Re: RE: [xmca] Response to Mike's question

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Nice summary, thanks. I hope its of use to Mabel, i cetainly found it
thought provoking,
mike

On Sun, Nov 15, 2009 at 8:59 PM, lpurss <lpurss@shaw.ca> wrote:

> Hi Mike
>
> My computer lost your thread so I went back to Mabel's thread.
> I looked up Daniel Stern's section in his book on developmental evidence
> for
> intersubjective processes of "affect attunement", It starts on page 83. I
> will write out in point form.
>
> Beginning at birth early forms of intersubjectivity are seen in infants.
> This argues for the "fundamental" nature of the intersubjective matrix in
> which we develop. It also speaks to the issue of innnateness.
> Intersubjectivity in very young infants has been researched.  For example
> when mother and infant are in separate rooms but see each other on a
> monitor
> as if sitting face to face and a split second delay in the sight or the
> sound is introduced the infant quickly notices and the interaction breaks
> up. Their conclusion was that "correspondence" is already expected in
> interhuman contact. Trevarthen calls this "primary intersubjectivity"
> Stern and his collegues were interested in how the mother/infant dyad lets
> each other known about their inner feeling states.If an infant emitts an
> affective behavior AFTER the event how can the mother let the infant know
> she grasped not only what the infant did but also the feeling the infant
> experienced that lat behind what he did? The emphasis has shifted from the
> overt behavior to the subjective feeling behind what he did? Stern labels
> "affect attunement" (in contrast to imitation)  the path to capturing the
> way that the infant becomes sensitive to the behavior, timing, and affect
> of
> others.
> Before 3 months infants are most interested in events that are perfectly
> contingent with their behavior.. Between 4 to 6 months they become
> fascinated with events that are highly but imperfectly contingent with
> their
> behavior.
> Infants are born with minds that are especially attuned to other minds as
> manifested in their behavior.. From birth onward one can speak of a
> psychology of mutually sensitive minds. In short an early form of
> intersubjectivity is present.
> At 7 to 9 months infants become capable of more elaborate forms of
> intersubjectivity well before the infant is verbal or symbolic. The
> sharable
> mental states start to include goal-directed intentions, focus of
> attention,
> and as before, the experience of action. At this this stage far more work
> is
> going on concerning the sharing of the focus of  attention in order to
> TRIANGULATE AN OBJECT, where the infant "passes through the other" to reach
> the object.  This is a cognitive aspect of intersubjectivity NECESSARY for
> symbolization and language.
>
> Stern is more interested in the feeling/experiencing domain of
> intersubjectivity. In this domain the reading of INTENTIONS are central to
> the forms of intersubjectivity that appear very early in the infant. Some
> pyschological element is needed to push, pull, activate or put events in
> motion. Intentions, in one form or another, and in one state of
> completeness
> or another, are always there driving forward the action or story.
> Stern sees the world in terms of intentions.  You cannot function with
> others without readinf or inferring their intentions. This reading or
> attributing of intentions is our PRIMARY guide to responding and initiating
> action. It is how we parse and interpret our surroundings.  Recognizing and
> deciphering intentionality is the starting point for adaptation and
> survival.  This perceiving/inferring of intentions in actions begins very
> early in life. Braten calls this "altero-centered participation as the
> ability to enter into the others experience and participate in it.
>
> At 12 months "social referencing is seen. A common example is when an
> infant
> learning to walk falls, she will look to her mother to "KNOW" what to feel.
> If the mother expresses fear and concern, the infant will cry. If she
> smiles, the baby will laugh.  In other words in situations of UNCERTAINTY
> or
> AMBIVALENCE the affect state shown in others is referenced for the baby to
> KNOW how to feel.
>
> After 18 months, when the child becomes verbal, new forms of
> intersubjectivity are quickly added.
> Stern challenges the general "theory of mind" perspective of representing
> "other" minds as mainly a cognitive process.Stern's position is that the
> fundamental base for intersubjectivity is about feeling, not cognition.
>
> In summary Stern's elaboration of the developmental evidence suggests that
> beginning at birth the infant enters into an intersubjective matrix. As new
> capacities are developed and new experiences become available, the infant
> is
> swept into the intersubjective matrix, which has its own ONTOGENESIS. The
> breadth and complexity of this matrix expands rapidly, even during the
> first
> year of life when the infant is still presymbolic and preverbal. Then, in
> the second year new experiences such as the "moral" emotions of shame,
> guilt, and embarassment are drawn into the intersubjective mix. as
> something
> the infant can now experience within himself and others. At each phase of
> the life course, the intersubjective matrix grows deeper and richer.
>
> Stern emphasizes what is at stake in psychological intimacy and
> belongingness is regulated by the intersubjective matrix. This system
> regulates psychological belongingness versus psychological aloneness. The
> poles of  this spectrum are, at one end cosmic lonliness, and at the other,
> fusion and disappearance of the self. The intersubjective system regulates
> the zone of intersubjective comfort somewhwere between the two poles. The
> exact point on the continuum must be NEGOTIATED continually with
> second-to-second fine-tuning.  TOO MUCH IS AT STAKE for it not to be.
> Stern believes intersubjective belongingness is different from physical,
> sexual, attachment, or dependency ties. It is a form of group belonging
> that
> is either unique to humans or has taken a qualitative leap in our species.
> One can argue that the leap is language, but without intersubjectivity,
> language could not develop.
>
> The intersubjective system is separate but complementary to the attachment
> system- and equally fundamental. Attachment theory has the two poles of
> proximity/security at one pole and distance/exploration-curiosity at the
> other pole.  The attachment system is designed for physical closeness and
> group bonding, rather than for psychological intimacy. Many people who are
> "strongly" attached do not share psychological closeness or intimacy (in
> fact, its the opposite)  Intersubjectivity is needed for psychological
> closeness.
>
> Stern points out in contrasting the systems of attachment and
> intersubjectivity in experience they support and complement each other.
> Stern points out that autistic children show greatly impaired
> intersubjective skills but are attached to their parents. Stern believes it
> is important to separate the two systems theoretically to understand that
> people can be attached without sharing intimacy, or can be
> intersubjectively
> intimate without being attached, or both, or neither. For the fullest
> connection both attachment and intersubjectivity are needed.
>
> Mike this was a long post to tease out the concepts Daniel Stern and others
> are exploring.  He does not fall into the trap of metaphorically
> infantalizing the adult as traditional psychoanalysis did.  He believes
> these processes I outlined continue to be central for human connection
> throughout the life cycle and the patterns are elaborated within cultural
> contexts.  His purpose is not to negate all the perspectives emerging from
> the "LINGUISTIC TURN" but to call our attention to the profound power of
> change in the particular intersubjective encounters and enactments that are
> being acted out in all our human activity.
>
> Larry
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Larry Purss" <lpurss@shaw.ca>
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, November 15, 2009 10:09 AM
> Subject: Re: RE: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?
>
>
> Hi Mabel
>
> Thanks for your reply.
> I mentioned the "Boston Change Process Study Group" as a quick way to
> explore this topic online.  However if you want the best source which
> elaborates this perspective I'm discussing  I would recommend you get
> Daniel
> Stern's book written recently which is called "The Present Moment in
> Psychotherapy and Everyday Life".  He builds his case point by point and
> references all the latest research in this area.  I"m glad to meet another
> person on chat who works in school settings, not in a teacher role but in a
> counselling role.  I also want to engage in school settings to promote the
> "social turn" in emerging perspectives in our culture and how they
> translate
> to school settings. Vygotsky has already been introduced to school settings
> through explorations of "developmental psychology" and learning
> (scaffolding
> and ZPD) and therefore is the best entry into schools to promote the
> "social
> turn" in relational cultural psychology.  I, like Andy, Mike and others
> also
> am interested in pragmatism, especially G.H. Mead as another stream of
> thought on the "social turn".  For this reason I am interested in the chat
> on Dewey and his perspective on "experience" as a term which can no longer
> carry his meaning and  his preference for the term "cultural".  I believe
> Dewey can be another way to amplify the "social turn" in school settings
> because he already is seen as part of the historical narrative of school
> culture.
> My interest in relational psychoanalysis is my curiosity on how they are
> embracing the "social turn" especially in the area of infant research.
>  What
> they can add to the conversation is the recognition that development in the
> first years of life (at the sensorimotor level and the affective level)
> continues to develop and be elaborated and is not superceded by the
> "linquistic turn".  As D. Stern emphasizes, all the conversation and
> theorizing elaborating a new framework which embraces the "linquistic turn"
> is vital and critical to "open new spaces" in which to be human and move
> away with our fixation on the "encapsulated" individual of the Cartesian
> Paradigm. However, Stern's 30 years of studying mother-infant
> intersubjective relational patterns and others who share his sensibility
> (The Boston Change Study Group for example) believe we must also elaborate
> our understanding of "implicit relational knowing".  Andy's articles
> discuss
> Winnicot and his model of developmental psychology as adding to G.H. Mead's
> and other perspectives on the origins of the social "self". The perspective
> of Stern is elaborating this line of inquiry in the moment to moment
> PRACTICAL activity as we interact with others.
> Mabel, like you I feel I'm bridging two worlds of experience and language
> games in the public school system. At times its overwhelming and
> disorienting as I try to elaborate a moral and ethical stance to guide how
> I
> ought to act in settings which expect me to act within an intrapsychic
> model. Vygotsky and CHAT  help refocus and revision how I ought to act..
> I hope this helps.
>
> Larry
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Mabel Encinas <liliamabel@hotmail.com>
> Date: Sunday, November 15, 2009 9:03 am
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
> >
> > Hi, Larry.
> >
> > Thank you very much for the reference.
> >
> > Actually, I have been studying 'affect attunement' (although I
> > do not call it in this way) in junior high school. I also
> > discuss the implicitness in the communitation, although I call
> > that unconscious, because it is not necessary that something has
> > to have been 'conscious' to become 'unconscious' (in
> > psychotherapy I am not a psychoanalist, but a Gestalt
> > psychotherapist, but my research is founded on Vygotsky). I will
> > check this as well!
> >
> > Thank you again.
> >
> > Mabel
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2009 19:50:05 -0800
> > > From: lpurss@shaw.ca
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?
> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >
> > > The discussion of the place of emotion in the developmental
> > process is a central question.
> > > I want to once again recommend googling "Boston Change Process
> > Study Group" to read articles by a group of scholars engaging in
> > exploring the interface BETWEEN emotions (implicit knowing) and
> > consciousness (explicit understanding). Daniel Stern, a member
> > of this group, is a seminal thinker in this area of study.
> > > They have studied the intersubjective processes of "affect
> > attunement" within the infant/caretaker relationship. They
> > differentiate intersubjective processes (psychological
> > processes) from "attachment" processes. HOWEVER what I believe
> > is their major focus is the recognition that the processes of
> > "implicit knowing" or "communication" that happen during infancy
> > (implicit affective knowing) do NOT become superceded when
> > language and symbolization is acquired. Their perspective is
> > that this level of implicit knowing continues to develop and
> > become more complex in the same way as cognition develops and
> > becomes elaborated. They take the position that relating at the
> > implicit level may become symbolically elaborated in language in
> > an intersubjective context and thereby become explixit
> > understanding. However it is their position that most implicit
> > ways of relating remain imlicit or unformulated (NOT UNCONSCIOUS
> > because they were never conscious before. The process is
> > relational and NOT an intrapsychic phenomena. However one can
> > take a phenomenological standpoint and make validity claims.
> > However one could just as well choose to take an intersubjective
> > communicative stance to "interpret" the processes. Or one could
> > take a third person stance to "construct" an explanation. Each
> > position taken allows one to make a validity claim one each
> > claim is only an interpretation.
> > > However it is at the implicit level of intersubjective
> > contexts that " the person in "moments of meeting" experiences
> > feeling engaged and vital.
> > > I believe the construct of "learning" as mediated can benefit
> > from incorporating this level of analysis.
> > >
> > > Andy this speaks to your statement that the "unit of analysis"
> > should be the "subject" as elaborated by Hegel.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca>
> > > Date: Saturday, November 14, 2009 8:17 am
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?
> > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >
> > > > In the following piece, we show how emotion (as evidenced in
> > > > prosody)
> > > > is a resource for the coordination of social action. Michael
> > > >
> > > > Cult Stud of Sci Educ
> > > > DOI 10.1007/s11422-009-9203-8
> > > > Solidarity and conflict: aligned and misaligned prosody
> > > > as a transactional resource in intra- and intercultural
> > > > communication involving power differences
> > > > Wolff-Michael Roth Æ Kenneth Tobin
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 2009-11-14, at 6:55 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> > > >
> > > > I'm going to ignore Andy's request to ignore his message to
> > > > Mabel,
> > > > because I'm sure Mabel is not the only person being told
> > this
> > > > sort of
> > > > thing. The claim, I suppose, is that emotion is a
> > > > subjective
> > > > experience, and therefore something mental, internal,
> > > > personal,
> > > > private and so inaccessible to other people, including the
> > > > researcher,
> > > > who has access only to the external 'expression' of that
> > > > emotion, on
> > > > the face, in movements, etc.
> > > >
> > > > Nonsense. How to argue against that view? Take a look at Joe
> > > > de
> > > > Rivera's work on emotions as interpersonal movements,
> > towards or
> > > > away
> > > > from people on three interpersonal dimensions of intimacy,
> > > > openness,
> > > > and status. Read Hall and Cobey (1976) on emotion as
> > > > transformation of
> > > > the world. Read Mead's Mind, Self and Society where he
> > > > challenges
> > > > Darwin, insisting that "we cannot approach them [emotions]
> > from
> > > > the
> > > > point of view of expressing a content in the mind of the
> > > > individual" (p. 17) because to do so presumes a dualism
> > > > between
> > > > consciousness and the biological organism.
> > > >
> > > > These are some resources that come immediately to my mind.
> > What
> > > > can
> > > > others out there recommend?
> > > >
> > > > Martin
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Nov 14, 2009, at 4:42 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > You have good muses Mabel (Vygotsky and Marx), pity you
> > > > > don't have better supervisors. Your approach, studying
> > > > > microsituations as social, is Vygotsky's approach too, I
> > > > > think, and excellent one, that is often, I fear, not well
> > > > > understood. I am probably the last person to ask about that
> > > > > kind of problem as I have a devil of a problem making myself
> > > > > understood. Others will know the answers to your questions
> > > > > better than me, too. But I will mention a few suggestions.
> > > > >
> > > > > Mabel Encinas wrote:
> > > > >> My supervisors are questioning now, that I do not study
> > > > emotions,
> > > > >> but "the expression of emotions". I know how to solidify
> > > > my
> > > > >> argument in this bit, but could you please give me some
> > > > references
> > > > >> of where should I read about the difference-relation
> > > > between
> > > > >> ontological and methodological dualism?
> > > > >
> > > > > I guess you have already read Vygotsky's comments on
> > > > > ontological vs methodological/epistemological dualism:
> > > > > http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1367
> > > > >
> > > > > If you use Google on this one, you will probably find a page
> > > > > where I am being attacked by someone called Neville for
> > > > > failing to make this distinction. I am far from sure of the
> > > > > value of that exchange but you are welcome to read it. I
> > > > > would not attempt a short summary of this issue.
> > > > >
> > > > > I am not sure what you are being accused of about emotions.
> > > > > Martha Nussbaum is a Critical Theorist who writes good stuff
> > > > > about emotions. And of course everyone reads Antonio
> > > > > Damassio, with his distinction between feelings and
> > > > > emotions. Certainly, emotions are only present in
> > > > > consciousness thanks to their "interpretation" by culturally
> > > > > acquired concepts.
> > > > >
> > > > > ""the expression of emotions" is a strange expression to me.
> > > > > Are they using "emotions" to refer to forms of consciousness
> > > > > which are "expressed" in high blood pressure, etc? Or are
> > > > > they using "emotions" to refer to physiological conditions,
> > > > > which are "expressed" in the character of behavior. I don't
> > > > > understand. I am sure others will know. Sounds like a
> > > > > template accusation.
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
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