >>>>>> the material world, which includes the natural world, the socio- >>>>>> historical world, and objective reality in general. These laws >>>>>> are reflected in the historical consciousness of humanity.>> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science >>>>>> of those universal laws … to which the development of the >>>>>> entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively >>>>>> subordinated. >>>>>> 28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] as >>>>>> the objective laws of development of the material world, of >>>>>> both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective >>>>>> reality in general. >>>>>> 29. ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of >>>>>> mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice. >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> H. <<Martin: "<Thought arises in material activity, even in >>>>>> animals. In humans it takes a more advanced form, in which >>>>>> activity is adjusted to signs.>" I continue: However, if one >>>>>> proceeds from the perspective of individual experience, the >>>>>> sign will be taken as the starting point in the theory of >>>>>> knowledge, which will lead to idealist-leaning errors.">> >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 35. Thought arises within and during the process of material >>>>>> action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only >>>>>> later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space and >>>>>> time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man. >>>>>> 36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding >>>>>> from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally formed >>>>>> world which is taken as the starting point in the theory of >>>>>> knowledge. >>>>>> 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion, >>>>>> since in individual experience, words (and signs in general) >>>>>> are in actual fact just as much given to sensual contemplation >>>>>> as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues and paintings, >>>>>> etc. etc. >>>>>> 38. Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic' >>>>>> variation. >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> I. Martin again: "<It is a mistake to try to understand human >>>>>> knowledge in terms of individual consciousness or experience. >>>>>> But it is also a mistake to try to understand knowledge in >>>>>> terms of *social* consciousness.>" >>>>>> ********** >>>>>> 39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the >>>>>> point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then >>>>>> idealism is inevitable. >>>>>> 40. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective >>>>>> experience', if the latter is interpreted as something >>>>>> independent of being, as something existing independently, as >>>>>> something primary. >>>>>> ************ >>>>>> <end of 'quiz'> >>>>>> ************ >>>>>> - Steve >>>>>> On Sep 25, 2009, at 5:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> I can't understand your quiz, Steve. Could you perhaps make us >>>>>>> a shorter version with answers at the end of the post? >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote: >>>>>>>> I have something fun, entertaining and educational for >>>>>>>> everyone on xmca! >>>>>>>> It just so happens that I took a close look at the Ilyenkov >>>>>>>> passages following Andy's quotes, did a little tinkering with >>>>>>>> the text, and came up with something fun: the Ilyenkov >>>>>>>> Epistemology Quiz, which anyone can take right on their own >>>>>>>> personal computer! >>>>>>>> Ilyenkov asks some fundamental questions regarding >>>>>>>> epistemology: "Where is the clear-cut dividing line between >>>>>>>> … philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? … >>>>>>>> which of these two points of departure is determining the >>>>>>>> direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject of >>>>>>>> your reflection … ? Here … is the question: take your >>>>>>>> thought, your consciousness of the world, and the world >>>>>>>> itself ... what is the relationship between them?" >>>>>>>> This can also be called: The How Much Do You Agree With >>>>>>>> Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test ... >>>>>>>> (Hmm. Somehow, it doesn't seem likely that this will become >>>>>>>> the rage on Facebook ... does it? ... LOL ...) >>>>>>>> Taking this "quiz" is very simple. It is comprised of 40 >>>>>>>> propositional statements by Ilyenkov, which I edited for >>>>>>>> clarity, about the relationship of consciousness and >>>>>>>> materiality, from the first chapter of his short book >>>>>>>> "Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of >>>>>>>> Positivism" (1979, New Park). To take the quiz, simply list >>>>>>>> the propositions that you agree with, and those you don't >>>>>>>> agree with, count them all up, and give Ilyenkov a score. >>>>>>>> Read critically like this, sentence by sentence, Ilyenkov is >>>>>>>> surprisingly clear. But one still has to think pretty hard >>>>>>>> about what he is saying. Hopefully, people will find it >>>>>>>> worthwhile to do so. >>>>>>>> Here is a little explanation of the editing I did to create >>>>>>>> this (this is the fine print part - can be skipped). What I >>>>>>>> have done is edit 15 of Ilyenkov's paragraphs (starting where >>>>>>>> Andy's quotes began) into what wound up becoming 40 >>>>>>>> propositional statements. They read quite coherently. This >>>>>>>> material makes for a decent introduction to both Ilyenkov and >>>>>>>> dialectical materialism. I eliminated his references to the >>>>>>>> Machists to keep things focused on his propositional >>>>>>>> statements about epistemological issues, and took out various >>>>>>>> other (for this purpose) secondary passages for the same >>>>>>>> reason. This makes him a little easier to grasp - he has a >>>>>>>> tendency to make a lot of side points as he goes. Also, I >>>>>>>> did some sentence rearranging to help clarify the specific >>>>>>>> proposition that is being made. There are a couple sentences >>>>>>>> which could be interpreted in different ways if they are not >>>>>>>> read very closely, so I included my interpretations below >>>>>>>> them. And I spelled out one or two important implications >>>>>>>> that Ilyenkov makes but does not explicitly state. (He makes >>>>>>>> these points in many other places in his writings, so they >>>>>>>> are supportable.) >>>>>>>> Everyone will see what I did - I am trying to be completely >>>>>>>> transparent. If I have misinterpreted or muddled Ilyenkov in >>>>>>>> any way, please let me know! >>>>>>>> I would be very interesting to compare notes on what >>>>>>>> propositions, formulations, ideas etc. people agree and >>>>>>>> disagree on. Some may disagree quite sharply on some points, >>>>>>>> and others may find themselves surprisingly in agreement with >>>>>>>> Ilyenkov on some issues but didn't know it. Some might find >>>>>>>> this stimulating ideawise. Others who are bored by >>>>>>>> philosophical discourse might save this for later if they >>>>>>>> need something to put them to sleep tonight! LOL This little >>>>>>>> quiz might even help clarify aspects of this interesting >>>>>>>> discussion on consciousness. Fun for the whole family! :-)) >>>>>>>> Andy, after carefully reading your posts about the how >>>>>>>> "consciousness is what is given to us" and "the idea of >>>>>>>> matter is derived from consciousness" - as well as other >>>>>>>> things you have said from time to time - it will be very >>>>>>>> interesting to see how you "score" Ilyenkov's positions on >>>>>>>> epistemology. I would actually be quite interested in >>>>>>>> everyone's thoughts ... >>>>>>>> ********************** >>>>>>>> The Internet Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz also known as The >>>>>>>> How Much Do You Agree With Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test >>>>>>>> from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of >>>>>>>> Positivism** by EV Ilyenkov, edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009 >>>>>>>> downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm >>>>>>>> *********************** >>>>>>>> a. Where is the clear-cut dividing line between … >>>>>>>> philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? … >>>>>>>> b. … which of these two points of departure is determining >>>>>>>> the direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject >>>>>>>> of your reflection … ? >>>>>>>> c. Here … is the question: take your thought, your >>>>>>>> consciousness of the world, and the world itself ... what is >>>>>>>> the relationship between them? >>>>>>>> 1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path … >>>>>>>> 2. In philosophy the 'party of the golden mean' is the >>>>>>>> 'party of the brainless', [that is, those that attempt the >>>>>>>> middle path are destined to fail if they] ... try to unite >>>>>>>> materialism with idealism in an eclectic way, by means of >>>>>>>> smoothing out the basic contradictions, and by means of >>>>>>>> muddling the most general ... and clear concepts. >>>>>>>> 3. These concepts [the two general concepts which must be >>>>>>>> clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness. >>>>>>>> 4. [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the >>>>>>>> ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc. >>>>>>>> 5. 'Consciousness' – let us take this term as Lenin did – is >>>>>>>> the most general concept which can only be defined by clearly >>>>>>>> contrasting it with the most general concept of 'matter', as >>>>>>>> something secondary, produced and derived. >>>>>>>> 6. [[sg interpretation: ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general >>>>>>>> sense] can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with >>>>>>>> ‘matter’ [in its most general sense.]]] >>>>>>>> 7. [[sg interpretation: …moreover … [consciousness can only >>>>>>>> be contrasted with matter] as something that is secondary, >>>>>>>> produced and derived.]] >>>>>>>> 8. Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter >>>>>>>> as such … >>>>>>>> 9. … it [matter] can only be defined through its opposite, >>>>>>>> and only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the >>>>>>>> other arises from it. >>>>>>>> 10. [[sg interpretation: Dialectics can only define things >>>>>>>> through their opposites, and furthermore can only do so if >>>>>>>> one of these opposites is fixed as primary and the other as >>>>>>>> arising from it.]] >>>>>>>> 11. [[sg interpretation of an implication made above: In >>>>>>>> dialectical materialism, the material is primary; and >>>>>>>> consciousness, its opposite, arises from it.]] >>>>>>>> 12. Lenin's position … [is as follows]: for materialism … >>>>>>>> matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is >>>>>>>> the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) … >>>>>>>> 13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is >>>>>>>> consciousness ... >>>>>>>> 14. [Consciousness for the idealist can take a multitude of >>>>>>>> forms and can appear] under one or another of its pseudonyms >>>>>>>> (be it the 'psychical', 'conscious' or 'unconscious', be it >>>>>>>> the 'system of forms of collectively-organised experience' or >>>>>>>> 'objective spirit', the individual or collective psyche, >>>>>>>> individual or social consciousness).] >>>>>>>> 15. [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] … >>>>>>>> 'collectively-organised' … experience … >>>>>>>> 16. … the relationship of matter to consciousness is >>>>>>>> complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the >>>>>>>> very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something >>>>>>>> already given, and existing before, outside, and independent >>>>>>>> of individual consciousness. >>>>>>>> 17. Just as matter does. >>>>>>>> 18. [[sg interpretation: Just as social consciousness does, >>>>>>>> matter, from the very beginning, precedes individual >>>>>>>> consciousness as something already given.]] >>>>>>>> 19. [There is] … even more [to it] than that. >>>>>>>> 20. This social consciousness – forms ... [the individual’s] >>>>>>>> consciousness to a much greater degree than [does] the >>>>>>>> 'material world'. >>>>>>>> 21. [Social consciousness] of course, in its individualised >>>>>>>> form, [takes] … the form of the consciousness of one's >>>>>>>> closest teachers, and after that, of the entire circle of >>>>>>>> people who appear in the field of vision of a person … >>>>>>>> 22. But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not >>>>>>>> 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the >>>>>>>> system of material and economic relations between people. >>>>>>>> 23. [[sg interpretation: According to Marx, social >>>>>>>> consciousness, which is secondary, is derived from social >>>>>>>> being, which is the system of material and economic relations >>>>>>>> between people.]] >>>>>>>> 24. It is … not true that the world is cognised in our >>>>>>>> sensations. >>>>>>>> 25. In sensations the external world is only given to us, >>>>>>>> just as it is given to a dog. >>>>>>>> 26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations, >>>>>>>> but in the activity of thought ... >>>>>>>> 27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science >>>>>>>> of those universal laws … to which the development of the >>>>>>>> entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively >>>>>>>> subordinated. >>>>>>>> 28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] >>>>>>>> as the objective laws of development of the material world, >>>>>>>> of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective >>>>>>>> reality in general. >>>>>>>> 29. ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of >>>>>>>> mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice. >>>>>>>> d. What is … 'thought'? >>>>>>>> 30. … [A materialist] line of thought [about what thought is] >>>>>>>> proceeds from Spinoza. He understands thinking to be an >>>>>>>> inherent capability, characteristic not of all bodies, but >>>>>>>> only of thinking material bodies. >>>>>>>> 31. With the help of this capability, a body can construct >>>>>>>> its activities in the spatially determined world, in >>>>>>>> conformity with the 'form and disposition' of all other >>>>>>>> bodies external to it, both 'thinking' and 'non-thinking'. >>>>>>>> 32. Spinoza therefore includes thinking among the categories >>>>>>>> of the attributes of substance, such as extension. >>>>>>>> 33. In this form ... [thinking] is, according to Spinoza, >>>>>>>> characteristic also of animals. >>>>>>>> 34. For him [Spinoza] even an animal possesses a soul, and >>>>>>>> this view distinguishes Spinoza from Descartes, who >>>>>>>> considered that an animal is simply an 'automaton', a very >>>>>>>> complex 'machine'. >>>>>>>> 35. Thought arises within and during the process of material >>>>>>>> action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only >>>>>>>> later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space >>>>>>>> and time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man. >>>>>>>> 36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding >>>>>>>> from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally >>>>>>>> formed world which is taken as the starting point in the >>>>>>>> theory of knowledge. >>>>>>>> 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion, >>>>>>>> since in individual experience, words (and signs in general) >>>>>>>> are in actual fact just as much given to sensual >>>>>>>> contemplation as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues >>>>>>>> and paintings, etc. etc. >>>>>>>> 38. Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic' >>>>>>>> variation. >>>>>>>> 39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it >>>>>>>> the point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, >>>>>>>> then idealism is inevitable. >>>>>>>> 40. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective >>>>>>>> experience', if the latter is interpreted as something >>>>>>>> independent of being, as something existing independently, as >>>>>>>> something primary. >>>>>>>> <Ilyenkov moves on to other questions at this point in the >>>>>>>> text.> >>>>>>>> <End of quiz.> >>>>>>>> So how did you score Ilyenkov? >>>>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>>>> - Steve_______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ >>>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, >>>>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ >>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, >>>>> Ilyenkov $20 ea >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> xmca mailing list >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> >>> -- >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ >>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, >>> Ilyenkov $20 ea >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, > Ilyenkov $20 ea > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca