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On 23 April 2011 21:48, Vera John-Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu> wrote: > Hi, > I have been thinking about this distinction between act and product. Hi Vera, I have generalized my response to process and form. > It seems to me that the process is primary but of course if it were not > engaged with some more stable aspects of our reality, it would ethereal. So > we move, constantly betweenrapid change, slow change, and tempory entities > which reveal no dsicernable change. > I need a bit more context here please, Vera. One way to think of the process/form distinction is the distinction between verb phrases and noun phrases (I'm sorry if this is "teaching to suck eggs", as I was a bit surprised by the "blank looks" from a few responses to this stuff). That is, verb phrases describe systems of action and noun phrases described systems of form. Hence when using a gerund, e.g. the noun 'learning' in "I like learning", we are referring to the classification of acts of learning which, to us, is a system of form, as opposed to instances of learning which is a system of process. For me this has bearing upon language learning (and use) in infants. As far as I can see, the process/form distinction only makes sense if we apply it in the context of agency (i.e regulatory systems). If we have a series of interacting processes and forms: P- F - P - F - P there is nothing to stop us thinking of this as F - P - F - P - F other than our treatment of Form as encoded as a static thing. Even the noun 'process' as in "the process" refers to a thing whose identity does not change with respect to the context of use. > But we do know, that if we think along a long time-scale "products" too > will be processes. This is why I am not afaraid to use the notion of > concept. For me, the most useful notion of concept is concept-as-model. It's not clear to me why it's useful to have a technical name for something that is both concept-as-model and some other meaning without having a unique term for concept-as-model. > Those are minimally changing processes within a particular activity system. > Sorry, I didn't take your reflections any further. An example might help me here. > All this may have been said before, but we are still exploing > concept-activity so this brief message may be relevant. > Yes. Thanks, Huw > Vera > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Huw Lloyd" <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2011 7:40 PM > > Subject: Re: [xmca] activity (was concepts) > > > On 21 April 2011 17:11, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: > > On Apr 21, 2011, at 2:17 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> > * The quotes you give seem to confirm for me that as a unit of an >> activity, "act" is exactly the right term for his use of "word meaning." >> >> >> I would say that making a meaning is an act. That speaking a meaning is > an > act. But that the meaning itself is the product of an act. Likewise, I'd > say that knowing as engaging with meaning is an act. > > > Hi Andy, >> >> LSV nowhere suggests that word meaning is an act. Word meaning, he says, >> is >> the "unity" of thinking and speaking, because when one uses a word (or >> words) in speaking, one is necessarily generalizing, and generalization is >> an act of thinking. That has the consequence, he argues, that by studying >> word meaning as the unit of analysis one is able to investigate the >> (dynamic, complex) relationship between speaking and thinking. >> >> So what is word meaning? >> >> LSV tells us it is the "inner form" of the word. LSV himself used the >> notion of inner form before, in the Psychology of Art, where he explained >> that a word has not two but three basic elements: its sound, or “external >> form”; its meaning or significance [does anyone have the Russian to check >> the translation here?]; and its “inner form.” This third aspect, he says, >> is >> to be understood as the etymological form that expresses the content. It >> is >> often forgotten or displaced. For example, the Russian word for "mouse" >> once >> signified "thief", and only by means of the inner form have the sounds >> acquired the meaning “mouse.” The inner aspect is the “image” that a word >> contains; it can be said to be the link *between* sound and meaning, >> > > > If the ascii 'art' below appears badly formatted, try looking at it in a > fixed sized font (such as courier). > > > Form Process (Act) > ------- ----------------------- > > Meaning > < -- > Make a meaning > -- > > Inner Form > < -- > Make an "impression" > -- > > Sound > < -- > Make a sound (speak a meaning) > > > > between signifier and signified. The fact that LSV could also write of the >> 'inner form' of a statue makes it clear that 'inner' here does not mean >> 'inside'- for there is nothing special inside the marble. The form is >> 'inner' in the sense that it is the 'internal' relation between material >> and >> idea (in the case of the statue) and between sound and meaning (in the >> case >> of the word). It mediates, in other words, between the *material* and the >> *ideal* aspects. >> >> But the term "inner form" is much older. Dilthey pointed out that >> Aristotle >> wrote in his Poetics of the “inner structure” of the tragedy, in an >> analysis >> that LSV knew well. Von Humbolt wrote of “innere Sprachform” as the way a >> language shapes both the perception and the conceptions of its speakers. >> (He >> seems to have been rethinking the Kantian relationship between receptivity >> (sensibility) and creativity (reason); the forms that Kant proposed are >> imposed by mind were, for Von Humbolt, provided by language.) Potebnya >> argued that words carry not only a meaning, but also the past experience >> of >> the individual and the nation, through which all new experience is >> filtered. >> Consequently a word usually has three aspects: an external form, a >> meaning, >> and an internal form. In many cases the internal form is rooted in myth >> and, >> hence, acts as a bridge between folklore and modern language. With time >> the >> consciousness of a word's internal form fades, and one of the tasks of >> literature is to restore this consciousness. >> >> >> Nice work, Martin. I previously interpreted Cassirer's "Mythical form" > (influenced by Humbolt) to be representationally equivalent to feeling, > which, if it holds, implies something like this: > > > Form Act > ---- --- > > Concept > < -- > Thinking > -- > > Inner Form > < -- > Feeling > -- > > Vygotsky's Category? > <-- > Experience > > > > > > An alternative analysis, though, might be that there are systematic >> metaphoric substitutions in any language, such as “love is a journey.” >> This >> of course is Lakoff's example, and Lakoff argues that metaphor is "a >> conceptual system underlying" language, that provides an "ontological >> mapping across conceptual domains." LSV doesn’t seem to be interested in >> metaphor. To raise this point is to risk confusing our discussion, though, >> because what Lakoff calls 'conceptual' here is not what LSV considers >> conceptual. The kind of knowledge that metaphor provides through its >> mappings is what LSV considers to be word meaning. >> >> > > Extrapolated from Beer, Decision and Control, page 111: > > Form Act > ------- ---- > > Isomorphic Identity > <-- > Make a scientific comparison > --> > Analogy > <-- > Make a "philosophical" comparison > --> > Metaphor > <-- > Make a poetic comparison > > > This is not to say that there are no problems with LSV's account of >> word-meaning. One problem is that, if meaning is ‘in’ a word, it is not >> clear how it can differ for child and adult. It turns out that there is a >> considerable literature on this issue in the context of Frege’s >> distinction >> between sense [which LSV translates as 'meaning'] and reference, and it >> suggests one possible solution to the problem. Frege considered senses to >> be >> abstract entities, distinct both from referents, which are real objects, >> and >> from ‘ideas,’ which are psychological. Senses, then, occupy a “third >> realm” >> that is neither mental nor material. LSV did not draw such a clear >> distinction, so that ‘meaning’ for him at one moment seems something >> linguistic, at other times a matter of what someone “thinks.” According to >> most readings of Frege each sign has a single, invariant sense which all >> speakers of a language will “grasp” in the same way. But Frege >> acknowledged >> that people can differ in what they can “bring to mind” of a sense (I'm >> drawing here on the work of philosopher Robert May, at UC Irvine). The >> solution to the problem of framing LSV’s claims in Frege’s terms would be, >> then, to suggest that child and adult necessarily grasp the same sense in >> a >> word or expression (because there is only one sense to grasp), but they >> bring to consciousness different aspects of this sense. >> >> That's quite enough for one message, I think! >> >> >> I don't know Frege and Lackoff is on my shelf unread. Are there > particular > pieces you'd recommend? > > Huw > > > Martin >> >> >> __________________________________________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca