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These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes, and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving. Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards. If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site, please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
I am attaching an historical snippet of a conversation from Anna
Stetsenko
written to XMCA in 2005 which is part of an extended converstion
that was a
response to her article written for MCA in 2005.
--------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Stetsenko, Anna
Date: Nov 5, 2005 8:51 AM
Subject: could you please post this for me on xmca? thanks.
To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
I wrote my comment below yesterday morning but then my university's
server was down for much of the day (right, Joe?) and I could not
post it. There are many new things today but I still think my
yesterday's response is relevant. One addition only, because Mike
and others again asked for clarification of my central terms. It
would be impossible to explain what I meant by intersubjectivity and
subjectivity (and I would also have to go back to Greeks, Hegel etc
and do some historical excavations) if not that …I use them from
within the CHAT tradition, i.e. works by Vygotsky and Leontiev who
had done much of such historical excavations already (with some
variations due to the difficult task of finding a suitable
translation, because for example, 'psyche' in English is not the
same as 'psihika' in Russian; 'consciousness' is not 'soznanie', and
on and on – just to say that translating is a highly theoretical
work in itself). To discuss all the details here would be a
separate, tedious and lengthy work. I suppose that one quote from
Vygotsky should be helpful to illustrate the usage of terms:
Any function in the child's cultural development appears twice, or
on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the
psychological plane. First it appears between people as an
interpsychological category, and then within the child as an
intrapsychological category... Social relations or relations among
people genetically underlie all higher functions and their
relationships.'
------------------------------------------
Now, my comment from Nov 4, 2005.
Mike has suggested that the discussion on xmca moves on to new
topics. I totally agree and now want to thank all the participants
for their time and effort. I do need to make up on my promise to
comment, not to start a new round of discussions but to highlight a
couple of things. I start with a response to Viktor – because this
is a good way to sum up the main points --
and then make a few more general comments. Viktor: You presented a
fascinating analysis of Ilyenkov and I find myself agreeing with the
main thrust of your arguments. In fact, I think there is much more
agreement between what you are saying and my paper than you seem to
imply. Let me explain this, necessarily briefly.
First. My treatment of Ilyenkov is very sketchy in my paper (as you
noticed)
whereas you presented a much more detailed and, already due to this,
a more fair account of his views. However, all the sketchiness of my
treatment of EVI notwithstanding, my main argument does not depart
that strongly from yours. Namely, I imply that it is a puzzle that
EVI's dialectical – as I directly say -- view is not consistently
pushed through and that it is often, de facto, does not say what
needs to be said (your take) or is in contradiction with his own
passages on ideality as reified in objects (my take). I attribute
this puzzle, and you do too, to the difficulty of Ilyenkov's
position in the sinister atmosphere of his society and the related
impasse of not being able to fully integrate creative agency of
individuals into the picture. Yes, you are right, because that would
have threatened the status quo of the then established presumably
perfect social order, which in reality was a stifling bureaucracy (I
admit, you say it more openly than I did). Secondly and more
importantly, regarding your central claim:
<<For Marx (and Ilyenkov), subjectivity, the object, and the ideal
develop simultaneously as the outcome of the special conditions of
human sociality; the voluntary (in the sense here of non-
instinctive) collaboration of mostly if not entirely socialized
individuals for the purpose of producing the means for satisfaction
of collective and individual needs. >>