Re: [xmca] Shared knowledge as Common Ground

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I'll seek out the article, Larry. Maybe those interested in the "grounding"
issue could coordinate around putting together something like a reading
list. Very helpful to think about the issue of grounding in connection with
imagination and creativity.

Anything by Twardoswki himself to recommend?
mike

On Mon, Oct 25, 2010 at 9:55 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Mike
> I would be very interested in reading Herb Clark's article.
> Your question  about parallel universes is a topic that I find interesting
> and have often wondered about. A general answer would be that it is a
> process of HISTORICIZED development and ontogenetic development of knowledge
> partakes of "common  ground"
>  Andy's comment on Hegel mixed with Marx with a twist of pragmatism
> captures something of a shared "grounding"
>
> On this note of understanding the DURABLE FORMS of common ground, I was
> wondering if CHAT has ever discussed the ideas of Kazimierz Twardowski??  An
> article by Jerzy Bobryk titled "The Social Construction of Mind and the
> Future of Cognitive Science" explores the trajectory of cognitive science as
> a science of the EXTENDED and socially constructed mind.  Kazimierz
>  Twardowski's "theory of Intentionality" and his theory of "actions and
> products" provide the conceptual framework for Jerzy Bobryk's analysis.  The
> article is in the journal FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE,  2002, volume 7,  481-495.
>
> In 1894 Kazimierz Twardowski when reflecting on "intentionality" noticed
> that mental states could be directed at IDEAL or NONEXISTING OBJECTS that
> could be an object of my intentional states.  Twardowski points out that
> "object" was used in two senses. 1) for the independently existing entity to
> which our mental actions are DIRECTED. 2) for the MENTAL PRODUCT OF THIS
> ACTION, presentation, or psychological REPRESENTATION of the mentioned
> entity. This 2nd sense focused on the IMAGINATION of the object that comes
> into existence and cannot exist independently of my mental action.
>
> In 1912 Twardowski explored the relationship between physical and
> psychological actions and PRODUCTS.  In pairs such as : "TO jump- THE
> jump",  "TO walk-THE walk",  "To perceive-THE perception",  "TO imagine-THE
> image",  the first word denotes an action, the second a PRODUCT of this
> action. This is a difference of MEANING as both words have different
> DENOTATION.
>
> Some PRODUCTS are inseparable from action: a dance exists as long as the
> action of dancing that PRODUCES the dance continues, a thought exists as
> long as someone is thinking.
>
> Other actions yield PRODUCTS that can EXIST LONGER than the actions which
> produce them.  They are  DURABLE PRODUCTS.  [We build buildings.]  These
> durable products change or affect the objects that existed prior to the
> particular action that produced the durable product. These objects that are
> changed are called the MATERIAL OF ACTION and the action transforms the
> material in producing the durable product.
>
> According to Twardowski's theory, 3 ontological categories of actions &
> products can be distinguished.
> 1) PHYSICAL actions & products [walking - a walk]
> 2) PSYCHOLOGICAL actions & products [thinking - a thought]
> 3) PSYCHOPHYSICAL actions & products [speaking - a speech,  painting - a
> picture] In this category there is a physical action accompanied by a
> psychological action and DURABLE psychophysical products result.  At the
> moment when a psychophysical action occurs, both the MENTAL product and the
> PSYCHOPHYSICAL product EXIST SIMULTANEOUSLY.  The psychophysical products
> [such as signs] become the EXTERNAL EXPRESSIONS of the non-durable mental
> products. These DURABLE products or signs potentially CONTAIN A MEANING ( a
> mental content) that may partially CAUSE a similar mental product to appear
> in the receivers of the durable product.  For example a painting evokes a
> mental product in the person viewing a drawing.  The sybol, sign, or product
> is SEPARATED from the act that produced it. This DURABLE product in many
> cases produces another cognitive act which evokes a mental or psychological
> meaning. This new mental product is NOT IDENTICAL to the durable product
> that evoked the mental product. therefore each person will not have an
> identical mental product evoked. However the various mental products
> produced by the durable product reveal certain COMMON characteristics.
> These are elements that the individual mental products SHARE and are
> considered to be the MEANING OF a given durable psychophysical product.
> Therefore we may say that a given sign evokes multiple similar [but not
> identical]  thoughts in various persons.
>
> Meaning, from Twardowski's perspective, is no longer a specific mental
> product, but something we attain by the operation of ABSTRACTION performed
> on a given durable product.  Twardowski called the particular product of
> psychological mental action "meaning IN CONCRETO"  Whereas meaning
> understood as COMMON and DURABLE, which individual psychological mental
> products SHARE is termed "meaning IN ABSTRACTO". The person is influenced by
> the durable products and base her/his judgements and reasoning on these
> normative durable products, received from the exterior, in developing
> psychological products. In this process of psychological products being
> transformed to durable products, thinking individuals may USE products of
> psychological actions INDEPENDENTLY of the psychological actions themselves.
> In other words the durable products not only enable communication but also
> transform the person's thinking and STANDARDIZES [structures?] intellectual
> operations.  The durable products become OBJECTS.   These durable products
> can also be RECORDED by various media [recording systems] which transform
> psychological products [meanings]
>
> There is nothing new in Twardowski's theory of actions and products from a
> CHAT perspective. However, his use of the term "products" predates the term
> "objects" and speaks to the search for COMMON GROUND.  When Mike mentions
> reflects on parallel universes, it triggers further reflection on HISTORICED
> development.  It's fascinating that Twardowski was writing his thoughts in
> 1894.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 25, 2010 at 5:19 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Lucas-- I was able to grab the Herb Clark article. Concerned as it is with
>> joint, mediated, activity and the material/ideal nature of mediation, it
>> has
>> to be close to my heart.
>> If others are interested, i can send a pdf.
>>
>> The issue of "grounding" also comes up in wertsch's writings on the
>> given/new distinction, i think when he
>> discusses Rommetveit. Very worthwhile discussion and expansion as a topic.
>>
>> I would also note that the entire issue of Discourse Studies should be
>> interesting people in this
>> discussion, from the introduction of x-lchc-ite Sandro Duranti to the
>> discussion around Manny Schegeloff's work (another x-lchc-ite from
>> loooooong
>> ago).
>>
>> Like old home week! thanks.
>>
>> mike
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 12:25 AM, Lucas Bietti <lucas@bietti.org> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > Just a quick clarification. H.Clark's book is titled 'Using Language'.
>> > Interestingly, in the last years Clark and Nick Enfield have been using
>> the
>> > concept of Common Ground in multimodal interactions incorporating
>> material
>> > environments.
>> >
>> >
>> > Clark, H. (2005). Coordinating each other in a material world. Discourse
>> > Studies7 (4-5), 507-525.
>> > Enfield, N.J. (2006). Social consequences of common ground. In N.J.
>> Enfield
>> > &
>> > S.C. Levinson (eds.), Roots of human sociality: Culture, cognition and
>> > interaction(pp.399-430). Oxford: Berg.
>> > Enfield, N.J. (2008). Common ground as a resource for social
>> affiliation.
>> > In
>> > I.Kecskes & J.L. (eds), Intention, common ground and the egocentric
>> > speaker-hearer(pp.223-254). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
>> > Enfield,N.J.(2009). The anatomy of meaning: Speech, gesture, and
>> composite
>> > utterances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
>> >
>> >
>> > Hope this helps
>> > Lucas
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On October 21, 2010 at 10:32 PM Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > > I just read an interesting article on shared knowledge acquisition
>> > > and shared perception that develops as doctors participate in  joint
>> > > activity within the operating room.
>> > > When reading it I was thinking of Jay Lemke's article on how changing
>> > > media facilitate different forms of shared knowlege.
>> > >
>> > > The article is an examination of communicative activity in an
>> operating
>> > room
>> > > where there is an attendant, a resident, and a third year medical
>> student
>> > > and how they are developing shared perceptions and shared knowledge
>> > within
>> > > a particular situation.  The authors are usin a pragmatic model of
>> > > "reference repair" proposed by  Clark and Marshall [1981]
>> > >
>> > > Clark's model in 1981 was referring to "mutual knowledge" but in 1996
>> in
>> > a
>> > > book titled "Using Knowledge" he expanded the notion of mutual
>> knowledge
>> > to
>> > > a broader category of "common ground"
>> > >
>> > > Clark's proposed model of reference repair is expressed by the formula
>> > > Evidence + Asumptions + Induction schema = Mutual knowledge [or common
>> > > ground]
>> > > g
>> > > Evidence is the ground that both speaker and hearer both understand
>> some
>> > > matter in the same way.
>> > >
>> > > Assumptions are the things taken for granted when accepting these
>> grounds
>> > as
>> > > warrants
>> > >
>> > > Inductive schema is a RECURSIVE relation where evidence and
>> assumptions
>> > are
>> > > interrelated or linked.  Weaker bases of evidence [shared knowledge]
>> must
>> > be
>> > > compensated by increasing levels of assumptions.
>> > >
>> > > The authors in the discussion section of there article wrote
>> > >
>> > > "We are in full accord with Clark's shift from a treatment of
>> reference
>> > as a
>> > > simple matter of linquistic interpretation to a more situated model
>> that
>> > > encpmpasses "joint actions" and "joint perceptual experiences" and we
>> > think
>> > > this this [theory] ... would help to illuminate how participants' own
>> > > unfolding activities contribute to the determinant sense of what IS
>> > SEEABLE
>> > > at any given moment. Furthermore, we have much to learn about the
>> > > interactions between different kinds of bases of shared
>> understanding".
>> > >
>> > > Not sure if others will find the article interesting.  It is another
>> > > perspective on the theme of "co-ordinating perspectives"  through
>> > > "reflective capacity" as a "socio-relational" process.
>> > >
>> > > Larry
>> > __________________________________________
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