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I think Mike's point, when he pointed out this cover, was that it used a
variety of intriguing and unstable taxonomic methods, and I agree.
Trying to categorize all the taxonomies as "male-female" doesn't work,
and I don't think "go together like a horse and carriage" works
universally, either. Does salt and pepper really go together like a
horse and carriage, or a lock and key? What about two identical
objects? Or a magnet and a compass? I think the key is that we can't
actually find a single concept that fits all pairs. I do agree with
your excellent point about functional versus property-based pairings, as
in "table settings" versus "round things." I think Vygotsky addresses
this kind of distinction in his attempt to categorize different kinds of
complexes. Thinking about that, perhaps what we are looking at in that
cover art with about 27 pairs of objects is an amusing and varied
collection of pseudoconcepts.
- Steve
On Jun 27, 2010, at 3:36 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
I know that Vygotsky categorises "family groups" as a type of complex,
but I think that when someone sees, for example, knife, fork, plate
and spoon as forming a set, (a.k.a. a "table setting") this is, in my
view, a qualitatively different thing from seeing as a set a plate, a
bicycle wheel and a rainbow as a group (a.k.a., "round things"). The
former understand things as belonging to some larger functional group;
the latter abstracts one contingent attribute from things and groups
them together on that basis.
The New Yorker cover has pairwise family groups, things which "go
together like a horse and carriage."
Andy
Steve Gabosch wrote:
Andy, I agree - the pairs represented on the magazine cover don't
seem to be binary. That is, none of the pairs seems to represent only
two possible categories. (A side remark on binary classification -
your comments reminded me of the old Porphyrian tree, which takes a
category and then divides it into two classes, and then divides one
or both of those classes into two, and keeps repeating. An example
of such a tree: all reality is made of either thought or extended
bodies; all bodies are either animate or inanimate; all animate
bodies are either plants or animals; all animals are either
vertebrates or invertebrates; all vertebrates are either mammals or
non-mammals, etc. etc.)
I am not exactly sure what a complementary mutually constituting set
is. Would a bow and a violin, and a match and a firecracker,
qualify? How about fire and ice? Two identical objects? An egg and
a slice of bacon? That pesky magnet and compass?
Your point about Vygotsky's "family groups" - that is, complexes - is
apt. That method of classification allows us to associate just about
any two things that share at least one property (eaten for breakfast,
use magnetism, either hot or cold, etc.)
I didn't know it was an inherent property of all artifacts that
another artifact exists that fits it. It is certainly often true.
If you include the human body as a type of artifact, I think I would
agree with this idea as being universal, since all human-produced
artifacts are extensions in some way of humans themselves. Hence,
all artifacts must "fit" either to another artifact or directly to a
human body. If you don't include the human body, and are only
referring to fitting to other artifacts or objects, I am curious how
this intriguing claim could be demonstrated as always being true.
(For example, if you subtract the human, what does a magic wand
fit?) I am also curious who makes this claim ...
- Steve
On Jun 26, 2010, at 9:23 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
I didn't mean male-female just in the graphic sense in which the
idea is used in engineering, Steve, but in the slightly more general
sense. It is similar to the binary classification of the world found
in French sociology and anthropology, e.g. Bourdieu (good/bad,
weak.string, cognition/feeling, etc.), but the examples shown on the
New Yorker cover seem to me to be pairwise complementary mutually
constituting sets, rather than binary divisions of the world.
From there I think in 2 directions: 1. to the "family groups" which
is the first way (acc to LSV) that small children begin to make sets
of things before they have their heads bent into abstracting
attributes to make sets, and 2. that it is an inherent property of
all artefacts that their meaning is contained, not just in their use
in some form of practice, but in the existence of another artefact
that fits it. E.g., the meaning of a key is that somewhere sometime
there is a lock which it fits.
Nice pic.
Andy
Steve Gabosch wrote:
Since I got sidetracked by a New Yorker cover art jig saw puzzle on
that site, and then had to do some rummaging around to get to the
right place, I thought I'd give the specific url for the cover art
that Andy and Mike are talking about. (Not that the jig saw puzzle
wasn't kind of fun. I never did one on a computer before.)
http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=2010-06-28
On the "male-female" concept, I get that many of the paired objects
on the cover involve insertion and reception (e.g., lock and key,
nut and bolt, electrical socket and plug, vase and flower, corked
wine bottle and corkscrew, dust pan and brush). But this concept
doesn't apply to all of the pairs, and other concepts might also
apply to these pairs. Some objects are identical (green dots).
Others are nearly so, except for handedness (gloves, shoes). Some
can be logically paired for culinary reasons, at least by New York
standards (egg and bacon, salt and pepper, bread and butter, oil
and vinegar).
The pairing of the magnet and compass has me most perplexed. Those
two objects are usually kept apart for practical reasons, aren't
they? I'm pretty sure that particular pairing falls outside of a
gender-based taxonomy, but I'm not sure whether it qualifies as
paradigmatic, syntagmatic - or just plain contrary and
contradictory! :-))
Thinking of Shirley's comments, fun exercises like this, looking
for the insights that Mike and Andy offer into this cover art (and
re-looking up what those linguistic terms that Mike used mean)
strike me as ways of playing with higher cognitive concepts, which
leads us toward more capably applying them. Looking at levels of
grammar, meaning, taxonomy can be fun.
But, to point to Shirley's main line of interesting questions, I
don't know how higher cognitive concepts like these could be taught
only "orally," or if trying to restrict lessons about them to
somehow being strictly oral is even desirable. On the other hand,
oral skills in this regard should not be neglected - we need to not
just be able to think at a desk, but also on our feet.
I am just now reading a chapter in History of the Development of
the Higher Mental Functions where LSV stresses the importance of
writing, drawing and playing in cognitive development, as well as
of course mastering oral speech, from at least the age of four or
so. Being able to move back and forth between these "languages,"
(speaking, writing, drawing, playing), as Vygotsky called them,
seems to be essential in developing the higher mental functions.
Learning grammar concepts, I would think, requires both oral and
written speech, and even some drawing skills. I know I need to use
all three of these "languages" to learn new grammatical concepts.
It would be much harder to learn such things only orally, wouldn't
it? At the same time, learning about grammar through writing and
drawing strengthens my oral abilities. And, in any case, it sure
helps when that stuff can be done playfully!
So, back to fun. Just how **did** that magnet and compass hook up,
anyway? Sigh. Maybe I'm just being too taxonomically
Western-collegiate. Perhaps one of Luria's old Uzbek colleagues
would have just the right taxonomical explanation for why those two
artifacts wound up holding hands ...
- Steve
On Jun 26, 2010, at 4:21 PM, Shirley Franklin wrote:
I'm also interested in this too.
I had a conversation with a friend who trains up teachers in
schools and works with pupils, mainly who have English as a second
language. She was telling me that she uses a Hallidayan genre
model to help develop the children's speaking, and to make them
express themselves in higher levels of thinking.
I am troubled by this. i am interested in Hallidayan genre
teaching , as i think you can use a genre pedagogy to help pupils
to develop their written language, and in the process develop
their thinking. I am fascinated by how focusing on the different
levels of the text you can induct kids into thinking in ways
appropriate to the context and discipline, especially by working
at the levels of the word - concepts and grammar- sentence and text.
But I am not sure that you can do this orally. Can you tell pupils
how to frame their oral expression, to make them express
themselves in a "higher cognitive way"? It seems bizarre - because
I think we use language as a tool for thought. Can teaching more
sophisticated oral linguistic structures impact on thinking.
I hope this makes sense.
Its' been bothering me all day!
Best to all
Shirley
On 26 Jun 2010, at 17:02, ulvi icil wrote:
I am interested on the effect of schooling on concept formation, the
relationswhip between everyday and scientific concetps as a
candidate
research topic for my master thesis that I will start to work
October 2010
onwards !
Ulvi
2010/6/26, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
That article connects to several ongoing threads, Andy. But lets
see if
others are interested before I directly comment.
Instead, I think that the cover of the current issue of the New
Yorker
magazine provides interesting food for thought one concepts and
their
representations. It is accessible from www.newyorker.com. Try
to click on
the cover and than use control+ (on a pc) to get a larger and
larger
imaged.
The different layers of meaning appear to move between the
syntagmatic and
paradigmatic dimensions of meaning making. Besides,
its clever.
mike
On Sat, Jun 26, 2010 at 6:38 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
I just had a read of Mike's 1982 paper with Roy D'Andrade on the
influence
of schooling on concept formation:
http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/ap82v4n2.PDF
Great paper!
It occurred to me that Luria is in agreement with many others
that a
hierarchical system of categories, a taxonomy, is the
archetype of the
"abstract" concept. Luria's conception of how this relates to
prior forms
of
concept (affective and concrete) is the main point of interest
in the
article, but I would like to question whether this taxonomical
idea is
valid
as the archetype of the "true" concept. The article claims that
taxonomical
practices ("true" or not) are archetypal school practices, and
this is an
interesting and different question.
An interesting counterpoint to this is Hegel's classification of 3
different components which he thinks must *all* be present in the
formation
of a true concept:
The subject is (a) ascribed certain qualities; (b) seen as
having having
a
certain place in a system of social practice; and (c) taken
under its
genus,
as belonging to a certain living whole.
Further, I think (c) does not actually amount to the kind of
Linnaean
hierarchical family tree, but could also be interpreted like
genre and
archetype without the implied underlying totality. Also, there
is all too
much room for subsuming (c) under (a) as almost all of present-day
philosophy and natural science are wont to do.
Mike, you have done a lot of work on the role of this "taxonomical
activity" in and out of school. Davydov on the other hand,
emphasises (b)
as
opposed to (a). It would be interesting to investigate
concept-formation
on
this wider frame.
Andy
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