Re: [xmca] Emotion at Work

Work has grabbed me by the neck and is squeezing hard. I need time to read
and think
about these thoughtful messages and to be able to print them out and at
present I have no
printer. I will respond "seichas" as the Russians say, which
means,.......... asap which means.....
mike

On 7/31/07, Steve Gabosch <sgabosch@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> Are~'t you describing a kind of perspectivalism around a single unit of
> analysis? Is this what you (and you,michael) are gesturing toward, or am I
> misunderstanding?
> mike
>
>
>
> This is an interesting question, Mike. If I am grasping what you mean by
> perspectivalism, a term associated with Nietsche, and some pragmatist
> currents, I am probably not leaning in that particular direction too much,
> at least not on purpose. If I have the term's basic meaning right,
> perspectivalism or perspectivism is a type of relativist approach to seeking
> truth that emphasizes that we are always constrained by our perspectives. I
> agree that we are, but only up to a point. In contrast to the somewhat
> pessimistic stance of perspectivism, I am attracted to the more optimistic,
> objectivist stance of classical Marxism, which advocates overcoming the
> limitations of individual perspective and, as part of an ongoing historic
> motion toward human progress, points toward discovering the "objective"
> truth, an always expanding and never fully attainable goal. One could argue
> that there is a definite perspectivism in that outlook, in that our
> perspectives are always necessarily limited by existing conditions, but this
> is a highly qualified perspectivism. I am less inclined to begrudge and
> lament the limitations of our perspectives than I am to have a positive
> perspective on overcoming our limitations.
>
> My sketchy outline of a quest for a "unit of analysis" and "model" of the
> **individual** psychological process - a special study within activity
> theory, and certainly not its only "perspective" - aims at finding the
> mechanisms and emergent processes within and individual by which social
> conditions create subjective conditions, which in turn develop, behave and
> act on those social conditions and subjective conditions. Boiling the
> process down to a sequence defined in simple activity theory categories - a)
> needs/motives, b) emotions/thoughts, c) actions/operations - has its risks
> and limitations, but I think it is necessary to add this kind of abstract
> analysis to our inquiry so we can identify and correct two kinds of common
> errors we encounter in modern social theory.
>
> The first kind of error, typically made by the objectivists, is to offer
> explanations that skip over the subjective conditions and processes, over
> the middle stage "b" in my three step sequence schema. The behaviorists do
> this as a matter of principle, and various forms of "skipping over" and
> "reductionism" are introduced again and again from many perspectives.
> Reductionism runs rampant in social science. Social Darwinism,
> sociobiology, evolutionary psychology are various examples of popular
> reductionist outlooks over the decades. Marxists can also be stalwart
> objectivists and reductionists. They will often speak of class interests
> and objective conditions, and then skip right over the middle area and begin
> speaking on how people behave and act accordingly - "as a result". This
> objectivist limitation of the Marxist movement has been one of its downsides
> for many decades, and has left it open to many criticisms. There has been
> a largescale rebellion against objectivism and reductionism in all its forms
> throughout the social sciences and humanities since the 1960's. The
> "postmodern" tradition has been a leading form this rebellion against
> objectivism and reductionism has taken.
>
> The second error is made by subjectivists, who often offer explanations
> that confuse the cause and effect relationships between the objective and
> subjective, between "being" and "consciousness." In terms of the little
> schema I have introduced, this means confusing the sequence and relationship
> of processes in the first and second "stages," finding ways to use
> observations about the subjective conditions and processes of an individual,
> stage "b" in my schema, to explain the original social conditions in "a".
> This approach is pervasive in modern social theory. Social processes and
> conditions are frequently explained through individual behavior and
> subjective experiences. The social is explained through the individual
> rather than the cultural and historical. Although it is done in a
> sophisticated way, this is essentially what I see happening on the
> theoretical plane, to the extent it is argued that emotional payoffs drive
> motives. Instead of looking to the objective **social** conditions for the
> origin and development of motives, this perspective looks instead to the
> internal **subjective** conditions of an individual to explain their
> motives. The objective cause and effect sequence, the real direction of the
> emergent processes and dialectical dynamics, gets reversed, and subjectivist
> errors pop up left and right.
>
> The objectivists, in skipping over and downplaying the subjective stage,
> tend toward reductionist errors. The subjectivists seek to correct these
> errors by emphasizing the crucial role of the middle stage, the subjective
> processes, in human behavior and activity. But they have problems solving
> the problem of how objective conditions create subjective processes, and the
> objectivists attack them for that - but in doing so, often offer no clear
> solution of their own to how the subjective processes develop. The
> subjectivists then point these severe weaknesses out in their counterattacks
> and defenses. And so the debate has been raging in nearly every area of
> human science and art for a long time.
>
> In part, I think the challenge before CHAT is to embrace the insights
> offered by both objectivism and subjectivism, avoid the errors of both, and
> over time, create a new, grand synthesis. In some ways, this is what
> dialectical materialists like Vygotsky attempted to do, and what I think
> many of the leading writers in CHAT today, including Wolff-Michael, each in
> their own way, are trying very hard to do. Besides the influences of
> dialectical materialism, we also have pragmatism, dialectical phenomenology,
> and other serious trends in social science that are contributing to this
> international dialogue and dialectic. All bring both successes and
> limitations. I see CHAT as becoming a kind of collecting ground for these
> cutting edge ideas to try to combine into something new.
>
> Anyway, back to your question, Mike. I may have gone off on a tangent
> here, misunderstanding how you mean perspectivalism, a term I don't normally
> use. Did I get close to what you meant, or am I missing something?
>
> - Steve
>
>
>
>
>
> At 10:03 PM 7/30/2007 -0300, you wrote:
>
> Steve, with respect to the following I have a question:
> It must be able to a)
> describe the relevant surrounding activity
> systems, and the person's needs and motives
> within those systems (note that these needs and
> motives may be contradictory), b) describe that
> person's internal physical, emotional and
> cognitive processes (also potentially highly
> contradictory), and c) describe the external
> operations, actions and behaviors they carry out
> (which we know by observing ourselves and others
> can also be highly contradictory and not necessarily "on purpose").
> Are~'t you describing a kind of perspectivalism around a single unit of
> analysis? Is this what you (and you,michael) are gesturing toward, or am I
> misunderstanding?
> mike
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 7/30/07, Steve Gabosch <sgabosch@comcast.net> wrote:
> >
> > I see CHAT as being on an historic quest to find
> > a model and a unit of analysis that can outline
> > the essential psychological functions and
> > processes, both internal as well as the more
> > familiar external, of an individual engaged in
> > everyday activities such as work. As
> > Wolff-Michael points out, emotion has generally
> > been left out of previous efforts in CHAT.
> >
> > I think that this coveted model and its
> > accompanying unit of analysis needs to be able to
> > simultaneously describe the essential dynamics of
> > at least three levels of human social and
> > psychological reality. It must be able to a)
> > describe the relevant surrounding activity
> > systems, and the person's needs and motives
> > within those systems (note that these needs and
> > motives may be contradictory), b) describe that
> > person's internal physical, emotional and
> > cognitive processes (also potentially highly
> > contradictory), and c) describe the external
> > operations, actions and behaviors they carry out
> > (which we know by observing ourselves and others
> > can also be highly contradictory and not necessarily "on purpose").
> >
> > With a model and a unit of analysis that can
> > generate coherent simultaneous descriptions of
> > these "levels" of reality, CHAT (a future CHAT,
> > whatever that will look like) could then continue
> > on to provide explanations of human behavior and
> > activity that include an individual's
> > motivations, emotions, thoughts, and actions. (I
> > am leaving out the category "identity" that
> > Michael emphasizes - that is a side discussion in
> > the scheme I am outlining here). Achieving a
> > model and unit of analysis that can provide such
> > an integrated, simultaneous description of the
> > social context, the internal psychological
> > processes, and the external behaviors of an
> > individual in action is a tall order. The
> > ability to do this is an historic quest which all
> > of us that related to the CHAT community are part of, in one way or
> > another.
> >
> > A feature of the model that Michael proposes and
> > begins to outline in his article that bothers me
> > is his suggestion that emotional payoffs drive
> > motivation. This is certainly the common sense
> > view of individual psychology held by most
> > thinking people, that humans are driven by the
> > desire to increase their "emotional valence" and
> > therefore organize their choices of activities to
> > participate in, and the actions they carry out, accordingly.
> >
> > A way to address this difference of perspective
> > is to ask these simple questions: Do we have
> > needs and motives because we are emotional (and
> > cognitive)? Or are we emotional (and cognitive)
> > because we have needs and motives?
> >
> > Michael seems to be answering the first question
> > affirmatively - we have needs and motives because
> > we have emotions, which we strive to increase the
> > valence of. "Motivation arises from the
> > difference between the emotional valence of any
> > present moment and the higher emotional valence
> > at a later moment, to be attained as a
> > consequence of practical action." (pg 60).
> >
> > My inclination is to answer the second question
> > affirmatively - we have emotions, and in fact
> > have the specific emotions that we do at any
> > given time, because we have needs and
> > motives. We have needs and motives because must
> > cope with our contradictory surrounding social
> > environment. This perspective takes the view
> > that the surrounding social environment and its
> > contradictions compel us to have specific but
> > often contradictory needs and motives, which
> > generate conflicting emotions and thoughts within
> > us, which emerge externally as contradictory
> > behaviors, operations, and actions, some of which
> > we are conscious of, some of which we are not.
> >
> > Many of Michael's excellent points and insights
> > are still incorporated in my revision. This is
> > not a matter of one perspective being totally
> > wrong, the other, totally right. Both models can
> > generate important insights and take into account
> > many features of CHAT and many aspects of human
> > psychology, in the workplace and any everyday situation.
> >
> > Methodologically, I would consider this
> > discussion an investigation of the
> > "genetic-historic" relationship of emotion and
> > motive within an activity system. Michael seems
> > to place emotion in the genetic-historic sequence
> > as prior to motive. I place motive as prior to emotion.
> >
> > What would a unit of analysis of either model
> > look like? We like to point to the water
> > molecule as a unit of analysis of that chemical
> > compound. Among other things, this unit clearly
> > expresses itself in all the states of H2O - ice,
> > water, steam. The molecule retains its
> > conceptual cohesiveness in all conditions, in all
> > its transformations. But what unit of analysis
> > can be developed that can remain cohesive through
> > these three socio-psychological levels of reality
> > I am attempting to sketch? What unit of analysis
> > can remain cohesive while it is a set of
> > contradictory needs and motives in one state, a
> > collection of rapidly changing and interacting
> > body processes, emotions and thoughts in another,
> > and then a collection of conscious and
> > unconscious behaviors, actions and operations in a third?
> >
> > Clearly, we need a unit of analysis much more
> > complex than a molecule. In fact, we need what
> > will have to be the most complex unit of analysis
> > ever developed. As I say, this is an historic
> > quest, a long-term challenge. We have quite a
> > distance to go and much to learn.
> >
> > In the meantime, it seems to me we can focus on
> > developing the model, which includes getting the
> > basic components of the model in the right
> > genetic-historic sequence. My inclination is to
> > reverse the order of motive and emotion from that proposed by Michael.
> >
> > Best,
> > - Steve
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > At 09:54 PM 7/29/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> > >Dear Wolff-Michael:
> > >
> > > Yes, I immediately recognized (and
> > > appreciated) the double-entendre in the title.
> > > I also appreciate (now that I think about it)
> > > your remarks about how individual activity
> > > realizes a potential that exists on the
> > > collective level (though I think that is not
> > > ALL it does, else individual creativity would not be possible).
> > >
> > > Once more on Damasio. I found this today in:
> > >
> > > Volosinov, V.N. (1976) ¡°A Critique of
> > > Marxist Apologias of Freudianism¡± In.
> > > Freudianism: A critical sketch. Bloomington and
> > > Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
> > >
> > > Volosinov takes on a number of Marxist
> > > writers who have defended psychoanalysis. He
> > > dismisses with a wave of the hand Trotsky's
> > > remarks in Literature and Revolution (where
> > > Trotsky speculates on the compatibility of
> > > Marxism and psychoanalysis) and he is
> > > particularly hard on Luria's youthful enthusiasm for Freud. On p. 125
> he
> > says:
> > >
> > > ¡°It is an outright falsehood to represent
> > > the doctorine of erogenous zones as an
> > > objective physiological theory. According to
> > > this theory, the body is drawn into the
> > > personality¡¯s mental system, not vice versa.
> > > It is drawn, of course, not as an objective,
> > > external body, but as an experience of things
> > > corporeal, as an aggregate of internal
> > > instincts, desires, and notions. It is, so to
> > > speak, the body seen form the inside out.¡±
> > >
> > > Volosinov continues (pardon my triple quote marks):
> > >
> > > 'The attempt to ascribe an objective
> > > character to the psychoanalytical concept of
> > > "drives" is also completely incorrect. Luria
> > > writes "¡¦for psychoanalysis, drives are not a
> > > purely psychological concept, but have a much
> > > broader sense "¡(r)acting as a bridge between the
> > > mental and the somatic,¡¯ and are more of a
> > > biological nature."' No biologist would agree,
> > > of course, with such an odd definition of the
> > > biological as being a bridge between the soma
> > > and the psyche (¡¦). Thus the psychoanalytic
> > > concept of the whole personality contains not
> > > one objective quantity that would make it
> > > possible for that personality to be
> > > incorporated into the surrounding material
> > > reality fo the natural world. It is no easier
> > > to incorporate it into the objective
> > > socioeconomic process of history. We already
> > > know, after all, that Freud derives all
> > > objective, historical formations (the family,
> > > the tribe, the state, the church and so forth)
> > > from those same subjectively mental roots and that their
> > > existence begins and ends with that same
> > > interplay among internal subjective forces
> > > (power as the ego-ideal; societal solidarity as
> > > mutual identification, given the common nature
> > > of the ego-ideal; capitalism as the sublimation of anal eroticism, and
> > so on.)'
> > >
> > > Thus speaks Volosinov. But it seems to me
> > > that the SAME problem exists with Damasio's
> > > version of the James-Lange theory: it merely
> > > takes the objective world and turns it into
> > > psychological object. Not only is there no
> > > place for the social, there is no place for
> > > material culture as the product of sensuous human activity.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > >
> > >
> > >---------------------------------
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Received on Tue Jul 31 15:52 PDT 2007