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On 22 April 2011 02:30, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > Even in this translation, I still see a Marxist talking about *acts* of > thought and speech. So far as I can see you assimilate Vygotsky to language > *fetishism*, in the same sense as Marx criticises fetishism of commodities > in Chapter 1 of /Capital/. That is, you want to ascribe human powers to > words which are material artefacts produced and used by human beings, and do > not have human powers. Modern economics and modern linguistics require this > fetishism, but what attracts me to Vygotsky is that he does not. > > BTW, I don't think one can "use a concept" except in acceptably loose talk. > One can refer to or evoke a concept, but not really use one. One can use a > word, yes, but not a concept. > > I would call that thinking. Or is thinking not an act for you? Off to bed. Huw > Anyway, if you want to talk linguistics, go for it. > > Andy > > > Martin Packer wrote: > >> On Apr 21, 2011, at 10:39 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> Good ol' Lev is never that unambiguous is he, though? Consider this: >>> >>> "This justifies the view that word meaning is an act of speech. In >>> psychological terms, however, word meaning is nothing other than a >>> generalization, that is, a /concept/. In essence, generalization and >>> word meaning are synonyms. Any generalization - any formation of a >>> concept - is unquestionably a specific and true act of thought. Thus >>> word meaning is also a phenomenon of thinking" (Vygotsky Volume 1: 244). >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >> >> Andy, Let me offer this cleaner version of what you have found (basically >> it's David K's 'triangulated' translation). From the start of chapter 7. You >> highlight the word "concept." But notice that the meaning of a word is a >> generalization *from the psychological side.* Words are used, in acts of >> speech and in acts of thought. When a word is used in an act of thought, it >> is to generalize. But that doesn't mean that word meaning in itself is an >> act of thought, or that word meaning itself is a concept. >> >> "We found this unit, showing in simplest form a unity of thought and >> speech, within the meaning of the word [значении слова]. The meaning of the >> word, as we attempted to clarify above, represents a further indecomposable >> unity of the two processes, beyond which we can not say that it represents >> the phenomenon of speech or the phenomenon of thinking. A word devoid of >> meaning is not a word, it is an empty sound, hence meaning is a required, >> constitutive feature of the word. It is the word itself, viewed from the >> inside. Thus, we seem sufficiently entitled to study it as a phenomenon of >> speech. But the meaning of the word from the psychological side, as we have >> been repeatedly convinced in this entire study, is nothing but a >> generalization, or concept. Generalization [Обобщение] and meaning of the >> word are synonymous. Any generalization, any formation of a concept >> [образование понятия], is the most specific, authentic, most obvious act of >> thought. Therefore, we have the right to think of the meaning of the word as >> a phenomenon of thinking. >> >> "The meaning of the word is both a spoken and an intellectual phenomenon, >> and this does not mean a purely external participation in two different >> mental lives. The meaning of the word is a phenomenon of thought only in so >> far as the thought relates to the word and is embodied in the word, and vice >> versa: it is a phenomenon of speech only insofar as it relates to thought >> and is illuminated by its light. It is a phenomenon of verbal thought, or of >> meaningful words; it is the unity of speech and thought." >> >> Martin >> >> >> __________________________________________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Joint Editor MCA: > http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g932564744 > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857 > MIA: http://www.marxists.org > > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca