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These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes, and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving. Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards. If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site, please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
Mike,
I guess, this Russian "seichas", or even "shchass" (lit. 'now') translated
into Arabic is "bukra" (lit. "tomorrow"). Both, however, are most likely
to mean 'never' ;)... Here it is - cross-cultural temporality :)....
--- Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> Work has grabbed me by the neck and is squeezing hard. I need time to
> read
> and think
> about these thoughtful messages and to be able to print them out and at
> present I have no
> printer. I will respond "seichas" as the Russians say, which
> means,.......... asap which means.....
> mike
>
>
> On 7/31/07, Steve Gabosch <sgabosch@comcast.net> wrote:
> >
> > Are~'t you describing a kind of perspectivalism around a single unit
> of
> > analysis? Is this what you (and you,michael) are gesturing toward, or
> am I
> > misunderstanding?
> > mike
> >
> >
> >
> > This is an interesting question, Mike. If I am grasping what you mean
> by
> > perspectivalism, a term associated with Nietsche, and some pragmatist
> > currents, I am probably not leaning in that particular direction too
> much,
> > at least not on purpose. If I have the term's basic meaning right,
> > perspectivalism or perspectivism is a type of relativist approach to
> seeking
> > truth that emphasizes that we are always constrained by our
> perspectives. I
> > agree that we are, but only up to a point. In contrast to the
> somewhat
> > pessimistic stance of perspectivism, I am attracted to the more
> optimistic,
> > objectivist stance of classical Marxism, which advocates overcoming
> the
> > limitations of individual perspective and, as part of an ongoing
> historic
> > motion toward human progress, points toward discovering the
> "objective"
> > truth, an always expanding and never fully attainable goal. One could
> argue
> > that there is a definite perspectivism in that outlook, in that our
> > perspectives are always necessarily limited by existing conditions,
> but this
> > is a highly qualified perspectivism. I am less inclined to begrudge
> and
> > lament the limitations of our perspectives than I am to have a
> positive
> > perspective on overcoming our limitations.
> >
> > My sketchy outline of a quest for a "unit of analysis" and "model" of
> the
> > **individual** psychological process - a special study within activity
> > theory, and certainly not its only "perspective" - aims at finding the
> > mechanisms and emergent processes within and individual by which
> social
> > conditions create subjective conditions, which in turn develop, behave
> and
> > act on those social conditions and subjective conditions. Boiling the
> > process down to a sequence defined in simple activity theory
> categories - a)
> > needs/motives, b) emotions/thoughts, c) actions/operations - has its
> risks
> > and limitations, but I think it is necessary to add this kind of
> abstract
> > analysis to our inquiry so we can identify and correct two kinds of
> common
> > errors we encounter in modern social theory.
> >
> > The first kind of error, typically made by the objectivists, is to
> offer
> > explanations that skip over the subjective conditions and processes,
> over
> > the middle stage "b" in my three step sequence schema. The
> behaviorists do
> > this as a matter of principle, and various forms of "skipping over"
> and
> > "reductionism" are introduced again and again from many perspectives.
> > Reductionism runs rampant in social science. Social Darwinism,
> > sociobiology, evolutionary psychology are various examples of popular
> > reductionist outlooks over the decades. Marxists can also be stalwart
> > objectivists and reductionists. They will often speak of class
> interests
> > and objective conditions, and then skip right over the middle area and
> begin
> > speaking on how people behave and act accordingly - "as a result".
> This
> > objectivist limitation of the Marxist movement has been one of its
> downsides
> > for many decades, and has left it open to many criticisms. There has
> been
> > a largescale rebellion against objectivism and reductionism in all its
> forms
> > throughout the social sciences and humanities since the 1960's. The
> > "postmodern" tradition has been a leading form this rebellion against
> > objectivism and reductionism has taken.
> >
> > The second error is made by subjectivists, who often offer
> explanations
> > that confuse the cause and effect relationships between the objective
> and
> > subjective, between "being" and "consciousness." In terms of the
> little
> > schema I have introduced, this means confusing the sequence and
> relationship
> > of processes in the first and second "stages," finding ways to use
> > observations about the subjective conditions and processes of an
> individual,
> > stage "b" in my schema, to explain the original social conditions in
> "a".
> > This approach is pervasive in modern social theory. Social processes
> and
> > conditions are frequently explained through individual behavior and
> > subjective experiences. The social is explained through the
> individual
> > rather than the cultural and historical. Although it is done in a
> > sophisticated way, this is essentially what I see happening on the
> > theoretical plane, to the extent it is argued that emotional payoffs
> drive
> > motives. Instead of looking to the objective **social** conditions
> for the
> > origin and development of motives, this perspective looks instead to
> the
> > internal **subjective** conditions of an individual to explain their
> > motives. The objective cause and effect sequence, the real direction
> of the
> > emergent processes and dialectical dynamics, gets reversed, and
> subjectivist
> > errors pop up left and right.
> >
> > The objectivists, in skipping over and downplaying the subjective
> stage,
> > tend toward reductionist errors. The subjectivists seek to correct
> these
> > errors by emphasizing the crucial role of the middle stage, the
> subjective
> > processes, in human behavior and activity. But they have problems
> solving
> > the problem of how objective conditions create subjective processes,
> and the
> > objectivists attack them for that - but in doing so, often offer no
> clear
> > solution of their own to how the subjective processes develop. The
> > subjectivists then point these severe weaknesses out in their
> counterattacks
> > and defenses. And so the debate has been raging in nearly every area
> of
> > human science and art for a long time.
> >
> > In part, I think the challenge before CHAT is to embrace the insights
> > offered by both objectivism and subjectivism, avoid the errors of
> both, and
> > over time, create a new, grand synthesis. In some ways, this is what
> > dialectical materialists like Vygotsky attempted to do, and what I
> think
> > many of the leading writers in CHAT today, including Wolff-Michael,
> each in
> > their own way, are trying very hard to do. Besides the influences of
> > dialectical materialism, we also have pragmatism, dialectical
> phenomenology,
> > and other serious trends in social science that are contributing to
> this
> > international dialogue and dialectic. All bring both successes and
> > limitations. I see CHAT as becoming a kind of collecting ground for
> these
> > cutting edge ideas to try to combine into something new.
> >
> > Anyway, back to your question, Mike. I may have gone off on a tangent
> > here, misunderstanding how you mean perspectivalism, a term I don't
> normally
> > use. Did I get close to what you meant, or am I missing something?
> >
> > - Steve
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > At 10:03 PM 7/30/2007 -0300, you wrote:
> >
> > Steve, with respect to the following I have a question:
> > It must be able to a)
> > describe the relevant surrounding activity
> > systems, and the person's needs and motives
> > within those systems (note that these needs and
> > motives may be contradictory), b) describe that
> > person's internal physical, emotional and
> > cognitive processes (also potentially highly
> > contradictory), and c) describe the external
> > operations, actions and behaviors they carry out
> > (which we know by observing ourselves and others
> > can also be highly contradictory and not necessarily "on purpose").
> > Are~'t you describing a kind of perspectivalism around a single unit
> of
> > analysis? Is this what you (and you,michael) are gesturing toward, or
> am I
> > misunderstanding?
> > mike
> >
>
=== message truncated ===
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Received on Tue Jul 31 16:33 PDT 2007