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These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes, and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving. Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards. If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site, please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
On 19 April 2011 02:01, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > Huw, I think any scientific theory should aspire to be philosophically > rigorous. Philosophial rigour though is not something that depends on > results as "scientific" rigour does. For example, is we use the concept of > "activity" in our scientific work as a relation between the mental and the > physical for example, then we need to be aware that this introduces a > dichotomy which is ultimately unsustainable. On the other hand, it is almost > impossible to talk about, let alone explain, Activity without referring to > "states of mind" and so on. This is the difficult distinction between > communicative action and concepts. > The mental/physical distinction looks like a dead-end to me beyond the sphere of social discourse, though I understand your gist here to be about coherence. Yes, I'd only offer mild surprise that you'd willingly employ an incoherent theory. The distinction between the "-graphy" aspects of science and the "-ology" may be apt. > > On concepts: It is true that a concept **can** be conceived of within a > matrix of similarity and differences, but I think that is a view which > really misses what a concept is and fails to capture the full breadth of > meaning of the word. It has the effect of replacing the study of a concept > with the study of "features" ultimately leading to an arbitrary decision on > what counts as an "irreducible" "chunk" or "feature". I think there is a > difference between problems of recognition or categorisation, on one hand, > and conceptulisation on the other. Concepts actually always have fuzzy > boundaries, and focus on boundary problems often misses the essence. > Yes. Most definately. Although these fuzzy boundaries exist (or are far greater in proliferation) when the subject/organism/host of the epistemology entailing the concepts is considered as an open system rather than a closed system. I agree about the semiotic aspects, although I fear if it is insisted that this aspect part of the definition of a concept (rather than part of it's generation), you will create more confusion and disagreement in your wake, especially in the positivist camp. The only other pithy point I have to make about the commonalities & differences view of concepts right now is that you can cover a lot of ground with a few mirrors. The uniqueness and variety of our minds and behaviour is also a function of the uniqueness and variety in the world, sometimes this variety and fuzziness may simply be a reflection of it, not something intrinsic to our own epistemology. Huw > Andy > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Distinguishing a scientific theory from a philosophical one, we can, I >> believe, state that the sum of the within-paradigm conceptions combined >> with >> the means of measuring (creating) phenomena provide the working definition >> of the conception of the subject. This conception is still, in theory, >> comparable to other conceptions of the phenomena (e.g. a cognitive model >> compared with a cybernetic model), this seems to introduce a certain >> relativity to the term 'fundamental concept', so I'm not sure I agree with >> "I can't define it in terms of anything else", as opposed to "It would >> take >> me a long time to define it". >> >> Part of the interest here is in the semantics of the term 'concept'. To >> conceptualize something implies that you can conceptualize something else >> or >> something similar, implying that all concepts (or conceptions) can be >> conceived of as residing within a matrix of commonalities and >> variabilities >> (which was my starting point). >> >> >> >> >>> I think that for science, it is important to know what the concept of the >>> subject matter is, even if we can communicate adequately without that >>> understanding. >>> >>> >>> >> >> That seems perfectly reasonable and necessary. >> >> For me, another slightly confusing aspect of the term 'fundamental >> concept' >> in the context of philosophy is that it suggests Idealism which may, or >> may >> not, be your cup of tea. >> >> Huw >> __________________________________________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> > > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca