Re: [xmca] Consciousness As Noticing and Abstraction

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

The word translated as "awareness" is the term, osaznanie
about-consciousness in contrast with soznanie, consciousness. This causes me
some confusion in thinking about these issues.

Does phronisis imply the kind of "aboutness" or "turning-on-its-selfness"
that o-soznanie does?

(and note soznanie is so-znanie, with-knowing. It is worth in this regard
thinking about the implications of the last page of T&L. (see LSV, V1, Ch7,
p. 285). I would post but do not have to hand.
mike


On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 9:12 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi DavidI
> You wrote,
>
> To clear this up, he suggests junking ALL of the above and replacing them
> with a FOURTH meaning of "conscious", which is volitional, voluntary,
> deliberate noticing of one's own psychological activity, which he calls
> "awareness". The example he gives is knot-tying: Then you suggest when the
> focus of conciousness alights on HOW I make those  particular actions this
> is a particular FORM of consciousness which can be termed *awareness*
>
> This notion of *awareness* as a particular FORM of consciousness that
> focuses on HOW action proceeds seems similar to Aristotle's notion of
> phronesis [practical activity about how WE should proceed]  Is 8awareness8
> the psychological equivalent on the subjective level to the cultural
> historical level of phronesis.?
>
> My question is an attempt to LINK Anna Stetsenko's notion of
> *transformative
> activist stance* with the exploration of phronesis in authors such as
> Gadamer.  Have you read articles by Bent Flyvsbjerg on *phronetic social
> research*?  He is a city planner in Denmark who is exploring the notion of
> town planning as an act of phronesis.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 4:57 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> >wrote:
>
> > Mike, Steve:
> >
> > I meant this bit, which is paragraph 32 of the Second Section of Chapter
> > Six. Vygotsky has just complained that Freud and Piaget are using
> > "unconscious" or "subconscious" to mean things that are genetically
> > completely different: not yet conscious (that is, genetically primary),
> > semi-conscious (partially conscious and therefore somewhere in the
> > middle) and repressed from consciousness (that is, genetically late
> > emerging).
> >
> > To clear this up, he suggests junking ALL of the above and replacing them
> > with a FOURTH meaning of "conscious", which is volitional, voluntary,
> > deliberate noticing of one's own psychological activity, which he calls
> > "awareness". The example he gives is knot-tying:
> >
> > "Я завязываю узелок. Я делаю это сознательно. Я не могу, однако,
> > рассказать, как именно я это сделал. Мое сознательное действие
> оказывается
> > неосознанным, потому что мое внимание направлено на акт самого
> завязывания,
> > но не на то, как я это делаю. Сознание всегда представляет какой-то кусок
> > действительности. Предметом моего сознания является завязывание узелка,
> > узелок и то, что с ним происходит, но не те действия, которые я произвожу
> > при завязывании, не то, как я это делаю. Но предметом сознания может
> стать
> > именно это — тогда это
> >  будет осознание. Осознанием является акт сознания, предметом которого
> > является сама же деятельность сознания."
> >
> > ("I make a knot. I do it consciously. I cannot, however, tell you exactly
> > how I did it. My conscious act is unconscious, because my attention is
> > focused on the act of the tying, but not on how I do it. Consciousness is
> > always some piece of reality. The object of my consciousness is tying the
> > knot, a knot, and what was happening to it but not those actions that I
> make
> > when tying, not how I do it. But the object of consciousness can be just
> > that - then it will be awareness. Awareness is an act of consciousness,
> the
> > subject of which is itself the very same activity of consciousness.")
> >
> > I don't agree that there is any light between Luria and Vygotsky on this
> > question, Steve. the part I quote from Tool and Symbol is from a
> manuscript
> > co-authored by both of them. I also don't agree that what I wrote about
> > computer addiction and role play is not relevant to this thread; I think
> > that one of the great strengths of xmca is that it really does allow us
> to
> > "rise to the concrete". But I do admit that adolescence is more or less
> > beyond my expertise (I notice that whenever I start talking about my own
> > childhood I have probably trespassed the extremely narrow boundaries of
> what
> > I know about kids).
> >
> > So here are three things that are more to the point.
> >
> > a) My former grad, Yongho, who is doing his Ph.D. thesis is looking at
> some
> > data where the kids can manipulate "avatars" made with their own
> photographs
> > and get them to interact with each other. The third graders love it. The
> > fourth graders are a little shy. And the fifth graders hate it.
> >
> > b) At the same time, we've found that when we ask kids to role play,
> > the third graders take it very seriously, the fourth graders ham it up,
> and
> > the fifth graders tend to either parody or satirize.
> >
> > c) Finally, I am looking at some data this morning where the teacher
> > is trying to get the kids to distinguish between nuclear two-generation
> > families and extended three-generation families by looking at their own
> > family trees. She's having a lot of trouble  because the kids keep mixing
> up
> > a "broad" family (many siblings) with a "deep" one (many generations) by
> > talking about "large" families. So she introduces the term "nuclear".
> >
> > One of the kids immediately identifies the term as referring to atomic
> > weapons. The teacher is hopeful, since this would mean being able to talk
> > about North Korea, about divided families, and maybe even about the
> > "nucleus" of an atom and a family.
> >
> > But it turns out that the child only knows the "nuclear option" in the
> game
> > of Starcraft, which is an option offered to the human-like Terrans; the
> > option of simply dropping a bomb on subhuman races and eradicating them.
> For
> > the child, it's not a weapon at all; it's just a trump card in a game.
> >
> > Now it seems to me that what ALL of these examples have in common is a
> > growing ability to ABSTRACT a concept, including a self-concept, from its
> > context--and from its consequences. THAT seems to me to be
> > characteristic the end of childhood. I am hard put to describe this, as
> > Leontiev and Karpov do, as the struggle to be taken seriously by adults.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> >  --- On Thu, 5/12/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] how did Luria explain practical intellect
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Thursday, May 12, 2011, 8:03 AM
> >
> >
> > I am way back on "Vygotsky used the example of a knot."
> > Which example, David? Are you referring to tying a knot to remember and
> > example of quipu? If so, I cannot understand
> > what you say about it.
> >
> > Could you clarify?
> >
> > Arent the examples you give of driving a car etc for sort of
> > "action-reflexes" what, following Leontiev, Zinchenko, et al, are
> referred
> > to as operations?
> >
> > I'll start from the top if you could clarify here and get back on the
> > trail.
> > mike
> >
> >
> > On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 11:56 PM, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > How did Luria explain practical intellect, automatic behaviors, etc.
> and
> > > the distinctions David is making?
> > >
> > > - Steve
> > >
> > > PS I changed the subject line and snipped out other topics.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On May 11, 2011, at 5:52 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >
> > >  Steve:
> > >>
> > >> We need a distinction here, and I think it is equivalent to the
> > >> omnirelevant distinction Vygotsky makes between higher, culturally
> > mediated,
> > >> and lower, biologically endowed, psychological functions.
> > >>
> > >> Martin says (and I agree) that SOME forms of practical thinking are
> > purely
> > >> sensorimotor: always have been and always will be. I think that is
> true,
> > but
> > >> that when we examine those functions we find that they are utterly
> > >> uninteresting to historico-cultural psychology except insofar as they
> > form
> > >> the basis for higher, culturally mediated functions.
> > >>
> > >> I guess I would include the "jump" you create when you fire a gun next
> > to
> > >> somebody's ear (they jump before realizing that it is a gun), the
> sickly
> > >> feeling you get when you look down from a very tall building or come
> > around
> > >> a trail bend and see a coiled snake, and eidetic memories (the "after
> > >> vision" you see when you shut your eyes after looking at a bright
> > light).
> > >>
> > >> I think that if these were all there were to psychology,
> > >> historico-cultural pscyhology would be a bizarre branch of philosophy,
> > or an
> > >> obscure literary practice, and the reactologists would have been right
> > after
> > >> all. There is, however, a second kind of practical thinking which is
> > >> functionally similar, looks structurally similar, but is genetically
> > utterly
> > >> different and therefore, in the final analysis (e.g. under conditions
> of
> > >> pathological degeneration as in old people with Alzheimer's) it is
> also
> > >> structurally different.
> > >>
> > >> These are the hand-to-eye "reflexes" we see in driving, in computer
> > games,
> > >> in piano playing, and in a wide range of societal practices that are
> > >> manifestly symbolic manipulations. They are semiotically consequential
> > for
> > >> other people (not just for the biological organism).
> > >>
> > >> But they do appear for all the world like "automatic" reflexes (a term
> > >> that I think Vygotsky would avoid, except for metaphorical usages),
> > actions
> > >> into which consciousness does not (any longer) appear to enter. These
> > are
> > >> the actions I would like to call "post-verbal" or "de-verbal" thinking
> > >> rather than "pre-verbal" or "non-verbal" thinking.
> > >>
> > >> Vygotsky's example is tying a knot. It's not that this is unconscious
> > (you
> > >> are not asleep when you tie your shoes, and you are not even in a
> > trance).
> > >> It is that it is largely non-conscious, because your attention is
> > focused on
> > >> the result of the action and not on the activity itself. You can, if
> you
> > >> wish, focus on the activity, and in this sense it is structurally
> quite
> > >> different from what happens when I unexpectedly fire a gun next to
> your
> > ear.
> > >>
> > >> You cannot, no matter how hard you try, focus on the jump that you
> > >> involuntarily make when you hear an unexpected gunshot. The same is
> true
> > of
> > >> the other examples as long as they are unexpected, although of course
> > people
> > >> can and do culturally mediate their vertigo and deliberately train for
> > >> eidetic memory, after which we can no longer call it a lower
> > psychological
> > >> function.
> > >>
> > >> I think that all kinds of history, including ontogeny, know instances
> of
> > >> what in phylogenesis is called convergent evolution. The wings of
> birds,
> > >> insects and airplanes are functionally and even structurally similar,
> > but
> > >> they are only externally related; that is, related because of their
> very
> > >> different adaptation to the functional needs and to the environment. I
> > think
> > >> that pre-verbal and post-verbal "automatism" has the same type of
> > >> resemblance: a phenotypical rather than a genotypical one.
> > >>
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >> David Kellogg
> > >> Seoul National University of Education .
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --- On Wed, 5/11/11, Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> From: Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] last on concepts
> > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> Date: Wednesday, May 11, 2011, 3:28 AM
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> David,
> > >>
> > >>
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > >  Question: is what you are referring to as "practical intellect" and
> > >> "post-verbal" behavior equivalent to what Vygotsky refers to as
> > automatic
> > >> behavior or activity, such as in his discussion of Claparede's law, v1
> p
> > >> 183?  "This law states that difficulties or impediments encountered in
> > >> automatic activity lead to conscious reflection on that activity." p
> 70
> > >>  (Vygotsky seems to accept this law, but only as a functional law -
> his
> > >> criticism is that it only indicates whether the need for conscious
> > awareness
> > >> is present or absent in an individual, not how conscious awareness
> > itself
> > >> emerges. v1 p183)
> > >>
> > >> A classic example of automatic activity versus behavior guided by
> > >> conscious awareness is of course comparing the driver who is used to
> > >> changing gears with a stick shift to someone just learning how to do
> > that.
> > >>  The coordination of the gear shift with the clutch eventually becomes
> > >> habitual and only rises to consciousness when there is a problem for
> the
> > >> first driver, but initially requires constant attention from the
> second
> > one.
> > >>
> > >> - Steve
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On May 10, 2011, at 5:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote:
> > >>
> > >>  Steve:
> > >>>
> > >>> One of the things we did when we translated T&S into Korean was to
> > >>> carefully compare every single paragraph with the Minick translation
> > into
> > >>> English. We found quite a few differences. Here's the original
> > Vygotsky:
> > >>>
> > >>> Отношение мышления и речи в этом случае можно было бы схематически
> > >>> обозначить двумя пересекающимися окружностями, которые показали бы,
> что
> > >>> известная часть процессов речи и мышления совпадает. Это . так
> > называемая
> > >>> сфера &Lt;речевого мышления&Gt;. Но это речевое мышление не
> исчерпывает
> > ни
> > >>> всех форм мысли, ни всех форм речи. Есть большая область мышления,
> > которая
> > >>> не будет иметь непосредственного отношения к речевому мышлению. Сюда
> > следует
> > >>> отнести раньше всего, как уже указывал Бюлер, инструментальное и
> > техническое
> > >>> мышление и
> > >>> вообще всю область так называемого практического интеллекта, который
> > >>> только в последнее время становится предметом усиленных исследований.
> > >>>
> > >>> Here's an English translation, with some of the differences with
> Minick
> > >>> in parentheses:
> > >>>
> > >>> "(It would be possible to) schematically designate the relation of
> > >>> thinking and speech (in this case) by two intersecting circles,
> (which
> > would
> > >>> show that a certain part) of the processes of speech and thinking do
> > >>> coincide. (Here is the so-called sphere of “verbal thinking”. But)
> this
> > >>> verbal thinking exhausts neither all the forms of thought nor all the
> > forms
> > >>> of speech. There is the large area of thinking, which will not have
> > direct
> > >>> relation to the vocal thinking. (Here one should relate first of all
> as
> > >>> already indicated Bühler, instrumental and technical thinking and
> > generally
> > >>> the entire region of so-called the practical intellect, which only
> > recently
> > >>> becomes the object of those intensified studies.)"
> > >>>
> > >>> Now, Minick dislikes Vygotsky's tendency to say the same thing three
> > >>> times, and like Hanfmann and Vakar he often prunes in the hope of
> > producing
> > >>> a stronger and clearer image. Martin doesn't like Vygotsky's love of
> > >>> striking, and often spatial, images (and I certainly agree with
> Martin
> > that
> > >>> they ARE dangerous sometimes, as in the idea of four "planes" that so
> > struck
> > >>> you, Professor Mack, and Colin, which I think is a complete
> > >>> misunderstanding).
> > >>>
> > >>> I like both, and I think they are related. I think that we are
> supposed
> > >>> to take both with a block of salt, the way a cow does. I think that
> we
> > take
> > >>> Vygotsky's slightly different redundancies and his not quite
> > overlapping
> > >>> images not as Galton photographs (where similarities reinforce each
> > other
> > >>> and differences obscure) but as frames in a moving picture, verbal
> > >>> approximations of something that is changing as we speak.
> > >>>
> > >>> So here we have the image of two intersecting circles. Vygotsky says
> > it's
> > >>> only one of several ways to imagine this (and in fact he has already
> > >>> described it as the intersection of two lines, as a tangled skein, as
> > two
> > >>> "currents" that flow into each other, etc. So it is right and proper
> to
> > >>> begin with "It might be possible" or "it may be possible" or "it
> would
> > be
> > >>> possible" which is what Vygotsky really does.
> > >>>
> > >>> He's talking about speech functions in ADULTS, which is why he says
> "in
> > >>> this case". Think of an adult driving a car. This is an almost
> perfect
> > >>> example of practical, mechanical intellect. Vygotsky is surely right
> to
> > >>> suggest that it has no DIRECT relationship to verbal thinking; if you
> > >>> describe what you are doing while you are driving, you are probably
> > going to
> > >>> have an accident.
> > >>>
> > >>> But it's not at all like PRE-verbal nonverbal thinking, is it? We can
> > see
> > >>> this in a number of ways. First of all, we find conversation a little
> > >>> burdensome when we are driving unless it is actually connected with
> the
> > >>> driving task (e.g. a GPS). This suggests positive and negative
> > interference,
> > >>> doesn't it? Secondly, we do LEARN to drive in a verbal way, from
> > >>> instructions, instructors, and ultimately verbal tests. So perhaps we
> > should
> > >>> say that structurally, genetically, yea, even functionally, driving
> is
> > >>> POST-verbal or DE-verbal rather than PRE-verbal. And this DOES
> suggest
> > an
> > >>> INDIRECT relationship to verbal thinking.
> > >>>
> > >>> Here's some other stuff, earlier in the chapter, worth looking at in
> > this
> > >>> context:
> > >>>
> > >>> Так, Бюлер со всей справедливостью говорит: &Lt;Действия шимпанзе
> > >>> совершенно независимы от речи, и в позднейшей жизни человека
> > техническое,
> > >>> инструментальное мышление (Werkzeugdenken) гораздо менее связано с
> > речью и
> > >>> понятиями, чем другие формы мышления&Gt; (13, с. 100). Дальше мы
> должны
> > >>> будем еще возвратиться к этому указанию Бюлера. Мы увидим, что
> > действительно
> > >>> все, чем мы располагаем по этому вопросу из области экспериментальных
> > >>> исследований и клинических наблюдений, говорит за то, что в мышлении
> > >>> взрослого человека отношение
> > >>>
> > >> интеллекта
> > >>
> > >>> и речи не является постоянным и одинаковым для всех функций, для всех
> > >>> форм интеллектуальной и речевой деятельности.
> > >>>
> > >>> So Bühler, (with entire validity), says “The (performances) of the
> > >>> chimpanzee are completely independent from speech, and (in the later
> > life of
> > >>> man) technical, instrument thinking (Werkzeugdenken) is much less
> > connected
> > >>> with speech and with concepts, than other forms of thnking” (13, p.
> > 100).
> > >>> Further on we must again return to this indication of Bühler’s. (We
> > will
> > >>> see), that actually everything that we now have available on this
> > question
> > >>> from the areas of experimental studies and clinical observations
> (will
> > >>> confirm as a point of fact) that in the thinking of the adult person
> > the
> > >>> relation of intellect and speech is neither constant nor identical
> (for
> > all
> > >>> functions) and all forms of intellectual and verbal activity."
> > >>>
> > >>> Again, we can easily imagine that the practical, instantaneous
> problem
> > >>> solving behavior we see in an adult human repairing a car was
> > originally
> > >>> learnt from a repair manual, or from another more expert repairman;
> in
> > other
> > >>> words, at one point the adult human’s thinking was virtually
> identical
> > with
> > >>> written or oral speech and proceeded step by step alongside it.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Finally, take a look at "Tool and Sign in Child Development", Steve
> > >>> (Volume Six). In the first chapter, first section, paragraph 11-12,
> > Vygotsky
> > >>> and Luria go over this same ground. But this time they make an
> > invidious
> > >>> comparison between Kohler, who really tries to show how human the
> chimp
> > is,
> > >>> and Buhler, who is trying to show how chimplike the human is. And
> they
> > draw
> > >>> attention PRECISELY to the MISTAKE of assuming that practical
> > intelligence
> > >>> in later life is language free. Here's what they've got.
> > >>>
> > >>> Эта тенденция остается неизменной и у всех дальнейших исследователей,
> > за
> > >>> небольшими исключениями. В ней наиболее ярко выражена та упомянутая
> > >>> опасность зоологизирования детской психологии, которая, как уже
> > сказано,
> > >>> является господствующей чертой всех исследований в этой области.
> Однако
> > в
> > >>> исследовании Бюлера эта опасность представлена в наименее серьезном
> > виде.
> > >>> Бюлер имеет дело с ребенком до развития речи, и в этом отношении
> > основные
> > >>> условия, необходимые для оправдания психологической параллели между
> > шимпанзе
> > >>> и
> > >>> ребенком, могут быть соблюдены. Правда, Бюлер сам недооценивает
> > значение
> > >>> сходства основных условий, говоря, что действия шимпанзе совершенно
> > >>> независимы от речи и в позднейшей жизни человека техническое,
> > >>> инструментальное мышление в гораздо меньшей степени связано с речью и
> > >>> понятиями, чем другие формы мышления.
> > >>>
> > >>> "This tendency, with a few exceptions, remains unchanged in the work
> of
> > >>> all following investigators. It is here that the danger of what might
> > be
> > >>> called the ‘animalization’ of child psychology, mentioned earlier,
> > finds its
> > >>> clearest expression as the prevalent feature of investigation in this
> > field
> > >>> (see earlier reference). However, this danger is at its smallest in
> > Bühler’s
> > >>> experiments. Bühler deals with the pre-speech period of the child,
> > which
> > >>> makes it possible to fulfill the basic conditions necessary to
> justify
> > the
> > >>> psychological parallel between chimpanzee and child. It is true that
> > Bühler
> > >>> underestimates the importance of the similarities of these basic
> > conditions
> > >>> when he states : ‘The chimpanzee’s activities are totally independent
> > of
> > >>> speech, and in man’s later period of life technical, instrumental
> > thinking
> > >>> is much less connected to speech and concepts than other forms of
> > thought’,”
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>
> > >>
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
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> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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