These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes,
and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving.
Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards.
If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site,
please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes,
and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving.
Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards.
If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site,
please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of
"shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the
word he
wanted to say, and thought,
unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the
embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular,
historically
sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare
we
consider it, ART-i-ficial?
perhaps?
mike
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
wrote:
That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared
meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive
conclusion
that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural
communities."
There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words
below:
"The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense
that we may
all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very
different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal
material
form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of
natural
science is that matter exist independently of human activity,
obedient to
natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to
exist;
it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different
meanings to
one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human
activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of
it. This
is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal
foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a
multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the
community.
Andy
Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter,
or
"unit of analysis" for a study;
We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of
analysis we
use.
one would have to first select an artefact or combination of
artefacts,
(such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of
the said
"community." The point then is that the "community" is *not*
defined by
shared *meanings*;
So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings?
in fact, different components of the "community" may attach
diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word,
symbol, tool,
...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable.
If community is defined by shared meanings, those with
"diametrically
opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural
communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit).
But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever
way
it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts
is the
foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give
us what is
*particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one
and the
same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is
*individual* in
human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis.
The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense
that
we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may
have very
different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite
different
actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict.
Cliff
--